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ABSTRACT 
REFLECTING ON PERFORMANCE FEEDBACK: THE EFFECT OF 
COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING ON SUBSEQUENT LEADER PERFORMANCE 
 by 
Kelly R. Hall 
 
Performance feedback is an integral aspect of facilitating employee learning. 
Despite its importance, research suggests that when that feedback conveys a performance 
discrepancy, subsequent performance does not improve. Researchers have advanced 
reflection as a strategy for increasing feedback effectiveness and have established its 
value for learning and performance improvement. However, these studies have not 
accounted for the effects of specific types of reflection on performance. To this point, the 
current research examines the role of one form of reflection, counterfactual thinking, for 
learning after performance discrepancies. I explored boundary conditions that might 
influence self-focused upward counterfactual thinking—a form of reflection particularly 
important for learning and performance improvement—and examined whether and when 
such thinking influences the relationship between a baseline performance discrepancy 
and subsequent performance. To investigate these issues, I designed, developed, and 
validated a computer simulated leadership skills task and administered it to graduate and 
undergraduate students (N= 169) in a web-based research setting. I tested the proposed 
relationships using conditional process analysis. The results of this study demonstrated 
that when individuals encounter performance discrepancies they might attempt to 
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reconcile such through self-focused upward counterfactual thinking. This research 
represents a step toward an improved understanding of reflection, performance 
discrepancy feedback processing, and subsequent performance effects. 
 
Keywords: Counterfactual thinking, performance feedback, reflection, simulations. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Employee learning has important consequences for individual thought and 
behavior. Employee learning is also vital to the success of an organization; it is 
considered a prerequisite for organizational adaptability and competitiveness (Maurer, 
Pierce, & Shore, 2002). Due to its importance, companies devote significant resources to 
learning. For example, in 2012, organizations in the United States invested  $164 billion 
in learning initiatives (Miller, 2013).  
One of the most integral aspects of facilitating employee learning is providing 
feedback (Kuchinke, 2000). Feedback is any information regarding the effectiveness of 
an individual’s behavior (Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979). Although feedback is ubiquitous 
in organizations (Kinicki, Prussia, Wu, & McKee-Ryan, 2004), there are multiple 
characteristics that can make any one instance of feedback unique. For example, feedback 
may convey goal attainment (i.e. positive feedback) or it may convey a performance 
discrepancy (i.e. negative/corrective feedback) (Ilgen et al., 1979). Recent findings 
suggest that up to 90% of employees believe that receiving feedback about their 
performance discrepancies is critical for performance improvement, and more than 50% 
indicate they would prefer to receive such feedback to praise (Zenger & Folkman, 2015). 
While many employees prefer corrective feedback, and it is vital for organizations to 
provide it to employees, there is little evidence that providing such feedback actually 
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leads to performance improvement (e.g. Anseel & Lievens, 2006; Kluger & DeNisi, 
1996).  
The influence of feedback on performance has been investigated for nearly a 
century (Arps, 1917), and we know that when individuals encounter performance 
discrepancies, they may respond with self-enhancement strivings. Self-enhancement 
strivings are strivings that drive individuals to protect themselves from threatening 
information (e.g. corrective feedback) and increase favorable self-views (Sedikides & 
Strube, 1997). Self-enhancement strivings may lead one to dismiss corrective feedback, 
which can inhibit learning processes and subsequently maintain or lower performance 
levels (Anseel & Lievens, 2006; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). Thus, it is important to identify 
strategies that reduce such strivings and increase feedback effectiveness (Kinicki et al., 
2004). To this point, encouraging feedback recipients to actively process and elaborate on 
feedback has been proposed as a way to reduce self-enhancement strivings and to 
increase the acceptance of unfavorable feedback (Anseel & Lievens, 2006). 
Recently, scholars have positioned reflection as a learning intervention that can 
help employees process feedback and experiences, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
learning, behavior change, and performance improvement (e.g. Anseel, Lievens, & 
Schollaert, 2009; DeRue, Nahrgang, Hollenbeck, & Workman, 2012; Ellis, Carette, 
Anseel, & Lievens, 2014). Reflection has long been regarded as a critical component of 
the learning process (Dewey, 1933). Through probing cause and effect, questioning 
assumptions, and analyzing the meaning of experiences, one can increase his or her 
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awareness of personal experiences and therefore his or her ability to learn from those 
experiences (Ashford & DeRue, 2012; Hullfish & Smith, 1961). Scholars have found 
positive effects of reflective techniques in the feedback-performance relationship (e.g. 
Anseel et al., 2009; Ellis et al., 2014; Villado & Arthur, 2013). Such findings have been 
reported for individual written reflection strategies and structured group reflections (e.g. 
after-event-reviews).  
Despite the positive effects of reflection on learning, we know little about 
situational and contextual factors that support or hinder reflection in the workplace. To 
better understand the effects of reflection on employee learning and its role in feedback 
processing, I suggest that it is important to identify boundary conditions that prompt 
individuals to reflect and those that may accentuate or attenuate the effects of reflection 
on performance. Extant literature offers limited insight into such issues as of yet. Thus, 
the conceptual basis for evaluating learning through reflection is incomplete.   
The purpose of the current research is to offer a more complete picture of the 
effects of reflection. To this end, I will explore counterfactual thinking, a form of 
reflection that has received insufficient attention in management studies (Ellis et al., 
2014), as well as its effects on a key learning outcome, performance. Counterfactual 
thoughts are mental representations of alternatives to past events, actions, or states 
(Byrne, 2005; Roese, 1997). Prior management studies (e.g. Anseel et al., 2009; DeRue et 
al., 2012; Ellis & Davidi, 2005; Ellis, Ganzach, Castle, & Sekely, 2010; Ellis, Mendel, & 
Aloni-Zohar, 2009; Ellis, Mendel, & Nir, 2006) have not empirically examined how 
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counterfactual thoughts influence the ways in which one learns from and responds to 
feedback and experiences; yet, it is important to do so. 
Counterfactual thinking is a core feature of human cognition (Sanna & Chang, 
2003). Neural networks monitor counterfactual experiences and outcomes—similar to the 
monitoring of direct experiences (Platt & Hayden, 2011). When individuals engage in 
reflection, they not only consider what they did do, but also what could or should have 
been done (Epstude & Roese, 2008). Counterfactual thoughts can enhance awareness of 
what could have ensued from alternate behavioral choices (Boorman, Behrens, & 
Rushworth, 2011). This is important because, often, performance is improved by altering 
past performance strategies (Ilgen & Davis, 2000). Therefore, I argue that counterfactual 
thinking, which can illuminate such strategies and enhance motivation, warrants 
empirical attention.  
Though not empirically examined in extant management literature, the potential 
value of counterfactual thinking has been acknowledged by management scholars (Ellis 
et al., 2014). Specifically, counterfactual thinking is thought to help learners overcome 
perception biases and adjust mental models. These same scholars, as well as others 
(DeRue et al., 2012), highlight the need to better understand how counterfactual thinking 
contributes to reflective learning and development. Furthering this understanding will not 
only provide insight on cognitive mechanisms that influence how one learns from 
feedback; it is also expected to provide insight on how to improve responses to corrective 
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feedback that conveys performance discrepancies, an important issue to researchers and 
managers alike. 
To these points, it is important to consider whether reflecting on alternate courses 
of actions reduce dismissal of such feedback and, instead, lead to performance 
improvement. Likewise, it is important to consider what determines whether the recipient 
will act on lessons learned to improve performance. To address these questions, I argue 
that scholars must look beyond constructs considered in traditional feedback process 
models (Fedor, Davis, Maslyn, & Mathieson, 2001; Ilgen et al., 1979; Kluger & DeNisi, 
1996; Nadler, 1979). While there is empirical support for a fundamental proposition of 
such models (i.e. individuals go through a series of cognitive evaluations before 
responding to feedback), the models have been better predictors of responses to favorable 
feedback than to unfavorable feedback (Kinicki et al., 2004). Thus, when examining 
corrective feedback that highlights performance discrepancies, other cognitive processes 
must be considered.  
Scholars contented that when individuals encounter corrective feedback on 
performance discrepancies, they will work harder (e.g. expend more effort, persist, and 
focus on the task) if the feedback triggers motivational processes (Kluger & DeNisi, 
1996).  Many times, it does not. Moreover, most individuals will not try to determine 
why their performance strategies failed or generate ideas for improved performance, until 
after they have exhausted a ‘work harder’ strategy (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). Here, we 
see an inherent challenge of corrective feedback. If we struggle to get individuals to work 
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harder when they encounter a performance discrepancy, how then, can we get them to 
work smarter?  
I suggest that, when prompted to reflect on alternate behaviors and work 
strategies, as well as potential outcomes of such, it may help individuals overcome the 
breakdown that frequently occurs between the receipt of corrective feedback and 
intentions to respond to the feedback. I propose to integrate established theory from the 
psychology field—the functional theory of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 
2008)—to investigate how counterfactual thinking influences feedback processing and 
subsequent performance.  
The current research will contribute to both the reflective learning and feedback 
literatures. This research untangles counterfactual thinking from other aspects of 
reflection, such as self-explanation, wherein learners explain behaviors they did 
implement. Past management research has not accounted for the unique impact of 
counterfactuals on performance and, to date, reflection studies in the management 
literature have largely emphasized conversational forms of reflection such as after-event-
reviews (e.g. Ellis et al., 2014). Contextual factors, expected to exert distinct effects on 
counterfactual generation, are also investigated. The result is expected to be an improved 
understanding of reflection processes and effects on performance. Finally, the current 
research considers the indirect effect of counterfactual thinking in processing feedback 
that conveys performance discrepancies, which is expected to reduce the dismissal of 
such feedback and lead to improved performance. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
To better understand how reflection can influence feedback processing and 
learning, this research examines the effects of counterfactual thinking on learning 
following performance discrepancies. In this chapter, I will present a review of learning 
literature and propose a model that focuses on boundary conditions that influence 
counterfactual thinking and when such thinking affects task performance. Specifically, 
chapter two is organized into five sections. 
The first section provides a review of the feedback literature with an emphasis on 
the functions of feedback, its effects on performance, two feedback characteristics—sign 
and specificity, as well as feedback process models. The second section reviews 
reflection, particularly its contribution to learning and how reflection has been integrated 
into management studies. In the third section, I narrow down to a specific form of 
reflection, counterfactual thinking, and provide a detailed review of findings from the 
psychology literature. The fourth section presents the functional theory of counterfactual 
thinking to illustrate how counterfactuals can impact how individuals may process 
feedback that conveys performance discrepancies and subsequent behaviors. The last 
section includes the proposed boundary conditions that influence counterfactual thinking, 
as well as its effect on performance, and I advance the conceptual framework through the 
development of hypotheses.  
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Feedback 
 Feedback is ubiquitous in organizations (Kinicki et al., 2004), and it is a core job 
characteristic according to Hackman and Oldham’s (1976) theory of work design 
(Hackman & Lawler, 1971; Hackman & Oldham, 1976). It has been defined as any 
information regarding the effectiveness of an individual’s behavior (Ilgen et al., 1979). 
Feedback may be initiated by an external agent (e.g. manager, supervisor, etc.), or 
individuals may proactively seek feedback by monitoring the environment or requesting 
feedback (i.e. feedback inquiry) (Ashford & Cummings, 1983; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). 
Receiving feedback is important; it provides critical information about employees’ work 
behaviors. For instance, feedback helps employees know if their behaviors are correct, 
accurate, and adequate (Bourne, 1957; Earley, Northcraft, Lee, & Lituchy, 1990). Thus, 
feedback reduces uncertainty and signals the relative importance of goals in a workplace 
(Ashford & Cummings, 1983). Through feedback, employees can gain information about 
performance outcomes (i.e. outcome feedback) and on strategies used to obtain the 
outcomes (i.e. process feedback) (Earley et al., 1990). 
 
Functions of Feedback. 
 Feedback serves multiple purposes, including directive, incentive, and 
motivational functions (Payne & Hauty, 1955; Vroom, 1964). Most individuals, at some 
point, have lacked clarity in their jobs. By providing direction and clarifying roles, 
feedback can help employees overcome this challenge. Similarly, employees may find 
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themselves questioning the need to engage in certain behaviors or thinking ‘what’s in it 
for me?’ The incentive function of feedback addresses such issues by signaling expected 
payoffs for engaging in various workplace behaviors. Feedback can also ignite 
motivation processes, as it contains referent information that can help employees meet 
goals (Herold & Greller, 1977), as well as higher-order needs (Deci & Ryan, 1992; 
Hackman & Oldham, 1976). By providing performance discrepancy information and 
increasing employees’ awareness of their performance, feedback can influence self-
efficacy (Bandura & Cervone, 1983), goal commitment (Latham & Locke, 1991), and 
can provide employees with a sense of accomplishment and personal control over their 
jobs (Deci, 1975; Earley et al., 1990). The numerous effects of feedback make it an 
important organizational and individual resource that has meaningful implications for 
learning and performance in the workplace (Ashford & Cummings, 1983).     
 
Feedback Characteristics: Sign and Specificity. 
 Although feedback is common in organizations, there are a number of 
characteristics that make any one instance of feedback unique. Feedback sign and 
feedback specificity are two such characteristics. Feedback sign refers to the extent to 
which the feedback is positive (i.e. favorable; goal attainment) or negative (i.e. 
unfavorable; performance discrepancy) (Ilgen et al., 1979).  Feedback specificity refers to 
the level of information presented in the feedback message (Goodman et al., 2004; 2011). 
In the following sections, I will review these two feedback characteristics.  
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Feedback sign. The sign of feedback captures its positive or negative nature. This 
feedback characteristic has received a substantial amount of scholarly attention (Kluger 
& DeNisi, 1996). Through such efforts, researchers have determined that sign can affect 
many outcomes, including a recipient’s performance, recollection, perceptions of 
accuracy, and the overall processing of feedback (Fedor et al., 2001; Ilgen et al., 1979; 
Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Smither, Brett, & Atwater, 2007). An example of this can be 
seen in Smither et al.’s (2007) study. These scholars examined recipients’ recollection of 
feedback, nine months following the feedback intervention, and found that individuals 
were able to recall positive feedback more than negative feedback. This may be the result 
of individuals’ tendencies to deny and reject negative feedback (Ilgen et al., 1979).  
 As may be expected, individuals typically view positive feedback more favorably 
than negative feedback. This assessment can impact one’s mood, such that favorable 
feedback commonly leads to positive affect and unfavorable feedback leads to negative 
affect (Ilgen et al., 1979). Recognizing that mood may, in turn, influence the receipt of 
feedback, researchers turned their attention to this relationship.  
In a social perception task experiment, Ingram (1984) primed participants with 
positive and negative moods to determine the impacts on processing favorable and 
unfavorable feedback. Findings revealed that mood and favorability interact to influence 
how feedback is processed. Those primed with a negative mood experience prior to 
receiving unfavorable feedback, had longer reaction times and recalled more of the 
feedback than those who were not primed. Ingram argued that for feedback to be fully 
11 
 
 
 
processed and comprehended, it must be processed at a deep level. In Ingram’s study, this 
was facilitated by ensuring subjects were presented with mood-consistent feedback 
details (Bower, 1981). In other words, individuals were presented with unfavorable 
feedback when they were in negative moods, thus there was an alignment between mood 
state and feedback sign.     
 Although Ingram’s study provided insight regarding the influence of mood on 
feedback processes, these effects are not invariable. In fact, the relationship is believed to 
be quite complex and, in some cases, moods have no impact or may have mood-
incongruent effects. For example, negative moods, resulting from unfavorable feedback, 
may lead to increased motivation, while the reverse being true for positive moods (for a 
detailed discussion of the affect infusion model see Forgas & George, 2001). Basically, 
what is relevant is that information processing strategies can impact the magnification, 
elimination, or reversal of transient mood states that influence the receipt of feedback 
(Forgas, 1995). 
 Kluger and DeNisi (1996) reviewed research on the inconsistent effects of 
feedback sign on performance and offered a theoretical explanation for how feedback 
sign may lead to varying outcomes. According to these scholars, positive feedback may 
signal that an opportunity for self-enhancement is present which can result in task-
motivation processes. Through these processes, the feedback recipient can be prompted 
to raise the standard for performance and to improve future performance. Alternatively, 
feedback can also attenuate performance effects. Kluger and DeNisi (1996) suggest that 
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attenuation effects occur when feedback shifts attention to oneself, affective reactions, or 
framing effects. They argue that these attentional shifts deplete cognitive resources, 
hinder performance, and may cause the feedback recipient to maintain the performance 
standard, rather than seeking a higher performance goal. These effects are concerning, 
especially in the case of a performance discrepancy, as feedback details and the 
development of alternative work strategies for performance improvement fade into the 
background of one’s thought processes (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). 
 Krenn, Würth, & Hergovich (2013) found support for some of Kluger & DeNisi’s 
(1996) theoretical arguments. During a selective attention task, participants were given 
the option to raise the task difficulty level following feedback. Those who received 
positive feedback were more likely to raise the standard; whereas, those who received 
negative feedback were more likely to maintain the standard. Yet, interestingly, when 
performance scores from round one and round two of the study were compared, there 
were no significant performance improvements for those who chose to raise the 
performance standard following negative feedback. It appears that, perhaps, subjects had 
the motivation to increase the standard, though they lacked a performance improvement 
strategy. Other subjects, who chose to maintain the standard (i.e. the task difficulty level) 
following negative feedback, also struggled with subsequent performance efforts. For 
these individuals, performance levels across rounds remained constant and, in some 
cases, worsened. Ultimately, while feedback sign provides important cues about task-goal 
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discrepancies, empirical findings on the effect of feedback sign on performance have 
been inconsistent (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). 
 Feedback specificity. Feedback can vary based on the level of information 
presented in the feedback message, otherwise known as feedback specificity (Goodman 
et al., 2004). Earley et al. (1990) compared the effects of varying levels of feedback 
specificity during a stock investment simulation. More precisely, they assessed how such 
influences the relationships between feedback and goal-setting, self-confidence, effort, 
and appropriateness of information search. Their study showed that specific feedback 
rather than less specific feedback, appeared to be a more effective way to shape one’s 
task strategy. Fedor (1991) supported this position and argued that specific feedback 
prevents uncertainty about how individuals should respond to the feedback.  
Despite support for the value of specific feedback, Kluger and DeNisi (1996) 
suggested that the effects of feedback specificity are less clear. They argued that while 
there does appear to be a link between feedback specificity and learning, one should not 
assume that specific feedback always leads to learning, as empirical data suggest 
otherwise. In some cases, feedback can be too specific and/or the specific information 
may conflict with the recipient’s natural cognitive representation of the task. As a result, 
specific feedback may impede learning and performance (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). This 
presents a challenge for those tasked with providing feedback—low feedback specificity 
may leave the recipient feeling uncertain, while high specificity may hinder learning 
processes. 
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Research by Davis, Carson, Ammeter, & Treadway (2005), as well as Goodman 
and colleagues (2004, 2011), further highlight the complexities of feedback specificity. 
Davis et al. (2005) found that specific feedback was more effective for those with a 
performance goal orientation, whereas it was less effective for those with a learning 
orientation. Feedback specificity has also been shown to negatively impact exploratory 
behavior, learning, and transfer of training (Goodman et al., 2004, 2011). From this 
research, one may question if less specific feedback is more beneficial in situations that 
call for corrective action (e.g. performance discrepancies).  
Feys, Anseel, & Wille (2011) revealed findings that may help to answer such a 
question. These scholars examined the influence of feedback specificity on initial 
feedback reactions—a critical component of feedback processing. They found that 
unfavorable reactions to negative feedback were more pronounced as information 
specificity increased. Based on this finding, Feys et al. cautioned the use of high 
specificity feedback and suggested that less specific feedback, combined with guided 
reflection, may be more beneficial for recipients of unfavorable feedback.  
In spite of the contradictory findings regarding the benefits of specific feedback, 
managers are still trained and encouraged to give specific feedback (Goodman et al., 
2004; Tyler, 2012). Could this practice actually be hindering the learning and 
development of current and future leaders? To consider this possibility, it is important to 
review how employees process feedback. 
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 While the focus throughout this section has been on feedback sign and specificity, 
some details of feedback processing have emerged. In the following section, I will 
elaborate on feedback process models and provide a richer understanding of the cognitive 
steps one is believed to go through upon receiving feedback.  
 
Feedback Process Models. 
 Feedback is not a simple stimulus (Ilgen et al., 1979), nor is the overall feedback 
process. Scholars have identified cognitive processes that are believed to mediate the 
relationship between the receipt of feedback and the response to feedback. While there 
are multiple theoretical models that present this process (e.g. Fedor, 1991; Ilgen et al., 
1979; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Taylor et al., 1984), I will review two—Kluger & 
DeNisi’s (1996) model and Ilgen et al.’s (1979) model.  
I limit the review to the aforementioned models for specific reasons. Although, 
Kluger & DeNisi’s model, compared to other models, is complex and less amendable to 
advanced statistical processes (Kinicki et al., 2004), it does provide theoretical arguments 
that are specific to learning. Because learning is a focal point of the current study, Kluger 
and DeNisi’s arguments are worth noting. Similarly, Ilgen et al.’s model can also add 
value to the current discussion. It is the foundation of the other feedback process models 
and a parsimonious representation of the cognitive steps in the feedback process. 
Moreover, Ilgen et al.’s model has undergone a longitudinal examination (Kinicki et al., 
2004), wherein the mediating role of cognitive variables in the feedback process was 
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empirically tested using covariance structure analysis. In contrast, variables from other 
models (Fedor et al., 1991; Taylor et al., 1984) have been used in bivariate studies, and 
the evaluation of psychometric properties of the variables in such studies has been less 
robust (Kinicki et al., 2004).  
Kluger & DeNisi’s (1996) feedback intervention theory. Recall that Kluger & 
DeNisi conducted a meta-analysis that revealed that over a third of feedback 
interventions decreased performance. This finding, which could not be explained by 
sampling error, feedback sign, or established theories, led to the proposal of the feedback 
intervention theory (FIT). The FIT offers an explanation as to how feedback is 
cognitively processed and how such processing influences one’s response to feedback. 
Kluger & DeNisi argue that behavior is regulated through comparisons of 
feedback to goals and standards, of which there are many. These goals and standards are 
organized by the individual hierarchically and, upon receiving feedback, individuals shift 
their locus of attention to varying levels of the hierarchy. The hierarchy progresses from 
task-learning processes (i.e. involving details of the task) to task-motivation (i.e. 
involving the focal task) and, finally, meta-task processes (i.e. involving the self). These 
three types of processes can impact feedback effectiveness in unique ways. 
A core assumption of FIT is that feedback interventions command significant 
cognitive resources; yet, individual attention is limited. Feedback cues, the nature of the 
task, and situational and personality variables impact how one’s limited attention is 
allocated to the hierarchical processes. When attention is directed toward the self, meta-
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task processes are activated, and these processes attenuate the effects of feedback on 
performance. An example of such processes is the activation of affective responses. In 
contrast, attention directed to task-motivation processes can lead to increased effort and 
persistence. For instance, task-motivation processes can prompt the feedback recipient to 
compare the feedback to the task standard, which ultimately contributes to improved 
performance. However, in some cases, task-motivation processes are inadequate to 
eliminate the feedback-standard discrepancy. As a result, attention may shift to task-
learning processes (e.g. increased cognitive elaboration of feedback). Task-learning 
processes help individuals develop working hypotheses and evaluations of their 
behaviors, as well as develop task-specific strategies.  
Enhancing the effects of feedback on performance is important, particularly in the 
case of a performance discrepancy.  Strategies for responding to such feedback are to: 1) 
increase effort, 2) abandon the standard, 3) change (i.e. lower) the standard, or 4) reject 
the feedback (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). Through their arguments, Kluger and DeNisi 
(1996) highlight some of the challenges associated with corrective feedback. Corrective 
feedback, shown to lead to affective reactions (Ilgen et al., 1979), can divert attention up 
the hierarchy and further away from details of the task. This can hinder task-motivation 
processes, the link to task-learning processes. When task-learning processes are not 
activated, it can prevent one from identifying improvement strategies and may 
subsequently decrease the likelihood of reducing the feedback-standard discrepancy. 
Taken together, these findings suggest it may be less likely for recipients of corrective 
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feedback to increase effort and more likely for them to focus on affective reactions or to 
disregard the feedback. This is critical given that managers cannot avoid giving negative 
or constructive feedback to employees, and employees’ responses to such feedback are 
pivotal for performance (Kinicki et al., 2004).  
 Krenn et al. (2013) lent partial support for the feedback intervention theory. Their 
study showed that individuals were more likely to raise the standard following positive 
feedback; however, there were no significant performance differences for those who 
raised standards following positive feedback and those who maintained standards. In 
contrast, corrective feedback was shown to lead to avoidance behaviors and no 
significant performance improvements, even when recipients chose to practice and 
maintain the standard. Again, this sheds light on the importance of identifying strategies 
that may assist individuals with tapping into the benefits of task-learning processes.  
Ilgen et al.’s (1979) feedback process model. Ilgen et al. (1979) view the feedback 
recipient as a processor of information. Specifically, as individuals receive feedback, they 
process the information through a series of sequential cognitive steps that include: 
perception of feedback, acceptance of feedback, desire to respond, and intended response. 
Depending on the outcome of such processing, feedback may or may not lead to the 
desired behavior.  
 Perception of feedback refers to the extent to which the recipient perceives that 
feedback is an accurate representation of his or her behavior and, thus, influences the 
acceptance of feedback (Ilgen et al., 1979). These scholars argued that when individuals 
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receive timely, consistent, positive, and specific feedback from a credible and trustworthy 
source, they are likely to perceive the feedback as accurate and to accept the feedback. 
Individual differences, such as locus of control and self-esteem, can also exert an 
influence on the perceptions of feedback and feedback acceptance.  
Feedback acceptance prompts a desire to respond to the feedback.  A recipient’s 
desire to respond is believed to be influenced by the extent to which the feedback 
conveys a sense of competence and personal control to the recipient, as well as provides 
information about extrinsic rewards associated with the use of feedback. The desire to 
respond leads to behavioral intentions. Thus, Ilgen et al. (1979) argued that cognitive 
processes mediate the relationship between receipt of feedback and response to feedback.  
As noted earlier, Kinicki et al. (2004) tested the Ilgen et al. feedback process 
model using covariance structure analysis. This was the first complete test of the 
proposition that individuals go through a series of cognitive evaluations prior to 
responding to feedback. Consistent with Ilgen et al.’s (1979) model, Kinicki et al. found 
strong support for the mediating properties of the cognitive chain. However, in their 
empirical test, a gestalt of feedback characteristics—frequency, specificity, and sign 
(positive)—was formed to develop a feedback-rich environment construct. In a feedback-
rich environment, individuals receive frequent, specific, and positive feedback. Kinicki et 
al. (2004) demonstrated that when the feedback environment is rich, individuals are more 
likely to perceive the feedback as accurate. While this finding is important, it does not 
help to explain corrective feedback processing. To this point, there is a need for further 
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research that focuses on deep level cognitive processes that mediate the processing of 
feedback that conveys performance discrepancies.  
From Kinicki et al.’s findings, it seems clear that cognitive processes play a 
critical role in how individuals respond to feedback. What remains less clear, however, is 
how to help employees overcome attitudinal and behavioral resistance to feedback that 
conveys performance discrepancy information (Kinicki et al., 2004). As discussed earlier, 
feedback is not always positive, as was represented in the feedback-rich environment 
construct, and past findings (Ilgen et al., 1979), as well as theory (e.g. self-consistency; 
self-enhancement), support the notion that individuals are less likely to perceive 
corrective feedback as accurate and therefore less likely to accept it. It is also not clear if 
specific feedback is the best option when providing corrective feedback. Given that 
feedback specificity may conflict with one’s natural cognitive representation of the task 
(Kluger & DeNisi, 1996), is it plausible that specific feedback may obstruct some of the 
cognitive processes that mediate the relationship between the receipt of feedback and 
how one responds to feedback?   
 Scholars have argued that it is important for feedback to be processed at a deep 
level (Ingram, 1984), and this seems particularly true for processing feedback that 
highlights performance discrepancies and conveys the need for corrective actions. Thus, I 
argue that strategies that enhance deep-level information processing should be explored 
as a means to enhance the effectiveness of feedback. One process that can help achieve 
this is reflection.     
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Reflection 
Reflection, a critical component of organizational learning and development 
(Argyris & Schön, 1974; Busby, 1999) has roots in ancient history (Daudelin, 1997) and 
has long been advocated (Dewey, 1933) as a way to enhance learning processes. Though 
several terms and definitions of reflection have been offered (see Table 1 for a sample), 
most emphasize deep level processes that help individuals analyze behaviors and gain 
awareness of their experiences. Such processes can enable learners to reframe their 
knowledge base (Raelin, 2007) and consequently may lead to new perspectives that 
influence behavior. Reflection has been a popular topic of inquiry in educational research 
(Fund, Court, & Kramarski, 2002; Kolb, 1983; Moon, 1999; Ryan & Ryan, 2013), as can 
be seen in influential learning theories, such as experiential learning theory (Kolb, 1983). 
Though, somewhat recently, management scholars have acknowledged its value in 
processing feedback and experiences, as well as leadership development (e.g. Anseel et 
al., 2009: Ellis et al., 2014). To better understand the value of reflection, this section 
reviews reflection studies in the management literature. 
Table 1  
Reflection Terminology & Definitions 
Term  Source Definition 
Reflection Anseel et al., 
2009; Hullfish & 
Smith, 1961 
A cognitive process in which a person 
attempts to increase his or her awareness of 
personal experiences and therefore his or 
her ability to learn from those experiences 
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Term  Source Definition 
Reflection Boud et al., 1985 A generic term for those intellectual and 
affective activities in which individuals 
engage to explore their experiences in order 
to lead to new understandings and 
appreciation 
Reflective thought Dewey, 1933 Active, persistent, and careful 
consideration, of any belief or supposed 
form of knowledge in the light of the 
grounds that support it, and the further 
conclusions to which it tends 
Systematic reflection Ellis & Davidi, 
2005 
A learning procedure during which learners 
comprehensively analyze their behavior and 
evaluate the contribution of its components 
to performance outcomes 
Reflection Matthew & 
Sternberg, 2009 
A process of guided critical thinking that 
directs attention selectively to various 
aspects of experience, making knowledge 
typically acquired without conscious 
awareness explicit and available for 
examination and modification  
Reflection Mezirow, 1990 The assessment of assumptions implicit in 
beliefs about how to solve problems 
Reflection Raelin, 2002 The practice of periodically stepping back 
to ponder the meaning of what has recently 
transpired to ourselves and to others in our 
immediate environment 
 
Reflection Studies in Management Literature. 
 Over the last decade, there has been a stream of management research that has 
examined the role of reflection in learning from feedback and experiences. Ellis and 
colleagues (Ellis & Davidi, 2005; Ellis et al., 2006, 2009, 2010, 2014) have been at the 
forefront of this research, and their studies have demonstrated the value of systematically 
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reviewing experiences through after-event-reviews (AERs)—an organizational learning 
procedure that gives learners an opportunity to systematically analyze their behavior, as 
well as its contributions to performance outcomes. AERs provide learners with the 
opportunity to engage in a series of processes that are designed to contribute to learning 
and performance improvements. During the self-explanation process, learners analyze 
their behaviors and develop explanations for past performance; while, the data 
verification process engages counterfactual thinking, wherein learners consider alternate 
courses of action. Learners also benefit from feedback processes—during reflection, 
learners self-generate feedback that can contribute to learning. In contrast to definitions 
found in the feedback literature (e.g. Ilgen et al., 1979), Ellis & Davidi (2005) refer to 
feedback as “information with which a learner can confirm, overwrite, tune, or 
restructure information in memory, whether that information is domain knowledge, 
metacognitive knowledge, beliefs about self and task, or cognitive tactics and strategies” 
(p. 859). Thus, there are numerous potential outcomes of after-event-reviews.  
 After-event-reviews can influence motivational, cognitive, and behavioral 
outcomes. Specifically, AERs have been shown to increase self-efficacy, enhance mental 
models of events, and lead to improved task performance (Ellis et al, 2014). Through the 
Ellis et al. studies, we have learned that focusing on wrong actions is most effective when 
reflecting on successful events, any reflection foci (i.e. right or wrong actions) is effective 
when reflecting on failed events, and personal and filmed AERs are equally effective for 
performance improvement. Furthermore, AERs have been shown to be more effective 
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when learners make internal and specific, rather than external and general, attributions for 
their performance (Ellis et al., 2006).  
 In contrast to after-event-reviews operationalized as structured group reflections, 
Anseel et al. (2009) examined individual written reflections as a strategy to improve task 
performance following feedback. Their findings revealed that reflection following 
feedback enhanced performance more than feedback alone. Reflection without feedback 
did not yield significant performance improvements.  
 This research provides further support for the benefits of reflection, but is 
reflection effective for everyone? Anseel et al. (2009) found that individual differences 
influence the effectiveness of written reflections. Specifically, the strategy was less 
effective for those low in learning orientation and those low in need for cognition. When 
participants were low in these traits, they engaged less in reflection. Likewise, the 
strategy was less effective for those who reported that the task was not personally 
important to them.  
Although, Anseel et al.’s study did not investigate whether individual written 
reflections are more effective for performance improvement than are group reflections, 
other studies have explored such. Daudelin (1996), as well as Gurtner, Tschan, Semmer, 
& Nägele (2007), found individual written reflections to be superior to group reflections. 
Group reflection discussions may distract individuals from focusing on helpful 
performance strategies, and the reflective thoughts may be less specific than those 
generated during written reflections (Daudelin, 1996). Thus, individual reflective 
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processes, which help individuals explore performance outcomes, may be particularly 
beneficial for enhancing the effectiveness of corrective feedback.   
 In sum, reflection studies in the management literature have offered support for 
the value of reflection as a learning intervention. However, important questions remain 
unanswered. Existing studies have not accounted for the unique contributions of specific 
forms of reflection to learning. For example, recall that reflection is believed to be 
facilitated through self-explanation, data verification (i.e. counterfactual thinking), and 
self-feedback processes. Are some of these processes more effective for certain types of 
feedback (e.g. corrective feedback)? We do not yet know, as studies have not 
disentangled these processes from each other (Ellis et al., 2014).  
 I argue that counterfactual thinking is an important form of reflection, especially 
for processing feedback on performance discrepancies, and should be examined 
independently from other forms of reflection. Counterfactual thinking is a common 
feature of human cognition (Sanna & Turley, 1996) that can be particularly active when 
individuals experience negative affect or identify problems (Epstude & Roese, 2008)—
outcomes often associated with the receipt of corrective feedback (Ilgen et al., 1979).  
This leads one to ask—can the effectiveness of corrective feedback on subsequent 
performance be enhanced through counterfactual reflection and, if so, what are the 
boundary conditions that facilitate such reflection? My study builds on research in the 
psychology field which indicates that counterfactual thought serves a functional value, is 
a useful component of behavior regulation, and is closely connected to goal cognitions 
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(Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1997), all of which are important 
for responding to performance discrepancies. As such, the focus of this review now turns 
to counterfactual thinking. 
 
Counterfactual Thinking 
 Counterfactuals have been defined as mental representations of alternatives to 
past events, actions, or states (Byrne, 2005; Roese, 1997). The earliest conceptualizations 
of counterfactual thinking were based in the simulation heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982) and presented in Kahneman & Miller's  (1986) norm theory. These scholars 
proposed that individuals mentally undo events and simulate alternate versions of the 
events. Thus, counterfactual thinking can lead to learning from mistakes and to 
identifying alternate courses of action (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Markman, Elizaga, 
Ratcliff, & McMullen, 2007; Roese, 1994).  
Counterfactuals are depicted with conditional propositions that contain an 
antecedent and a consequence (Roese, 1997). There are multiple types of counterfactuals, 
as shown in Table 2. To better understand how counterfactual thoughts influence 
behavior, the following sections review empirical findings from the psychology literature, 
followed by a discussion of the functional theory of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & 
Roese, 2008), the framework that has organized the findings based on the paths through 
which behavior is regulated.   
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Table 2 
Types of Counterfactual Thinking 
Type Description Example 
Counterfactual 
Direction 
Upward vs. downward 
Comparison of a 
present outcome to a 
better (upward) or 
worse (downward) 
outcome 
“I should have taken the job with the 
higher salary.” (upward) 
 
“Other people with my qualifications 
earn much less than I do.” (downward) 
Counterfactual 
Structure 
Additive vs. subtractive 
Inaction vs. action 
Addition or 
subtraction of an 
aspect from the 
present state 
“I should never have started 
smoking.” (subtractive; focus: action) 
 
“I should have taken vitamin C.” 
(additive; focus: inaction) 
Counterfactual 
Referent 
Self vs. others 
Focus is on the 
actions or features of 
oneself or other 
people 
“I should have driven more slowly.” 
(self) 
 
“The other driver should have paid 
more attention.” (others) 
Adapted from Epstude & Roese, 2008 
Counterfactual Direction. 
Early research on counterfactual thinking attributed counterfactual direction (i.e. 
direction of comparison) strictly to emotional regulation (Taylor & Schneider, 1989). 
Researchers have since acknowledged that counterfactual direction can serve both 
affective and preparative functions (e.g. Epstude & Roese, 2008; Markman, Gavanski, 
Sherman, & McMullen, 1993; Sanna, 2000). Upward counterfactual thoughts improve 
reality (e.g. “if only…), whereas downward counterfactuals worsen reality (e.g. “at 
least…”) (Markman et al., 1993). Thus, upward counterfactuals can prompt one to 
consider paths for self-improvement, while downward counterfactuals can regulate mood 
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repair and maintenance. To date, scholars have reported numerous antecedents and 
outcomes of counterfactual direction. 
Markman et al.’s (1993) research was the first to identify the functional value of 
counterfactual thinking and to investigate factors that may lead one to engage in such 
thinking. Prior research had largely focused on cognitive rules that prompt counterfactual 
generation, such as the timing of events in the cognitive chain (Kahneman & Miller, 
1986; Wells, Taylor, & Turtle, 1987).  In contrast, Markman et al. argued that 
counterfactual thoughts can be driven by situational factors, and in any given situation, 
individuals will generate the counterfactuals that yield the most psychological value. 
Using a computer-simulated blackjack game, they examined the effects of event 
repeatability on participants’ spontaneous counterfactual generation—both the prevalence 
and the direction. The results demonstrated that when individuals believed the event was 
repeatable (i.e. had the opportunity to play again), they engaged more in counterfactual 
thinking, and they made upward comparisons—thoughts about how their results may be 
better. This empirical test lent support to their notion that upward comparisons were 
activated by the goal of future improvement. In contrast, downward counterfactuals were 
used as a coping mechanism for those who had performed poorly and believed they 
would not have an opportunity for improvement. In fact, when individuals generate 
upward comparisons in the absence of opportunity for future improvement, it can often 
lead to negative affective consequences (Sanna, 1997). 
29 
 
 
 
Overall, individuals are more likely to engage in upward comparisons after they 
have experienced a loss or failure, which in a work-context could be when encountering 
performance discrepancies.  Downward comparisons, on the other hand, are more 
common following successes (Markman et al., 1993; Roese & Olson, 1995; Sanna & 
Turley, 1996). Though, this is not always the case—the influence of outcome valence on 
counterfactual direction may be different based on one’s perceptions of control. 
Perceived control influences counterfactual generation (Markman et al., 1995; Roese & 
Olson, 1995), such that individuals tend to alter aspects of events that are within their 
control and the outcomes they deem controllable. If individuals feel as though they 
cannot control the outcome, they will be less likely to generate upward counterfactuals, 
even if they have experienced a loss or failure. When the outcome is perceived to be 
uncontrollable, greater functional value (e.g. preserve or enhance self-esteem) can be 
gained from downward comparisons (Roese & Olson, 1995). Because upward 
counterfactuals focus on performance improvement, it is important to better understand 
antecedents of upward counterfactual thinking. What factors, beyond perceived control, 
outcome valence, and beliefs about future opportunities, influence upward counterfactual 
thinking?  
Morris & Moore (2000) were among the first scholars to consider the influence of 
organizational factors on counterfactual thoughts. In doing so, they investigated how 
accountability may influence counterfactual thinking. Specifically, they examined the 
influence of hierarchical accountability on the generation of self-focused upward 
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counterfactuals—the counterfactuals that have been shown to be particularly beneficial 
for learning (Epstude & Roese, 2008).  
Using archival data from the Aviation Safety Reporting System, which included 
pilots’ reflections on naturally occurring near accidents, Morris & Moore (2000) 
examined the prevalence of self-focused upward counterfactuals, specific comments 
about lessons learned, and how such lessons will be applied in the future. While all pilots 
are required to complete a reflection following a near accident, the researchers argued 
that commercial and military pilots, compared to private pilots, would be reflecting under 
higher levels of accountability and thus may reflect differently. The findings, which were 
later replicated in a lab study, revealed that higher accountability inhibited self-focused 
upward counterfactuals, as well as learning processes. Similar effects were seen in 
Markman & Tetlock's (2000) lab study, wherein accountability led to counterfactual 
excuse-making (i.e. denying responsibility through “I couldn’t have known…”).   
Upward counterfactual thinking may lead individuals to accept responsibility for 
undesirable outcomes, which can come at the expense of regret, negative affect and 
dissatisfaction with performance outcomes, especially for those with low self-efficacy  
(Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1995; Markman et al., 1993; Pierro et al., 
2008; Sanna, 1997). However, research suggests that overall the benefits of upward 
thinking outweigh the costs. Upward counterfactual thinking can trigger hopefulness 
about the future (Boninger, Gleicher, & Strathman, 1994), develop a sense of perceived 
control (Nasco & Marsh, 1999), lead to motivation and preparative intentions for future 
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behaviors (McMullen & Markman, 2000; Roese, 1994; Sanna, 1997), and improve task 
persistence (Markman, McMullen, & Elizaga, 2008; Markman, McMullen, Elizaga, & 
Mizoguchi, 2006).  
Notably, individual differences and beliefs can influence the effects of 
counterfactual thinking. Research has shown that individuals with low self-efficacy felt 
less prepared when generating upward counterfactuals, whereas those with high self-
efficacy felt prepared following both upward and downward counterfactual thinking, as 
long as they believed the event was repeatable (Sanna, 1997). Dyczewski & Markman 
(2012) also found evidence that beliefs about ability can influence counterfactual 
thinking outcomes. In their study, participants who believed intelligence-related abilities, 
were fixed (i.e. entity theorists) displayed greater motivation and enhanced performance 
when they reflected on downward counterfactuals. In contrast, those who believed 
intelligence-related abilities are malleable (i.e. incremental theorists) were more 
motivated and performed better following upward counterfactual thinking.  
Taken together, the research on counterfactual direction has shown that 
perceptions of control, ability-related beliefs, and organizational factors can influence 
counterfactual direction. Moreover, perceptions about future opportunities for 
improvement affects whether one reflects upward or downward. For this reason, 
opportunity has been called the “master moderator” (Eptsude & Roese, 2008). When an 
opportunity is present, individuals tend to respond with behavioral regulation; whereas a 
lack of opportunity or problematic circumstances leads to affect regulation.  
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Counterfactual Structure. 
 Counterfactuals are constructed by adding or removing elements that were in the 
original event (Roese & Olson, 1993). When individuals focus on their inactions, the 
counterfactuals take an additive structure (e.g. “If only I had taken advantage of the extra 
training available...”). In contrast, when individuals focus on their actions, they engage in 
subtractive counterfactual thinking (e.g. “If only I hadn’t missed the policy update...). 
Empirical findings indicate counterfactual structure may play an important role in how 
people process information and form behavioral intentions (Epstude & Roese, 2008).  
 Individuals are more likely to generate additive counterfactuals following 
negative (Roese & Olson, 1993) and unexpected events (Sanna & Turley, 1996). Because 
these counterfactuals help to illuminate alternate strategies and to identify ways to avoid 
undesirable outcomes, they can constitute an adaptive strategy that enhances future 
performance (Roese, 1994; Roese & Olson, 1993). Kray, Galinsky, & Markman (2009) 
demonstrated this during a negotiation task. Participants engaged in counterfactual 
thinking between negotiation rounds, and those who reflected via additive counterfactual 
thinking, rather than subtractive, were more successful at obtaining value and generating 
creative agreements during the negotiations.  
 Kray et al.’s (2009) findings are consistent with research by Markman et al. 
(2007). Kray et al. revealed that two very different information processing styles are 
evoked by additive versus subtractive thinking. Their research demonstrated that additive 
thinking promotes an expansive processing style, wherein individuals tend to be more 
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creative. In such cases, individuals are free to explore multiple ways of altering an event 
(Kray et al., 2006). In contrast, subtractive thinking counterfactuals center on existing 
knowledge structures (i.e. elements in the original event), which prompt a relational 
processing style that tends to be more effective for performance on analytical tasks. Since 
Markman et al.’s (2007) study, it has been proposed that subtractive thinking requires 
more controlled mental operations and may have a lower likelihood for eliciting 
behavioral intentions, though further investigation of additive and subtractive 
counterfactuals has been encouraged (Epstude & Roese, 2008).  
 
Counterfactual Referent. 
 A final, yet important, distinction between various types of counterfactuals is that 
of self-focused versus situation- or other-focused. Recall that Morris & Moore (2000) 
found that accountability can inhibit self-focused counterfactuals, which may lead one to 
focus on others’ actions or various circumstances beyond one’s control. Similarly, lack of 
personal control and lack of power have also been shown to diminish self-focused 
counterfactual thinking (Scholl & Sassenberg, 2014). When individuals lack such, they 
may be more prone to focus on others’ actions, which tends to lead individuals to think 
counterfactually about how others could have made the outcome better (Rim & 
Summerville, 2014). While individuals can learn from other-focused counterfactuals, 
self-focused counterfactuals are more useful for personal improvement and are believed 
to provide greater functional value (Epstude & Roese, 2008). Based on this and what we 
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know about counterfactual direction, it may be more likely for those who receive 
corrective feedback to learn and to attain performance improvements when they engage 
in self-focused upward counterfactual thinking. If this is true, then it is important to 
investigate factors that may prompt individuals, who encounter performance 
discrepancies, to generate self-focused upward counterfactuals.   
 In sum, counterfactual thinking is a component of everyday thoughts.  Individuals 
think counterfactually by comparing reality to alternate versions of outcomes and actions. 
Through such thoughts, individuals experience affective and preparative consequences. 
Following decades of research in the psychology field, scholars now contend that the 
primary function of counterfactual thinking centers on the management of ongoing 
behavior. To explicate the various ways in which counterfactual thinking influences 
behavior, Epstude & Roese (2008) proposed the functional theory of counterfactual 
thinking which organizes the aforementioned findings and counterfactual effects on 
behavior along two paths. The following section provides a discussion of this theory. 
 
The Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking. 
 The functional theory of counterfactual thinking is grounded in processes of 
comparative judgment and the fundamental assumption that counterfactual thought 
regulates behavior (Epstude & Roese, 2008).  Based on this theory, counterfactual 
thinking is activated through the recognition of a problem (e.g. performance discrepancy) 
or negative affect, such as that triggered by a negative emotional reaction. Counterfactual 
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thinking affects intentions and behaviors. This can be facilitated by two pathways, the 
content-specific pathway and the content-neutral pathway, which are illustrated in Figure 
1 and discussed thereafter.  
Figure 1 
Content-Specific vs. Content-Neutral Pathways of Counterfactual Thinking
 
Adapted from Epstude & Roese, 2008 
 
Content-specific pathway. The content-specific pathway illuminates causal 
inferences—lessons learned or beliefs in the causal effectiveness of behaviors—that serve 
as a foundation for behavioral intentions (Epstude & Roese, 2008). Counterfactual 
thinking is prompted by negative affect, events, or experiences that leave individuals 
unsatisfied with outcomes or their performance levels.  Because counterfactuals take a 
conditional form that specifies antecedents and consequences, one can make causal 
inferences that link actions to outcomes. Thus, individuals can gain insights that are 
useful for behavior—benefits that are akin to those of task-learning processes in Kluger 
& DeNisi’s (1996) feedback intervention theory. Causal inferences are more beneficial 
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when generated through upward counterfactual thinking, as its focus is improvement 
rather than maintaining status quo (i.e. downward counterfactuals) (Epstude & Roese, 
2008). 
 According to the functional theory of counterfactual thinking, counterfactuals 
may influence behavior indirectly by developing intentions which, in turn, impact 
behavior, or directly—through task-specific insight. When stronger links between 
behaviors and events are developed in memory, individuals are more likely to form 
intentions for future opportunities (Sheeran, Webb, & Gollwitzer, 2005). Counterfactuals 
help to create the link in memory and to facilitate such intentions. The manifestation of 
intentions to behaviors is further supported through other theoretical frameworks (e.g. 
theory of planned behavior) (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). 
 Multiple counterfactual studies have demonstrated the direct effect of 
counterfactuals on behavior (e.g. Roese, 1994; Markman et al., 2008). Specifically, 
studies have prompted subjects to generate counterfactuals about their anagram 
performances, and then provided them with opportunities to perform again. Across these 
studies, individuals’ persistence and performance levels increased more following 
upward, additive, and self-focused counterfactual thinking. These studies have also 
demonstrated the impact of counterfactuals on mood and strategic thoughts (Epstude & 
Roese, 2008), which leads to the second pathway of counterfactual thinking—the 
content-neutral path.  
37 
 
 
 
Content-neutral pathway. In contrast to the content-specific pathway, that 
transfers specific information from causal inferences, the content-neutral pathway 
influences behavior through shifts in mindsets, motivation, and self-inferences. Epstude 
& Roese (2008) argue that the content-neutral pathway is less about specific information 
and more about how information is handled, and they go on to state that a counterfactual 
can “ignite attentional, cognitive, or motivational processes that themselves alter 
behavior” (p. 175). For example, recall that Kray et al. (2006) found that additive 
counterfactuals led to more creative negotiation tactics, thus demonstrating a different 
mind-set prompted by additive vs. subtractive thinking. The motivational effects can be 
seen in studies that indicate additive counterfactuals activate a promotion focus, whereas 
subtractive counterfactuals activate a prevention focus (Roese et al., 2009; Roese et al., 
2006). Finally, counterfactual thinking can result in self-inferences—such as one’s sense 
of mastery or confidence—and feelings of personal control, such as those demonstrated 
in McMullen et al. (1995) and Nasco & Marsh (1999). Together, these influences affect 
behavior.  
 An assumption of the functional theory of counterfactual thinking is that the 
compatibility between the two paths should strengthen effects on behavior (Epstude & 
Roese, 2008). For example, if an individual experiences increased motivation from 
counterfactual thinking, the effects of content-specific paths (e.g. causal inferences) 
should be clearer and stronger. It is further proposed that causal links in one task domain 
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may be facilitated from mind-sets produced by counterfactuals in a different domain. 
Thus, benefits of counterfactual thinking may transfer across situations.    
 Counterfactual thinking is prompted by negative experiences, is a ubiquitous 
aspect of cognition, and has been shown to influence behavior in numerous ways. Thus, 
the functional theory of counterfactual thinking offers a valuable perspective when 
assessing how employees may process and respond to corrective feedback on 
performance discrepancies. Yet, to date, there are few studies (e.g. Morris & Moore, 
2000) that have investigated the impact of workplace factors on counterfactual thinking, 
which are crucial to consider when examining how employees’ process and respond to 
performance discrepancies. To this point, in the following section I propose and develop 
hypotheses for factors that influence counterfactual thinking during feedback processing 
and subsequent performance.   
 
Hypotheses Development 
 The feedback process can be impacted by individual differences, as well as 
situational and contextual factors. Thus, it was important to consider such factors when 
examining the role of counterfactuals in the cognitive processing of corrective feedback, 
as well as subsequent learning and behavioral changes. Recall that, compared to other 
types of counterfactuals, self-focused upward counterfactuals are particularly useful for 
learning and behavioral regulation (Epstude & Roese, 2008). However, little is known 
about individual and contextual factors that prompt individuals to develop these types of 
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counterfactuals.  For this reason, in the current research, I explore boundary conditions 
that prompt or inhibit self-focused upward counterfactual thinking following performance 
discrepancies. Likewise, the conceptual model includes proposed boundary conditions 
that influence the effect of self-focused upward counterfactual thinking on performance. 
Examining these relationships should help explain the relationship between baseline 
performance discrepancies (conveyed through corrective feedback) and changes in 
individuals’ performance. Figure 2 illustrates the hypothesized relationships.  
Figure 2 
Hypothesized Relationships 
 
 
 I propose that task-relevant knowledge and psychological empowerment will 
accentuate self-focused upward counterfactual thinking while feedback specificity will 
attenuate such thinking. Task-relevant knowledge refers to facts and knowledge 
structures that are necessary for successful task performance (Costanza, Fleishman, & 
Marshall-Mies, 1999). Psychological empowerment refers to a set of psychological 
states—meaning, competence, self-determination, and impact—that are necessary for 
individuals to feel a sense of control in relation to their work (Spreitzer, 2008). As 
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previously reviewed, feedback specificity is a situational variable that has been defined as 
the level of information presented in the feedback message (Goodman et al., 2004).  
I also propose that performance following counterfactual thinking, will be 
influenced by core self-evaluations, as well as counterfactual content. The concept of 
core self-evaluations is a higher-order trait that encompasses basic conclusions 
individuals hold about themselves, the world, and others (Judge et al., 2007; Judge et al., 
2003; Bono & Judge, 2003). In the current research, counterfactual specificity refers to 
the level of detail versus abstraction of counterfactual thoughts.  
 
Effect of Baseline Performance Discrepancy on  
Self-Focused Upward Counterfactual Thinking. 
 Consistent with my review of the counterfactual thinking literature, I propose that  
feedback that conveys a performance discrepancy, compared to other types of feedback, 
will predict self-focused upward counterfactual thinking. Recall that self-focused upward 
counterfactuals focus on how an individual could have altered his or her behavior to 
achieve a better outcome. According to the functional theory of counterfactual thinking 
(Epsude & Roese, 2008), the first step in the regulatory process of counterfactual 
thinking is the identification of a problem (e.g. performance discrepancy) or the 
experience of negative affect. In such situations, individuals often attempt to reconcile 
discrepancies and to learn from their mistakes; self-focused upward counterfactual 
thinking can help achieve these ends (Roese, 1994).  
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Relative to other types of feedback (e.g. positive feedback), feedback that conveys 
a discrepancy is more likely to prompt self-focused upward counterfactual thinking. 
Research on negativity bias is one literature stream that provides insight on how 
performance discrepancies may prompt such thinking. Negativity bias refers to the 
tendency for individuals to pay more attention to negative than to positive information 
(Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Ito, Larson, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998). Across numerous 
domains (for a review see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), scholars 
have found that negative information impacts behaviors and cognitions more strongly 
than comparable positive information. In other words, negative information is more 
potent than positive information and, as a result, people react more strongly (Baumeister 
et al., 2001).  
The elevated potency inherent in corrective feedback, compared to other 
feedback, increases the likelihood that feedback recipients will engage in self-focused 
upward counterfactual thinking. Bohner, Bless, Schwarz, & Strack (1988) demonstrated 
that individuals are more likely to engage in causal and analytic reasoning following 
negative events, compared to positive events, as such thinking may help individuals to 
avoid similar situations in the future. Similarly, Baumeister (1991) found that when 
individuals experience a negative situation, they are more likely to search for meaning 
and to try to make sense of the situation compared to positive situations. In this way, 
negative information leads to more extensive and elaborate information processing than 
positive information (Baumeister et al., 2001).  
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The influence of negativity is not limited to past events; it also affects individuals’ 
thoughts about the future. Individuals are often motivated to avoid future negative 
outcomes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Upon receiving feedback on performance 
discrepancies and in an effort to avoid negative outcomes, individuals may reflect on past 
behaviors and consider alternative future behaviors that will decrease the likelihood of 
further negative outcomes. In essence, the negative potency of such feedback should 
prompt one to engage in analytic reasoning about their behaviors (Bohner et al., 1988) 
and to try to avoid future mistakes. Thus, it is likely such reasoning will be facilitated by 
self-focused upward counterfactuals.  
 Studies have demonstrated that self-focused counterfactuals are more prevalent 
than other-focused counterfactuals (Davis et al., 1995; White & Roese, 2007), while 
upward counterfactuals have been shown to be more common than downward (Epstude 
& Roese, Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Roese & Olson, 1997). Additionally, upward 
counterfactual thinking is the most common type of counterfactual thinking following 
failure (Markman et al., 1993) and self-focused is best suited for learning and behavioral 
regulation (Epstude & Roese, 2008).  Following these findings and based on the 
preceding discussion, I predict: 
Hypothesis 1: Baseline performance discrepancy will positively relate to self-
focused upward counterfactual thinking.  
 Hypothesis 1 is consistent with previous findings. Though, recall that one of the 
primary objectives of the current research is to explore boundary conditions that 
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determine when individuals, who receive feedback on performance discrepancies, will 
engage in self-focused upward counterfactual thinking. We know that contextual factors, 
such as accountability (Morris & Moore, 2000), can inhibit self-focused upward 
counterfactual thinking. What other factors may inhibit or promote self-focused 
counterfactuals? To address this question, the following section presents proposed 
moderators of the relationship between baseline performance discrepancy and self-
focused upward counterfactual thinking.   
 
Moderators of the Effect of Baseline Performance Discrepancy on  
Self-Focused Upward Counterfactual Thinking. 
 Task-relevant knowledge. Knowledge is defined as “a collection of discrete but 
related facts and information about a particular domain,” and task-relevant knowledge 
refers to facts and knowledge structures that are necessary for successful task 
performance (Costanza et al., 1999, p. 71). According to Locke (2000), task-relevant 
knowledge influences how individuals approach tasks and the specific actions individuals 
implement to make their task strategies work. I propose that, following performance 
discrepancies, higher levels of task-relevant knowledge will increase self-focused upward 
counterfactual thinking.  
Theoretically, this argument is consistent with Bandura’s (Bandura, 1977, 1986) 
social cognitive theory. According to social cognitive theory, task knowledge can enable 
individuals to transform experiences into guides for task behaviors (Bandura, 1986). 
Bandura argued that knowledge serves as a resource, from which individuals can 
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generate innovative courses of action. When individuals possess task-relevant 
knowledge, they are more likely to experience higher levels of self-efficacy (Bandura, 
1986), a trait shown to increase the preparative function of upward counterfactual 
thinking (Sanna, 1997).    
Similarly, task-relevant knowledge can enhance one’s ability to exercise self-
influence in his or her work environment (Bandura, 1986), thereby increasing the number 
of behavioral options available. Barrick & Spilker (2003) demonstrated that when 
individuals possess higher levels of task knowledge, they are more likely to focus on 
relevant information for attaining goals and are more likely to engage in goal directed 
behaviors. Task-relevant knowledge has also been shown to positively influence the 
number and quality of solutions generated when solving workplace problems (Butler & 
Scherer, 1997). 
From this research, it is evident that task-relevant knowledge helps individuals to 
direct efforts towards goals, as well as to select a behavioral response from among 
multiple possibilities (Bandura, 1986). Recall that as individuals’ perceptions of 
opportunities increases, so too does the likelihood of upward counterfactual thinking (e.g. 
Eptsude & Roese, 2008; Markman et al., 1993). Thus, it follows that an increased 
capability to engage in self-influence and an increased repertoire of behavioral 
opportunities for attaining a task goal will lead one to engage in self-focused upward 
counterfactual thinking. In contrast, a deficiency in task knowledge restricts one’s choice 
of task behaviors, thereby limiting the exercise of self-influence, and inhibits 
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opportunities (Bandura, 1986). When opportunities are lacking, individuals are more 
likely to engage in downward counterfactual thinking (Markman et al., 1993).    
Other research also supports the argument that following performance 
discrepancies, higher levels of task-relevant knowledge will increase self-focused upward 
counterfactual thinking. More precisely, task-relevant knowledge facilitates better 
representations of problems encountered during a task (Braune & Foshay, 1983), 
provides additional information to draw upon when solving problems (Phillips & Gully, 
1997), and helps individuals transition from one problem state to another (Jong & 
Ferguson-Hessler, 1996).  
 Prior knowledge influences new conceptualizations of events. As individuals 
develop new conceptualizations, they have a tendency to “hark back to old ideas,” from 
which they can draw insight and use to reassemble in a new conceptualization (Perkins, 
1988). In the context of a work domain, old ideas include prior task knowledge. Research 
has demonstrated that even when individuals are instructed to not use such knowledge 
during a task, inadvertently, they do (Marsh, Ward, & Landau, 1999).   
 Scholars have established that higher levels of task-relevant knowledge can lead 
to more effective work behaviors. To this point, Rapp, Ahearne, Mathieu, & Schillewaert 
(2006) found that salespeople with higher levels of task knowledge were more likely to 
engage in adaptive selling. In doing so, they experimented with new techniques, adjusted 
to meet the demands of a situation, and engaged in other similar success-facilitating 
strategies.  
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 Because task-relevant knowledge contributes to one’s ability to exercise self-
influence in his or her work environment, and task-relevant knowledge has been shown to 
provide additional insights about problems and events, facilitates better representations of 
situations, leads to adaptive behaviors, and is positively related to self-efficacy, I argue 
that such knowledge will influence the extent to which individuals explore mental 
simulations of how they could have altered their behaviors to attain better work 
outcomes. Therefore, I predict: 
Hypothesis 2: Task-relevant knowledge moderates the influence of baseline 
performance discrepancy on self-focused upward counterfactual thinking, such 
that the influence becomes more positive as task-relevant knowledge increases.  
 Psychological empowerment. Psychological empowerment is a motivational 
construct that emerged from the empowerment literature (Conger & Kanungo, 1988; 
Spreitzer, Kizilos, & Nason, 1997; Thomas & Velthouse, 1990). In contrast to social-
structural forms of empowerment, which emphasize the sharing of power between 
subordinates and supervisors through organizational interventions (Conger & Kanungo, 
1988), psychological empowerment captures the extent to which employees experience 
empowerment (Spreitzer, 2008). In this way, psychological empowerment is a cognitive 
state, which is manifest in four dimensions.   
 According to Spreitzer and colleagues (Spreitzer, 1995; Spreitzer et al., 1997), 
individuals perceive that they are empowered and in control of their work when they 
experience meaning, competence, self-determination, and impact. Meaning reflects the 
47 
 
 
 
extent to which individuals psychologically invest in a task (Thomas & Velthouse, 1990) 
and refers to the alignment of one’s work goals and beliefs or values (Maynard, Gilson, 
& Mathieu, 2012; Spreitzer, 1995). Competence, which has been linked to the concept of 
self-efficacy (Bandura & Cervone, 1983), reflects an individual’s belief in his or her 
capability to perform work activities (Spreitzer, 1997). Individuals experience self-
determination when they have choice in initiating and regulating their action and when 
they experience a sense of autonomy (Deci et al., 1989). The fourth dimension, impact, 
represents the extent to which individuals believe their behavior will influence work 
outcomes (Spreitzer, 2008). Scholars have demonstrated that when one of the four 
dimensions is missing, the experience of empowerment will be limited (Spreitzer, 1995).    
 Across numerous studies, scholars have consistently shown that empowerment 
predicts performance and other positive workplace outcomes (Seibert, Wang, & 
Courtright, 2011). Though, to date, the influence of empowerment on learning through 
counterfactual thinking has not yet been examined.  However, prior research on social 
power, the capacity to control one’s own and others’ outcomes (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007), 
and social perception support the prediction that psychological empowerment will 
positively contribute to self-focused upward counterfactual thinking.  
 Power affects basic cognition and has clear links to self-regulation (Guinote, 
2007b). Across three studies, Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee (2003) demonstrated that, 
compared to those with low power, those with high power are more likely to act in a 
goal-consistent manner and to show a strong tendency toward action versus inaction. 
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Likewise, research has shown that, during goal-pursuit, those with power are more likely 
to attend to goal relevant cues, are better at prioritization, are more flexible in their 
thinking, and extensively process central information about a task or situation (Guinote, 
2007). Similarly, studies have shown that power increases task persistence and resistance 
to external influences that detract from goal attainment (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, 
Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008; Slabu & Guinote, 2010). From this research, it can be seen 
that power is positively related to thoughts and behaviors that support goal attainment.  
 In contrast, powerless individuals face challenges during goal pursuit and operate 
under more constraints. They have to attend to multiple cues in the environment, many of 
which may not be relevant for task success (Guinote, 2007a; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & 
Anderson, 2003). A lack of power also tends to inhibit behaviors during goal-pursuit 
(Galinsky et al., 2003). To this point, the approach-inhibition theory of power (Keltzer et 
al., 2003) indicates that power directs one’s actions towards reducing discrepancies 
between current and desired end states, while a lack of power leads one to focus on 
avoiding threats and punishments. Thus, the powerless experience less flexible thinking 
and a stronger focus on obstacles and barriers in the environment (Galinsky et al., 2008). 
With increased attention to multiple cues and goals in a situation (e.g. avoiding 
punishments while executing a task), the powerless may have less cognitive resources to 
devote to goal-pursuit (Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002). 
 Scholars have recently examined the role of social power in counterfactual 
thinking. Through a series of studies, Scholl & Sassenberg (2014) demonstrated that 
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when individuals had less power (i.e. subordinate vs. manager) they were less likely to 
engage in self-focused counterfactuals. In contrast, those with high power were more 
likely to engage in such thinking. The effect of high power on self-focused 
counterfactuals was independent of attributions and facilitated by a perceived sense of 
personal control. When individuals experienced a sense of personal control, they 
considered alternative ways in which they could have changed the outcome. In contrast, 
those with less power and, consequently, a lower sense of personal control were more 
likely to succumb to thoughts about how the situation may have been different or how 
others could have behaved differently (i.e. other-referent counterfactuals).  
 In the context of a workplace, one’s sense of power is not determined solely by 
his or her role or job position. Rather, individuals can acquire a sense of power when they 
perceive to be in control of their work, that is, through psychological empowerment 
(Conger & Kanungo, 1988). In such instances, individuals adopt an active orientation 
toward their work and sustain increased levels of task motivation (Spreitzer, 1995). 
Psychological empowerment should thus have important implications for how individuals 
process feedback on performance discrepancies. To this point, and based on the findings 
reviewed above, when individuals are confronted with performance discrepancies, 
psychological empowerment will positively contribute to self-focused upward 
counterfactuals—the counterfactuals that lead to learning and illuminate strategies for 
performance improvement.  
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Hypothesis 3: Psychological empowerment moderates the influence of baseline 
performance discrepancy on self-focused upward counterfactual thinking, such 
that the influence becomes more positive as psychological empowerment 
increases.  
Feedback specificity. Recall that the level of information presented in a feedback 
message can vary in specificity. Specific feedback highlights errors individuals have 
made and provides detailed information on how recipients can improve their performance 
(Goodman et al., 2004; Payne & Hauty, 1955). When individuals receive specific 
feedback, they are more likely to judge the correctness, accuracy, and adequacy of their 
response (Bourne, 1966). Yet in many ways, specific feedback reduces the need for 
recipients to engage cognitive processes, as they are essentially given a roadmap to guide 
performance improvement efforts. In contrast, low feedback specificity provides 
substantially less information and can highlight a problem that is not well understood. 
Individuals may attempt to overcome such a problem by engaging in self-focused upward 
counterfactual thinking. Prior research and theory in the feedback literature (Goodman et 
al., 2004, 2011), as well as other bodies of learning literature (Keith & Frese, 2008), 
support this logic.  
Error management training (Frese, 1995) is one stream of research that offers 
insight on varying levels of guidance during learning, and the value of error management 
training is supported by action theory (Frese & Zapf, 1994). According to action theory, 
individuals hold action-oriented mental models that are foundational to work behaviors. 
51 
 
 
 
Errors contribute to the development of such models, as errors contain information that 
help individuals to think retrospectively about their strategies and to adjust strategies to 
improve performance (Keith & Frese, 2008). 
Error management training consists of learning events, wherein learners are 
provided minimal guidance.  In such training, individuals are afforded opportunities to 
make errors, to identify the cause of the errors, and to generate solutions to overcome the 
errors (Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000). Learners are not guided by immediate specific 
feedback. Rather, they are enabled to engage in deep level information processing, which 
is believed to be one of the mechanisms that contributes to the effectiveness of error 
management training (Dormann & Frese, 1994). Indeed, there are benefits to this training 
approach. Error management training increases controlled processing of behaviors 
(Ivancic & Hesketh, 2000) and facilitates self-regulatory processes, such as 
metacognitive activity and emotional control in the face of performance discrepancies 
(Keith & Frese, 2005). It is also an effective approach for promoting adaptive task 
strategies (Ivanhic & Heketh, 2000), as well as increasing transfer of training (Keith & 
Frese, 2008). 
A variation of error management training, guided error training, differs from the 
above approach in that learners are provided examples of errors, along with the solutions 
for overcoming the errors. In this way, guided error training provides more details (i.e. 
higher specificity) to learners. Ivanhic & Heketh (2000) demonstrated that guided error 
training decreases opportunities to build metacognitive skills and inhibits adaptive 
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transfer—the use of knowledge to change a learned procedure or to generate a solution to 
a new problem. Additionally, they suggested that, during guided error training, learners 
may be more likely to attribute their errors to the training program rather than to 
themselves. The drawbacks of the guided approach help to highlight the potential value 
of less specific feedback to self-focused upward counterfactual thinking. Attributions 
facilitate counterfactual thinking (N’gbala & Branscombe, 2003). In the case of guided 
error training, higher specificity may inhibit the self-focused attributions that facilitate 
self-focused counterfactuals, as well as the metacognitive activity that supports planning, 
monitoring, and evaluation of one’s task progress (Brown, Bransford, Ferrara, & 
Campione, 1983). It is plausible to consider such effects will be present when examining 
the influence of high feedback specificity on counterfactual thinking.  
Empirical findings in the feedback literature, also support the argument that less 
specific feedback will enhance self-focused upward counterfactual thinking. Goodman et 
al. (2011) reported that less specific feedback led to increased levels of explicit 
information processing, as measured in a “think out loud” decision-making experiment. 
Those in the low feedback specificity condition also engaged in more planning for the 
future.  When individuals are focused on preparing for the future and finding routes to 
alleviate problems, they often engage in upward counterfactual thinking (Sanna, 2000). 
Such counterfactuals can help to illuminate causal links between behaviors and outcomes 
that may otherwise not be apparent.   
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In an earlier experiment, Goodman et al. (2004) examined the effects of feedback 
specificity on practice performance, exploration, and learning during a series of decision-
making tasks. The results of the study revealed that high feedback specificity was 
negatively related to exploratory behavior and learning. In the context of counterfactual 
thinking, high feedback specificity may limit the extent to which individuals explore 
alternative versions of their behaviors and associated performance outcomes.  
Based on the preceding discussions, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 4: Feedback specificity moderates the influence of baseline 
performance discrepancy on self-focused upward counterfactual thinking, such 
that the influence becomes weaker as feedback specificity increases.  
 
The Effect of Self-Focused Upward  
Counterfactual Thinking on Performance. 
 Counterfactual thinking involves the transfer of information from a causal 
inference and/or the activation of information processing that enhances motivation and 
effort expenditure. These processes, attained via the content-specific and content-neutral 
pathways, fuel behavior change (Epstude & Roese, 2008). Self-focused upward 
counterfactuals are particularly influential for behavioral regulation and, in this study, are 
expected to predict performance. 
 As previously reviewed, multiple studies have shown that upward counterfactuals 
predict intentions for behavior change. More precisely, upward counterfactuals lead to 
intentions to perform success-facilitating behaviors (Roese, 1994). Beyond intentions to 
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perform improved behaviors, there is also robust support for the influence of upward 
counterfactuals on improving performance, specifically on anagram tasks and academic 
outcomes (e.g. Markman et al., 1993; Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Roese, 1994). Given that 
upward counterfactuals predict behavioral intentions and performance improvement in 
such situations, it follows that, in a work context, upward counterfactuals will also predict 
performance. Likewise, and as noted by Epstude & Roese (2008), “it is straightforward 
that self-focused thoughts are more useful for self-improvement” and behavior change 
(p.179).  
Therefore, I predict: 
Hypothesis 5a: Self-focused upward counterfactual thinking is positively related 
to performance.  
  Scholarly research has indicated that performance discrepancies can prompt self-
focused upward counterfactual thinking, and such thinking influences behavior (Epstude 
& Roese, 2008). These findings suggest that self-focused upward counterfactual thinking 
will mediate the relationship between baseline performance discrepancy and 
performance. To this point, feedback on performance discrepancies should prompt 
individuals to reflect on alternative strategies they could have pursued to attain a better 
outcome. Such reflection provides causal insight about behaviors and outcomes, as well 
as motivational benefits (Epstude & Roese, 2008), which, in turn, affects performance.  
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Specifically, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5b: Baseline performance discrepancy indirectly affects performance, 
through self-focused upward counterfactual thinking. 
  In accordance with my previously stated objectives, this research also explores the 
conditions that lead one to improve performance following self-focused upward 
counterfactual thinking. Therefore, the following section outlines proposed boundary 
conditions that influence the extent to which such thinking effects performance.  
 
Moderators of the Effect of Self-Focused  
Upward Counterfactual Thinking on Performance. 
  Core self-evaluations. Core self-evaluations are fundamental, bottom-line 
evaluations that individuals hold about themselves, others, and the world (Judge, Locke, 
& Durham, 1997). These evaluations consist of four traits, including self-esteem, 
generalized self-efficacy, locus of control, and neuroticism (see Table 3), which, together, 
form a higher-order core self-evaluations trait. Core self-evaluations have been shown to 
predict life and job satisfaction, as well as job performance (Bono & Judge, 2003; Judge, 
Locke, Durham, & Kluger, 1998). 
 Table 3 
Core Self-Evaluations 
Core Evaluation Definition 
Self-esteem 
 
The overall value one places on oneself  
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Core Evaluation Definition 
Generalized  
self-efficacy 
One’s estimates of one’s capabilities to mobilize the motivation, 
cognitive resources, and courses of action needed to exercise 
general control over events in one’s life 
Locus of control 
The degree to which individuals believe that they control events 
in their lives (internal locus of control) or believe that the 
environment or fate controls events (external locus of control)  
Neuroticism 
A Big 5 trait considered to be the converse of self-esteem and 
generally refers to a lack of positive psychological adjustment 
and emotional stability 
Adapted from Harter, 1990; Judge & Bono, 2003; Judge et al., 1997; Judge et al., 1998; 
Rotter, 1966 
  
  According to the core self-evaluation theory (Judge et al., 1997), core self-
evaluations subconsciously influence how individuals process information and interpret 
their environment. Those with higher evaluations tend to feel in control of situations, are 
better at overcoming obstacles, and are more apt to focus on positive aspects of an event 
(Judge et al., 1998). Similarly, core self-evaluations influence individuals’ perceptions of 
job characteristics (Judge, Bono, & Locke, 2000), as well as their motivation to perform 
their jobs (Erez & Judge, 2001; Judge et al., 1998).  
  Core self-evaluations have been shown to influence work behaviors in both lab 
and field settings. Through a series of studies, Erez & Judge (2001) demonstrated that 
higher core self-evaluations led to increased levels of task performance, task persistence, 
and goal-commitment. Likewise, those with high core self-evaluations were also more 
likely to engage in goal-setting activities.  
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  Kamer & Annen (2010) examined the influence of core self-evaluations on 
performance appraisal outcomes. Specifically, they examined the influence of core self-
evaluations on performance appraisal satisfaction and goal-commitment. Their findings 
revealed that those with higher core self-evaluations reported higher satisfaction with 
their performance appraisal as well as increased goal-commitment.  
  I propose that core self-evaluations will influence the extent to which self-focused 
upward counterfactual thinking effects performance. Because those with higher core self-
evaluations feel more capable of mobilizing a course of action and cognitive resources, 
are less fearful of novel situations, and have increased confidence in their abilities (Bono 
& Judge, 2003; Judge et al., 1998), it is likely core self-evaluations will influence 
whether individuals transfer the benefits of self-focused upward counterfactual thinking 
to performance efforts. Following this logic and consistent with the review of the effects 
of core self-evaluations on task behaviors, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 6: Core self-evaluations moderate the influence of self-focused 
upward counterfactual thinking on performance, such that the influence of self-
focused counterfactual thinking becomes more positive as core self-evaluations 
increase.   
  Counterfactual specificity. Counterfactual thinking enables individuals to 
mentally simulate how alternative behaviors might have led to different outcomes. I 
argue that the specificity level of such simulations (i.e. the counterfactuals) plays an 
important role in determining whether the counterfactuals influence performance. More 
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specifically, I argue that detailed and specific (i.e. concrete) counterfactuals, rather than 
vague and abstract, will more positively effect performance. Theory and findings in the 
goal-setting literature, namely goal-setting theory (Locke & Latham, 1990), as well as 
findings from implementation intention (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006) and counterfactual 
thinking research (Smallman, 2013), illustrate the value of specificity during mental 
simulations. 
Goal-setting research (Locke & Latham, 2002) has found that specificity 
contributes to the effectiveness of goals. According to goal-setting theory (Locke & 
Latham, 1990), specific goals help to reduce ambiguity about what has to be achieved. 
Thus, specific goals direct effort and attention during the pursuit of a task. It is likely that 
the specificity of counterfactuals will regulate effort, attention, and behavior similarly, 
thus leading to stronger effects on performance.   
  I further propose that detailed and specific counterfactuals will exert effects on 
behaviors similar to those of implementation intentions. Implementation intentions have 
been defined as if-then plans that connect good opportunities to act with cognitive or 
behavioral responses that are useful for accomplishing goals (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 
2006). Implementation intentions specify when, where, and how one intends to achieve 
the goal, rather than merely specifying an intended outcome (i.e. a goal intention). The 
detail and specificity of such thoughts create a stronger link in memory compared to 
vague and abstract thoughts (Sheeran et al., 2005). As a result, individuals are more apt to 
engage in goal-directed behaviors when the opportunity presents. Gollwitzer & Sheeran 
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(2006) documented empirical support for this notion in a fairly recent meta-analysis.  
   I propose that there are parallels between implementation intentions and 
counterfactuals. Both thought processes evoke if-then conditionals that serve as self-
regulatory guides for behavior. As such, I argue that when counterfactuals are detailed 
and specific, they will exert a stronger influence on performance. 
  A recent study (Smallman, 2013) in the counterfactual thinking literature offers 
empirical support for my argument. In a series of five studies, Smallman demonstrated 
that counterfactual content influences the extent to which counterfactuals elicit relevant 
behavioral intentions. The level of detail and specificity of counterfactuals were among 
the content aspects examined. The findings revealed that when counterfactuals are 
detailed and specific, they are more likely to evoke behavioral intentions. According to 
the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991), behavioral intentions indicate the extent to 
which one will work hard and expend effort for performance. 
  Based on the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) and building on 
Smallman’s (2013) finding, as well as the parallels between implementation intentions 
and counterfactuals, I predict that: 
Hypothesis 7: Counterfactual specificity moderates the influence of  
self-focused upward counterfactual thinking on performance, such that the 
influence of self-focused counterfactual thinking becomes more positive when 
counterfactual specificity includes a detailed/specific behavioral description. 
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Conditional Indirect Effects. 
 Recall that the overall goal of this research is to offer a more complete picture of 
the effects of reflection. To this end, I have hypothesized boundary conditions that are 
believed to influence the extent to which individuals engage in self-focused upward 
counterfactual thinking following a performance discrepancy, as well as those that are 
believed to influence the extent to which such thinking affects performance. Because the 
proposed relationships are contingent on boundary conditions, so too is the hypothesized 
indirect effect in the proposed research model (Hayes, 2012).  
Stated differently, I argue that the indirect effect of self-focused upward 
counterfactual thinking in the baseline performance discrepancy—performance 
relationship is dependent on the values of the proposed moderators. Thus, I have 
proposed above moderated mediation (James & Brett, 1984) or, in other words, a 
conditional process model (Hayes & Preacher, 2013). A conditional process model 
attempts to explain both how and when an effect occurs (Hayes, 2013) and can, therefore, 
offer valuable insight into complex relationships.   
Assuming task-relevant knowledge, psychological empowerment, and feedback 
specificity moderate the association between baseline performance discrepancy and self-
focused upward counterfactual thinking, it is expected that these constructs will 
conditionally influence the strength of the indirect relationship between baseline 
performance discrepancy and performance. Likewise, assuming that core self-evaluations 
and counterfactual specificity moderate the relationship between self-focused upward 
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counterfactual thinking and performance, it is likely these moderators will influence the 
association between baseline performance discrepancy and performance. Because the 
variables in my proposed research model are expected to demonstrate a pattern of 
moderated mediation, I present and will test the following hypotheses:   
 
Hypothesis 8a: Task-relevant knowledge will moderate the positive and indirect 
effect of baseline performance discrepancy on performance, through self-focused 
upward counterfactual thinking. Specifically, self-focused upward counterfactual 
thinking will mediate the indirect effect when task-relevant knowledge is high but 
not when it is low.  
Hypothesis 8b: Psychological empowerment will moderate the positive and 
indirect effect of baseline performance discrepancy on performance, through self-
focused upward counterfactual thinking. Specifically, self-focused upward 
counterfactual thinking will mediate the indirect effect when psychological 
empowerment is high but not when it is low. 
Hypothesis 8c: Feedback specificity will moderate the positive and indirect effect 
of baseline performance discrepancy on performance, through self-focused 
upward counterfactual thinking. Specifically, self-focused upward counterfactual 
thinking will mediate the indirect effect when feedback specificity is low but not 
when it is high. 
Hypothesis 8d: Core self-evaluations will moderate the positive and indirect effect 
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of baseline performance discrepancy on performance, through self-focused 
upward counterfactual thinking. Specifically, self-focused upward counterfactual 
thinking will mediate the indirect effect when core self-evaluations are high but 
not when core self-evaluations are low. 
Hypothesis 8e: Counterfactual specificity will moderate the positive and indirect 
effect of baseline performance discrepancy on performance, through self-focused 
upward counterfactual thinking. Specifically, self-focused upward counterfactual 
thinking will mediate the indirect effect when counterfactual specificity is high but 
not when it is low. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 In this chapter, I introduce the research methodology used to examine the research 
model discussed in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2). The details of my study are organized into 
three sections. The first section provides details pertaining to the design and data 
collection, which includes a discussion of the simulation I created to test my research 
model and the identification of sample participants. The second section introduces the 
study’s independent, dependent and control measures. The final section details the 
statistical method used to analyze and interpret the data.   
 
Research Design and Data Collection 
Research Setting.  
 To test the conceptual model, I designed, developed, and validated a social 
interaction simulation and administered it via a virtual experiment (Harrison, Lin, Carroll, 
& Carley, 2007) to study participants. Simulations are more standardized than 
observations, as well as other forms of behavioral evaluations, and are an effective means 
of studying behavior (Thornton & Cleveland, 1990). Simulations have enabled 
management scholars to replicate the core features of an activity and to elicit overt 
behaviors from participants, while pursuing highly focused research and controlling for 
extraneous effects (Secchi, 2015; Thornton & Cleveland, 1990). These immersive 
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technology tools have been used extensively to examine aspects of the learning process, 
such as the effects of reflection interventions (e.g. Anseel et al., 2009; Ellis et al., 2006, 
2009), as well as in other management research such as feedback, empowerment, and 
individual work performance (Biron & Bamberger, 2010; Goodman et al., 2004, 2011). 
Scholars have included an array of simulated tasks in management studies, for instance 
electronic workplace correspondence (Anseel et al., 2009), complex decision-making 
endeavors (Ellis et al., 2009), strategic planning (Ellis et al., 2006), and operational 
activities (Goodman et al., 2011). In the current study, a simulated leadership skills task 
was designed, developed, validated, and implemented. I introduce the details of such in 
the following sections.    
 
Simulation Overview and Development. 
 Simulation overview. The simulation, developed via SimWriter® immersive 
learning technology, was comprised of a series of discrete simulated social interactions 
designed to capture realistic workplace interactions and to facilitate assessment of 
leadership skill proficiency. Research participants assumed the role of a manager, Pat 
Reese, and interacted with subordinates in a virtual organization. Participants 
demonstrated their leadership skill by responding to interactions in the leadership role. 
They chose a response from a series of provided potential responses. Following the 
participant’s selection, and using conversation branching rules similar to those of a 
decision-tree structure, the simulated subordinates then replied to the participant with 
comments tailored to the participant’s response selection.  
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I designed the simulation to assess two leadership skills, negotiation and 
management of personnel resources, over task rounds. Each task round included six 
interactions (i.e. conversations), comprised of up to 25 opportunities (i.e. decision points) 
for participants to demonstrate their negotiation skill proficiency and up to 24 
opportunities to demonstrate their management of personnel resources skill proficiency. 
The underlying critical incidents and details of some interactions were inspired by 
negotiation, management, and supervisory case studies and role-plays (Asherman & 
Asherman, 2004; Clandy, 1994; Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders, 2015), whereas others were 
inspired by conversations with management scholars and industry professionals with 
management experience.  Upon executing a trial run of the simulation and based on its 
length, approximately two hours, as well as the results of the skill-domain validation 
process, the findings for which are discussed in Chapter 4, the negotiation interactions 
were removed from the final simulation. Thus, the final simulation deployed in this 
research consisted of three interactions with up to 24 opportunities to demonstrate one’s 
personnel management skills per task round (i.e. six interactions with up to 48 decisions 
total).  
Participants completed the first task round (Time 1) by observing and responding 
to subordinates during three interactions that reflected situations managers routinely 
encounter in the workplace. These included situations such as helping subordinates to 
adjust to organizational changes, to identify root causes of lack of productivity, and to 
communicate effectively regarding task demands. After the first task round, participants 
received performance feedback, and subsequently participated in a written reflection 
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activity. Upon completing the reflection activity, participants advanced to a second task 
round (Time 2), also consisting of three interactions, to demonstrate their leadership skill 
performance following reflection. After completing the simulation, participants were 
debriefed on the purpose of the research.  
 Simulation development. To assure the realism and to enhance the face validity of 
the simulation, the simulation content and context, such as the job setting, worker details, 
and skills, were developed using occupational details provided in the Occupational 
Information Network (O*NET) Content Model (Peterson et al., 2001). O*NET is a 
comprehensive, theoretically and empirically sound system that provides occupational 
information for nearly 950 jobs in the United States (National Center for O*NET 
Development, n.d.). The O*NET Content Model is the conceptual foundation of this 
system.   
The O*NET Content Model (Figure 3) offers a framework for identifying and 
organizing important information about jobs. Six descriptors are used to organize such 
information, including: worker characteristics, worker requirements, experience 
requirements such as skills, occupational requirements, worker characteristics, and 
occupation-specific information. As such, it encompasses both job-oriented descriptors, 
as well as worker-oriented descriptors. Likewise, it includes occupational-specific 
descriptors and cross-occupational descriptors—thus enabling occupational information 
to be applied across jobs and industries (Mumford & Peterson, 1999). In these ways, the 
O*NET skills domain provides a common language for leadership skills across job 
settings. Moreover, the O*NET skills domain integrates decades of academic research 
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and is considered the most comprehensive skills model from which to draw from when 
investigating leadership skills (Mumford et al., 199; Mumford et al., 2007, p. 164; 
Peterson et al., 2001). Therefore, the leadership skills that served as the foundation for the 
simulation developed for this study are included in the O*NET skills taxonomy and those 
considered essential for more than 25% of O*NET classified occupations.  
Figure 3 
The O*NET Content Model 
 
 
Adapted from National Center for O*NET Development, n.d. 
 
The choice to focus on leadership skills within my simulation was important for 
several reasons. Foremost to this point, scholars have stressed the importance of 
reflection for leadership development (Ashford & DeRue, 2012; DeRue et al., 2012) and 
have drawn attention to the leadership talent deficit common across many organizations. 
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Ashford & DeRue (2012) reported up to 70% of North American employers lack 
sufficient leadership skills within their workforces. Similarly, recent reports indicate the 
deficit is widening in every region of the world, with 86% of HR leaders citing leadership 
as their number one challenge (Deloitte University Press, 2015). Due to such findings, it 
was practically relevant and important to investigate the extent to which counterfactual 
reflection influences how one may learn from feedback and improve performance on 
leadership tasks. 
It was also important to capture reality while investigating these issues via 
computer simulation (Secchi, 2015). To this point, the simulation reflected careful 
consideration of design properties that contribute to psychological realism (Colquitt, 
2008). Specifically, I included vivid and engrossing interactions, accompanied by 
detailed background information, graphics, and audio-video content. To illustrate, 
Figures 4 and 5 below provide sample simulation content. 
Figure 4 
Sample Simulation Audio-Video Content: Manager - Employee Interaction 
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Figure 5 
Sample Simulation Graphic: Manager’s Email Correspondence 
 
Email content adapted from Eylon & Herman, 1999 
Additionally, I filmed the audio-video content in a realistic workplace setting. 
Specifically, I obtained permission from a local business to use their facilities to film 
each simulated interaction. There, I filmed 186 scenes, which featured 13 actors of 
varying ages, ethnicity, and gender. I chose actors for the simulated interactions from 
available volunteers, friends, and family.  These actors were age appropriate for the role 
they played in the simulation.    
Recall that as participants engaged in simulated interactions, they received 
multiple responses from which to choose. I designed the simulation such that each 
response option reflected varying degrees of leadership skill effectiveness. To assure the 
response options reflected varying levels of skill proficiencies, I developed and validated 
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behaviorally anchored rating scales (BARS) (Smith & Kendall, 1963), as described in the 
next section, which I used to guide the design of participant response options. 
Subsequently, I used the scales to validate the corresponding response option scores used 
for performance score calculations in the final simulation.   
In addition to the careful development of participant response options, the design 
of the current study required two complete task versions (Time 1 and Time 2 tasks) to test 
the effects of counterfactual reflection on leadership skill performance. It was important, 
therefore, to ensure that Time 1 tasks (i.e. three interactions per skill category) were 
equivalent in complexity to those presented at Time 2. To develop such, I followed an 
incident isomorphic cloning procedure (Clause, Mullins, Nee, Pulakos, & Schmitt, 1998; 
Lievens & Sackett, 2007) that has been supported as an effective means of developing 
alternate assessments (Lievens & Anseel, 2007) and has been implemented in prior 
management reflection studies (Anseel et al., 2009).  
The incident isomorphic cloning procedure is grounded in item generation theory, 
which posits that the items that comprise test forms (in this case simulated interactions) 
contain both radicals and incidentals (Kyllonen, 2002). Radicals are structural features 
that determine item difficulty, whereas incidentals are surface details and characteristics 
that do not influence item difficulty (Dennis et al., 2002; Irvine et al., 1990; Lievens & 
Sacket, 2007). Based on the role of these factors, the incident isomorphic cloning 
procedure consists of developing alternate task items by generating item variants that 
retain the radicals (features that determine item difficulty) while altering the incidentals 
(surface details) (Lievens & Anseel, 2007). Specifically, when following this approach, 
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the skill domain and the critical incident are considered radicals that impact item 
difficulty. Conversely, the context of the incident, as well as linguistic and grammar 
changes to the context in which the incident is embedded and the ways of responding to 
the incident, are incidentals (Lievens & Sackett, 2007). Consequently, these were the 
incidentals of focus when I developed item variants for the alternate simulated 
interactions.    
As such, the incident isomorphic cloning procedure yielded alternate task 
measurement items (i.e. task rounds) that were based on the same critical incident yet 
appeared superficially different. Although superficial details varied between task items, 
by using behaviorally anchored rating scales as the foundation for generating the original 
and alternate task items, I generated psychometrically equivalent task rounds. I now 
discuss the steps for developing and validating the behaviorally anchored rating scales, 
followed by the simulation validation protocol.   
 
Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scales. 
Behaviorally anchored rating scales are assessment tools that capture performance 
in multi-dimensional, behavior-specific terms (Schwab, Heneman, & DeCotiis, 1975) and 
provide raters with behavioral descriptions that exemplify varying degrees of each 
dimension (Smith & Kendall, 1963). BARS are designed to standardize observation and 
rating processes (Smith & Kendall, 1963; Jacobs, Kafry, & Zedeck, 1980). Additionally, 
scholars consider BARS useful when providing feedback, as the scales provide concrete 
examples of job behaviors that can be improved (Cummings & Schwab, 1973). To these 
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points and to support one of my primary design goals—to design a simulation that 
includes participant response options with varying levels of skill proficiencies and an 
empirically sound scoring scheme—I developed behaviorally anchored rating scales for 
the negotiation and the management of personnel resources skill domains. 
Scholars have long argued that BARS cannot be developed in a haphazard fashion 
(Bernardin & Smith, 1981). Rather, the development procedure for BARS is a multi-step 
process that draws upon the expertise of those with knowledge of the job and integrates 
feedback from those who will use the scales for observation and rating purposes. Because 
the focal skill domains in my simulation (see Table 4 below) are well documented, and 
some behavioral descriptions were adapted from BARS utilized in prior studies (Mero & 
Motowidlo, 1995), I employed a variation of multi-step BARS development procedures 
that have been implemented in prior studies (Schwab et al., 1975; Smith & Kendall, 
1963), which I now describe.  
Table 4 
Leadership Skills Included in Simulation Development 
Skill Definition 
Negotiation 
bringing others together and trying to recognize differences 
(Mumford et al., 1999) 
Management of 
Personnel Resources 
motivating, developing, and directing people as they work 
(adapted from Mumford et al., 1999) 
 
Step 1: For each skill domain, I identified specific illustrations of effective and 
ineffective behavior. To this end, I reviewed relevant literature and resources, as well as 
established BARS, that included the two leadership skills assessed in my simulation. 
73 
 
 
Following this approach, I identified critical incidents for each skill domain from 
multiple scholarly sources, as well as (“Coaching,” SIOP, 2016; Hill, 1997; Lewicki et 
al., 2015; Lewicki, Saunders, & Barry, 2011; Mero, 1994; Noe, Hollenbeck, Gerhart, & 
Wright, 2014).   
Step 2: Based on the critical incidents identified in Step 1, I generated behavioral 
statements that illustrated specific behaviors at low, moderate, and high levels of skill 
proficiency. Each level of skill proficiency was assigned numeric point values consistent 
with a 7-point BARS. For instance, Table 5 illustrates varying levels of skill for 
motivating and showing sensitivity to employee needs, as well as the corresponding point 
values.  
Table 5 
Sample BARS Behavioral Statements 
Proficiency 
Level 
Behavioral Statement 
High 
(6 to 7) 
Creates work environment that recognizes and rewards employee 
goal accomplishment and shows sensitivity to employee personal 
needs 
Moderate 
(3 to 5) 
Attempts to motivate others by providing feedback and 
encouragement and being aware of personal needs 
Low 
(1 to 2) 
Does not motivate or encourage others to exert more effort on task 
accomplishment or recognize personal needs 
  
Step 3: The third step included a retranslation task in which a group of individuals 
were asked to reallocate the behavioral statements according to the three levels of skill 
proficiency. Stated differently, they were asked to match each statement to its intended 
level of proficiency. To this end, I provided the definition of each skill, as well as a 
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summary of critical incidents associated with each skill, to five judges and asked them to 
assign each behavioral statement to the level of skill proficiency reflected in the 
statement. Moreover, I requested their general feedback about any statements that were 
unclear.  
Scholars contend that when users of the BARS participate in this process, it 
enhances the face validity of the scale, and raters may be “sold” on the desirability of 
executing future ratings honestly and carefully (Smith & Kendall, 1963).  As such, four 
of the five judges who participated in the retranslation task used the BARS in subsequent 
rating tasks as part of the simulation validation process, and all five had sufficient 
qualifications, namely terminal degrees, to participate in the process. Based on their 
reallocation of the behavioral statements and their general feedback, I revised behavioral 
statements as necessary. Specifically, three behavioral statements on the negotiation 
BARS were revised to include a direct reference to conflict, thereby maintaining 
consistency with other behavioral statements in the scale.  
Step 4: After revising the behavioral statements, another group of 10 judges, half 
of whom were eventual users of the BARS in subsequent rating tasks and all of whom 
had either a terminal degree or 10+ years of management experience, completed the 
reallocation task, using the process described in Step 3. In this case, however, there was 
clear modal agreement for each behavioral statement and consensus that all statements 
were clear and representative of varying levels of skill performance. Thus, I retained all 
statements in the final BARS. The final negotiation and management of personnel 
resources BARS included multiple behavioral statements per proficiency level, five and 
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four respectively. The final BARS, used to design and to validate the simulation content 
can be found in Appendix A. I now describe the specific steps taken during the 
simulation validation process. 
 
Simulation Validation. 
Recall that I incorporated O*NET job information in the development of my 
simulation. Although this responded to calls for research designs that maximize content 
validity, as well as external validity (Colquitt, 2008; Scandura & Williams, 2000), I also 
took additional steps to validate the simulation and the effectiveness of the leadership 
skill scoring rules. More precisely, expert raters conducted independent evaluations of the 
simulation content, using the behaviorally anchored rating scales described above. The 
expert raters were comprised of individuals from academia and industry professionals 
with leadership experience. I conducted three expert rating processes, as shown in Table 
5. In the following sections, I provide an overview of each rating process, and I provide 
the results in Chapter 4.  
Table 6 
Expert Rater Evaluations 
Content Evaluated Aim of Evaluation/Details 
Time 1 and Time 2 tasks 
Assess the similarity between the incidents depicted 
in Time 1 and Time 2 interactions 
Participant response options 
Determine the ranking of skill effectiveness for each 
set of response options 
76 
 
 
Social interactions 
Identify the skill domain represented in each 
interaction 
o Time 1 tasks = 6 interactions  
o Time 2 tasks = 6 interactions  
 
Time 1 and Time 2 tasks cloning. To assure the cloning process yielded two task 
rounds that were equivalent in complexity, the content of each round was assessed to 
determine the degree of similarity between Time 1 tasks and Time 2 tasks. Following an 
established protocol by Lievens & Anseel (2009), five independent raters participated in 
the rating process.  
It was important to assess the similarity of each parallel point of the cloned 
interactions. As such, the raters evaluated the similarity of the item stems (situations 
surrounding the interactions) of each original and cloned task item (interaction), as well 
as the item responses (responses available to participants during the interactions). More 
precisely, they assessed the similarity of 261 cloned sets, which included: 1) six cloned 
interaction introductions, 2) 87 cloned simulated character scenes, and 3) 168 cloned 
participant response options.  The similarity of each was assessed using a 7-point scale, 
ranging from 1 = not at all similar in terms of content to 7 = very similar in terms of 
content.  
Participant response options. I conducted a second rating in which expert raters 
reviewed the response options presented to participants during the simulation. The goal 
of this aspect of the review was to assure that the ranking of skill effectiveness presented 
for the decision points in the interactions represented the intended skill levels (i.e. low, 
moderate, and high). To this end, I provided raters with the behaviorally anchored rating 
77 
 
 
scales used during the simulation development process and asked that they assess the 
behaviors depicted in each response using the provided behavioral scales.  
The expert rater group for this task was comprised of 10 individuals. Five 
assessed the participant response options in first task round, and five assessed the 
response options in the second task round. More precisely, each rater evaluated 168 
participant response options of varying skill proficiencies, namely 56 high, 56 moderate, 
and 56 low-skill proficiency response options.  
The data generated via the rater evaluation process was analyzed using an analysis 
of variance (ANOVA), which provided an empirical test of whether there were 
significant differences between the low, moderate, and high skill proficiencies reflected 
in the response options at each decision point during the interactions.  
Social interactions. To validate the simulated social interactions, I adapted a 
content validity assessment procedure suggested by Hinkin & Tracey (1999) to 
empirically test the skills reflected in each social interaction. I asked a group of raters to 
examine the content of the simulation and to identify the skill domain captured in each 
interaction. More precisely, 30 raters assessed the extent to which each social interaction 
captured the negotiation skill domain, as well as the extent to which each interaction 
captured the management of personnel resources skill domain, using a 5-point Likert type 
scale ranging from 1= not at all to 5= completely. The raters were also asked to classify 
each interaction as either a negotiation interaction or a management of personnel 
resources interaction.     
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Cloning effectiveness pilot study. The final step in the simulation validation 
process was a pilot study designed to provide further verification that the cloning 
procedure used to generate alternate task versions for Time 1 and Time 2 was effective. 
Based on the results of the skill domain rating task and the projected length of the full 
simulation, the negotiation interactions were not included in the pilot study, nor the final 
simulation. With the condensed simulation consisting of six management of personnel 
resources interactions (i.e. three per round), I collected data to test whether mean 
performance on the two task rounds was comparable as viewed by non-expert 
participants. In prior research, undergraduate students and, in some cases, college 
applicants have been used to assess differences between alternate test versions (e.g. 
Lievens & Anseel, 2007; Lievens, Buyse, & Sackett, 2005; Lievens & Sackett, 2007). 
Following this practice, my pilot study sample was comprised of undergraduate business 
students, and all received extra credit for their participation.  
Participants completed both task versions in a counterbalanced order, and I 
collected 58 usable responses. This provided a sufficient number of observations to 
determine if there were significant differences between mean performance on each task 
round (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). Specifically, I analyzed the data with a 2 
(order: normal vs. reversed) X 2 (task: Time 1 vs. Time 2) mixed ANOVA, with repeated 
measures on the last factor and performance as the dependent variable. I discuss the 
results in Chapter 4. 
 
79 
 
 
Reflection Prompt Pilot Study. 
 I conducted a second pilot study to test the effectiveness of the reflection prompt 
(see Appendix B). The sample was comprised of 12 undergraduate business students 
(58% female, 42% male). They were provided the counterfactual reflection prompt and 
were asked to reflect on their performance during a leadership and teamwork simulation, 
completed as part of a junior-level organizational behavior course. The content of their 
reflections confirmed that the reflection instructions were effective for prompting 
counterfactual thoughts. As such, I determined that the prompt was acceptable for my 
final data collection. 
 
 Final Data Collection.  
The sample to test my hypotheses was comprised of both graduate and 
undergraduate students, recruited from multiple U.S. universities. Prior reflection studies 
in the management literature (e.g. Anseel et al, 2009; Ellis et al., 2006, 2009), including 
DeRue et al. (2012) who examined the influence of reflection on leadership development, 
have included student samples. Similarly, the use of student samples is common practice 
throughout counterfactual thinking research (e.g. Markman et al., 1995; Roese & Olson, 
1993; Sanna, 1997; Smallman & Roese, 2009). More importantly, I selected a student 
sample for my study due to recent industry reports, which indicate that organizations 
consistently struggle to develop leadership skills across all levels—particularly among 
millennial leaders (Deloitte University Press, 2015).  Additionally, Mumford, Campion, 
& Morgeson (2007) have demonstrated that leadership skills are needed at all 
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organizational levels, and the leadership skills included in my research are those needed 
at all levels of organizational strata—including junior (1-5 years of experience), mid (6-
20 years), and senior (21+ years) levels (Mumford et al., 2007). Thus, graduate and 
undergraduate students, whose experience levels are represented in such strata, were an 
appropriate sample for this study.  
To encourage individuals to participate, I highlighted that the skills on which they 
were assessed are skills often evaluated in employment selection processes (Lievens & 
Anseel, 2007). I also informed participants that workplace simulations are often used in 
professional settings to develop individuals for management positions (Anseel et al., 
2009). Thus, through their participation, they had the opportunity to test their skill levels 
relative to those desired in selection and promotion decisions. I assured participants that 
their survey responses, performance scores, and reflection content would remain 
confidential. Additionally, students received extra credit for participation, when permitted 
by their instructors and the policies of their respective institutions.   
The faculty who assisted with the recruitment process provided the participation 
link to their students directly and, in some cases, posted to the link universities’ learning 
management systems (e.g. Blackboard®). The participation link remained active for four 
weeks, and a total of 613 students (136 graduate; 483 undergraduate) were invited to 
participate in the study.  
Of the 613 students invited to participate, 251 students (41%) provided their 
consent to participate in the study. Due to technology reporting failures, 18 cases were 
missing substantial amounts of data (i.e. >50%) and, consequently, were removed from 
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the final data set. Additionally, 34 participants completed the initial survey measures, 
described in the next section but failed to proceed to the simulation. Of the remaining 199 
participants who completed the initial survey measures and launched the simulation, three 
terminated their participation via an “early exit” option within the simulation, and 27 
dropped out without confirming their intent to exit. High incompletion rates have been 
found in prior web-based simulation studies (e.g. Anseel et al., 2009); however, through 
follow-up inquiries with assisting faculty, I learned that some participants did not adhere 
to instructions related to mobile device incompatibility. As such, the 27 dropouts who did 
not confirm their intent to exit may have exited because of compatibility issues. In sum, I 
collected 169 usable responses, 34% from graduate students and 66% from undergraduate 
students, which captured the full data collection process.   
Figure 6 illustrates the full data collection process. I have illuminated each stage 
of the data collection process in the figure. In the following sections, I introduce the 
details of each stage.  
Figure 6 
Data Collection Process 
 
 
 
* PE=psychological empowerment  
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Informed consent and condition assignment. Data collection complied with all 
policies and procedures set forth by the Institutional Review Board at Kennesaw State 
University. Participants provided informed consent to their participation. Data were 
collected using web-based survey software, as well as a web-based simulation developed 
with Tin Can xAPI learning technology specifications.  
As stated previously, participants assumed the position of a manager in a 
simulated organization. I randomly assigned participants to one of six conditions within 
the simulation, as shown in Table 7. These included manipulations of feedback 
specificity and psychological empowerment antecedents, such as autonomy support from 
leader, peer support, and resource availability (Laschinger, Finegan, Shamian, & Wilk, 
2001; Seibert et al., 2011). 
Table 7 
Experimental Conditions 
Condition Details 
1 Low psychological empowerment, low feedback specificity 
2 Low psychological empowerment, moderate feedback specificity 
3 Low psychological empowerment, high feedback specificity 
4 High psychological empowerment, low feedback specificity 
5 High psychological empowerment, moderate feedback specificity 
6 High psychological empowerment, high feedback specificity 
 
Individual difference, control, and task-relevant knowledge measure. Prior to 
beginning the simulation tasks, participants completed a core self-evaluation self-report 
survey (see Appendix C), as well as other individual difference measures for relevant 
control variables (see Appendices D-F). Additionally, participants completed an 
assessment designed to measure task-relevant knowledge (see Appendix G). After 
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completing the survey items, I directed participants to the webpage with the social 
interaction simulation, where they proceeded to Time 1 tasks.  
 Time 1 tasks. Participants demonstrated their management of personnel resources 
skills across three social interactions. During each task, participants interacted with a 
simulated employee and, to facilitate communication with the employees, were provided 
multiple responses from which to choose. Each response option reflected varying degrees 
of leadership skill effectiveness and had a point value associated with its effectiveness 
level (i.e. low = 1 point, moderate = 4 points, high = 7 points).  
Feedback provided. Web-based software tracked and recorded the participants’ 
responses. Additionally, the software tracked the corresponding score for each response, 
which it used to generate an overall performance score for Time 1 tasks. Upon 
completing the Time 1 tasks, the computed performance scores, as well as simulation-
generated performance feedback was provided to the participants. The content of the 
feedback varied based on the condition in which the participant was assigned. 
Manipulation check and psychological empowerment measure. After participants 
received their performance feedback, they completed a feedback specificity manipulation 
check (see Appendix H). Likewise, to help assess the extent to which psychological 
empowerment influences self-focused upward counterfactual thinking, participants 
provided self-reported psychological empowerment data (see Appendix I) prior to the 
reflection intervention. 
Counterfactual reflection intervention. When participants completed the feedback 
specificity manipulation check, as well as the psychological empowerment survey, the 
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simulation directed them to a counterfactual reflection intervention. The reflection 
intervention protocol included a reflection prompt, and I designed the simulation such 
that participants could not proceed to Time 2 tasks until they had spent at least five 
minutes on the reflection activity. I subsequently analyzed the reflection content provided 
by participants to assess the extent to which they engaged in self-focused upward 
counterfactual thinking. I discuss the process used to analyze the reflection content in the 
measurement section. 
Time 2 tasks. After participants completed the written reflection activity, they 
proceeded to Time 2 tasks that consisted of three social interactions (i.e. clones of Time 1 
tasks). Participants’ responses and scores were recorded and tracked, using the same 
process as Time 1.  
Debrief.  The experiment concluded with a debriefing, which was facilitated by 
the simulation.  The content of the debrief included a general description of the purpose 
of the research which protected details that, if shared with others, could potentially prime 
prospective participants.  Specifically, participants were informed that the purpose of the 
research was to determine if actions and thoughts taken early in the simulation influenced 
subsequent behaviors.    
 
Common Method Variance. 
My data collection process mitigated the threats associated with common method 
variance (CMV), the variance attributed to the method of measurement (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Specifically, my study included an objective 
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measure of performance. As such, the measurement of the criterion variable was 
separated from the source of the predictor measurement. In the following section, I 
discuss the details of each measure.  
 Measures  
Independent Variable. 
 Baseline performance discrepancy. After completing Time 1 tasks, participants 
received instant feedback on their Time 1 performance, which the computer simulation 
software automatically generated. The feedback addressed their baseline performance 
discrepancy, the difference between participants’ performance on Time 1 tasks and the 
desired performance (i.e. 100%). Thus, I operationalized baseline performance 
discrepancy as the extent to which Time 1 performance was below the target score, which 
was computed as: the target score minus Time 1 performance score earned. To illustrate, 
if a participant earned a score of 77% on Time 1 tasks, then the baseline performance 
discrepancy was 23. I now describe the process for calculating their performance below.   
    Dependent Variable. 
 Performance. Recall that, throughout the interactions, participants selected their 
preferred responses from provided options. As previously described, I assigned each 
response varying points based on skill effectiveness (i.e. low = 1 point, moderate = 4 
points, high = 7 points). Performance, the dependent variable, represented the overall 
score (i.e. percentage) earned on Time 2 tasks, which was tracked and reported by the 
simulation software. 
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Mediating Variable.  
 Self-focused upward counterfactual thinking. Self-focused upward counterfactual 
thoughts are thoughts about how one could have attained a better outcome by altering his 
or her behavior. To measure self-focused upward counterfactual thinking, I followed 
established coding procedures (e.g. Roese & Olson, 1993, 1995; Scholl & Sassenberg, 
2014). Two independent coders, blind to the subjects’ treatment condition or scores on 
any of the study’s measures, qualitatively assessed the respondents’ reflections and coded 
the referent focus (i.e. self-, other-, or situation- focused), as well as the direction of each 
counterfactual thought. Prior to coding, the coders received training on the coding task as 
well as the coding rules. 
Following the training and rules provided, the coders identified whether each 
thought was a counterfactual. When counterfactuals were identified, the coders proceeded 
to determine whether the counterfactual referent was self-, other-, or situation-focused. 
They coded counterfactual thoughts that specified alternatives to the respondents’ 
behavior as self-focused. In contrast, counterfactual thoughts that focused on alternatives 
to another person’s (e.g. the simulated person’s) behavior were coded as other-focused. 
Situation-focused thoughts included thoughts that referred to situational details or both 
actors (Scholl & Sassenberg, 2014) and were coded as such.  
Additionally, the coders identified the direction of counterfactual thoughts. They 
coded counterfactual thoughts that specified an outcome better than the actual outcome as 
an upward counterfactual. Conversely, they coded counterfactual thoughts that specified 
an outcome worse than the actual outcome as a downward counterfactual.  
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The coding process resulted in the frequency of each type of counterfactual 
thought. The current study examines the influence of self-focused upward counterfactual 
thinking on performance. Therefore, the percentage of such thoughts relative to the 
participants’ total thoughts (i.e. lines of reflection text) was the measurement focus of 
interest and the operationalization of self-focused upward counterfactual thinking.  
Following the process described, the coders evaluated 553 lines of text. To 
determine if there was agreement between the coders on whether the 553 lines of text 
contained counterfactual thoughts, I assessed Cohen’s k, which takes into account chance 
agreement and is appropriate when the aim is to assess absolute agreement between two 
coders (Cohen, 1960; Hallgren, 2012).  The two coders agreed that 178 lines contained 
counterfactual thoughts and 322 lines lacked such thoughts. There was substantial 
agreement between the two coders’ judgement (Landis & Koch, 1977), k = .79 (95% CI, 
.75 to .85), p < .001. 
Despite substantial agreement, the coders disagreed on 53 lines of text. As such, a 
third coder, whom received the same coding rules and training as the two primary coders, 
evaluated the items in question to resolve coding disagreements. Using a majority 
decision rule, 37 of the 53 lines were determined to contain counterfactual thoughts, 
whereas 16 did not. Thus, the total number of counterfactual thoughts identified was 215.  
As stated, the coders also determined the referent and direction of the 
counterfactuals. Recall that, when identifying counterfactual thoughts, the two primary 
coders agreed upon 178 counterfactuals. Their agreement on which type of counterfactual 
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(i.e. the referent-direction) reflected in these thoughts was very good, k = .91 (95% CI, 
.85 to .97), p <.001.  
Similar to the process previously described, a third coder resolved coding 
disagreements. To better illustrate the frequency of the types of counterfactuals 
participants generated and, in particular, the number of those that represent the mediating 
variable in this study, Table 8 summarizes the total number of each type of counterfactual 
identified and provides a sample statement for each:  
Table 8 
Counterfactuals Identified in Participants’ Reflections 
Type of 
Counterfactual 
Total Sample Participant Statement 
Self-focused upward 
(mediating variable) 
132 
When talking to each of the employees I could 
have had a better two-way conversation in order to 
help each of them with their problem(s). 
Self-focused 
downward 
8 
Had I been more direct and curt, I think employees 
would have been on the defensive and that is not 
how I want to run this department. 
Other-focused 
upward 
6 
Some of the performers weren't very clear with 
their responses and if they were that would of 
helped out a lot.   
Other-focused 
downward 
0 n/a 
Situation-focused 
upward 
69 
If there would have been a script button, I would 
have been able to follow along and pick up more 
of the details of the situation being presented.    
Situation-focused 
downward 
0 n/a  
TOTAL= 215  
 
Moderating Variables. 
 Task-relevant knowledge. Due to the need for a task-relevant knowledge measure 
that aligned closely with the simulation tasks, I developed the measure for this variable 
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specifically for this study. The behavioral statements in the management of personnel 
resources behaviorally anchored rating scale served as the foundation for this measure. 
Participants completed a 11-item self-report measure, in which they were asked to rate 
the extent to which their professional training and experience provided them the 
knowledge to engage in the tasks commonly performed to manage personnel resources. 
The tasks included in the measurement items paralleled those in the behaviorally 
anchored rating scales and, thus, were derived from scholarly sources (“Coaching,” 
SIOP, 2016; Hill, 1997; Lewicki et al., 2015, 2011; Mero, 1994; Noe et al., 2014). Items 
were rated on a 7-point Likert response format scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = 
strongly agree), and sample items included, (a) “Create a work environment that 
recognizes employee goal accomplishment” and (b) “Develop employees by correcting 
their weaknesses.” I provided the full measure in Appendix G.  
Extant literature has demonstrated that job experience influences task-relevant 
knowledge. More precisely, job experience contributes to the acquisition of such 
knowledge (Schmidt, Hunter, & Outerbridge, 1986). To this point, scholars (e.g. 
Ahearne, Mathieu, & Rapp, 2005) have included job experience measures when 
operationalizing task-relevant knowledge. Following this research, I collected the months 
of supervisory experience for each participant as a supplemental indicator of task-
relevant knowledge. 
 Psychological empowerment.  As previously discussed, I manipulated antecedents 
of psychological empowerment within the simulation. Specifically, participants who were 
randomly assigned to the high empowerment condition received email correspondence 
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within the simulation that suggested they had a high level of: (a) autonomy support from 
leader, (b) peer support, (c) resource availability, and (c) recognition, all of which are 
psychological empowerment antecedents (Seibert et al., 2011).  Conversely, those in the 
low empowerment condition received email correspondence that suggested a lack of 
such.  I adapted some of the email content from Eylon and Herman (1999), whereas I 
created other content specifically for this study. I have provided sample manipulations in 
Table 9. 
Table 9 
Sample Manipulations of Psychological Empowerment Antecedents 
Condition Sample Email Content 
High 
From: Taylor Hail, Director of Operations 
To: Pat Reese, Department Manager- Division 1 
Subject: Client Satisfaction Numbers Are In! 
 
Great work, Pat! I just glanced at the results of our recent client 
satisfaction report and your department is in the top spot again! I 
really appreciate all your hard work, as well as the guidance and 
support you provide to your team. You have really done a great job 
with them. Keep up the good work!  
 
- Taylor 
 
Low 
From: Taylor Hail, Director of Operations 
To: Pat Reese, Department Manager- Division 1 
Subject: Client Satisfaction Numbers Are In 
 
Alright, Pat, I just glanced at the results of our recent client 
satisfaction report and your department is lagging behind the other 
divisions. It’s obvious you’re not giving your team the guidance they 
need. Your recent attempts to improve performance appear to have 
had minimal effect. It is time to try a different approach.  
 
- Taylor 
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Similar to some field-setting psychological empowerment interventions (e.g. 
Logan & Ganster, 2007), the manipulations in the current study targeted three of the four 
dimensions of psychological empowerment, namely competence, self-determination, and 
impact. Although the meaning dimension additively contributes to overall psychological 
empowerment (Spreitzer, 1995), manipulations did not target this dimension. 
I made the choice to exclude manipulations that targeted the meaning dimension 
after thoughtful consideration of the essence of this dimension. The meaning dimension 
involves an individual’s “intrinsic caring about a given task” and reflects an individual’s 
assessment of a task in relation to his or her own ideals and values (Spreitzer, 1995; 
Thomas & Velthouse, 1990, p. 672). Thus, I expected that individuals would naturally 
vary on this dimension independent of the manipulations provided during the study.   
I assessed the influence of the empowerment manipulations with an adapted 
version of the Psychological Empowerment in the Workplace Scale (Spreitzer, 1995), as 
provided in Appendix I. Participants were instructed that their focal role for the scale 
items was their role in the simulation. The scale included 12-items, measured with a 7-
point Likert response format. 
 Feedback specificity. Participants were randomly assigned to a low, a moderate, 
or a high feedback specificity condition. To manipulate feedback specificity, I followed 
established protocol (Davis et al., 2005; Feys et al., 2011; Goodman et al., 2011; 
Northcraft, Schmidt, & Ashford, 2011). Participants in the low specificity condition 
received objective performance feedback and a brief, vague explanation of their 
performance. Those in the moderate condition received their score, as well as feedback 
92 
 
 
that included error signal information to direct their attention to possible causes of errors 
or ways to prevent errors in future tasks. The high feedback specificity condition included 
the same feedback as the moderate condition, in addition to detailed feedback on correct 
(incorrect) behaviors exhibited during multiple decision points in the simulation. I have 
provided a sample feedback message for each condition in Table 10.  
Table 10 
Sample Feedback Messages 
Condition Sample Feedback Message 
Low  
Feedback 
Specificity 
You received a low score, 57%, on ‘management of personnel 
resources,’ which indicates that you were unable to motivate, 
develop, and direct people as they work. This means that you did 
not assist employees in performance improvement and skill 
development nor recognize and reward goal accomplishment. 
Moderate 
Feedback 
Specificity 
You received a low score, 57%, on ‘management of personnel 
resources.’ This means that you did not display appropriate 
behaviors when trying to motivate, develop, and direct people as 
they work. People like you who achieved a low score on 
‘management of personnel resources’ are not yet capable of putting 
into practice the behaviors needed to assist employees in 
performance improvement and skill development and to recognize 
and reward goal accomplishment. In the future, when trying to 
manage personnel resources, try to assist employees in developing 
insight for performance improvement, to create balanced 
conversations for constructing development plans, and to be 
attentive to their needs and capabilities. 
High  
Feedback 
Specificity 
You received a low score, 57%, on ‘management of personnel 
resources.’ This means that you did not display appropriate 
behaviors when trying to motivate, develop, and direct people as 
they work. People like you who achieved a low score on 
‘management of personnel resources’ are not yet capable of putting 
into practice the behaviors needed to assist employees in 
performance improvement and skill development and to recognize 
and reward goal accomplishment. For instance, the following 
behaviors were noted during your interactions: 
 
 Although you attempted to motivate Laura, you failed to 
recognize and reward her goal accomplishment. 
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 In your conversation with Alex, you missed opportunities to 
engage Alex in a two-way developmental conversation and 
to recognize her personal needs. 
 In some instances, you failed to motivate and to encourage 
Michael, as well as to utilize questioning techniques for 
developing a path for his improvement. 
 
In the future, when trying to manage personnel resources, try to 
assist employees in developing insight for performance 
improvement, to create balanced conversations for constructing 
development plans, and to be attentive to their needs and 
capabilities. 
 
 To assess whether the manipulations of the three feedback specificity conditions 
were effective, I adapted two manipulation check items, measured on a 5-point Likert 
scale (1= strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree), from Goodman et al. (2004, 2011): (a) 
“I received detailed feedback about my performance as a unit leader” and (b) “I was 
given specific feedback about my performance as a unit leader.” The original items are 
presented in Appendix H. 
 Core self-evaluations. I measured core self-evaluations with a 12-item 
measurement, developed by Judge et al. (2003). Participants responded to 12 items using 
a 5-point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree). Sample items included: 
“Sometimes, I do not feel in control of my work” and “When I try, I generally succeed.” 
The measure is provided in Appendix C.  
 Counterfactual specificity. Counterfactual specificity refers to the extent to which 
counterfactuals provide a concrete behavioral description, rather than an abstract 
behavioral description. Thus, I operationalized counterfactual content as the proportion of 
concrete behavioral descriptions included in participants’ counterfactual thoughts relative 
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to their total number of counterfactual thoughts. Similar to other measurement aspects of 
the counterfactuals, two independent coders, whom received training and coding rules, 
qualitatively assessed the content of the counterfactuals to determine the level of 
specificity reflected in each thought. The coders rated each counterfactual thought on the 
extent to which it included a particular course of action (i.e. a specific behavior), using a 
5-point Likert response format scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree).  
I assessed Cohen’s k (Cohen, 1960) to determine if there was agreement between 
the coders on whether the counterfactual thoughts contained specific behaviors. There 
was substantial agreement between the two primary coders (Landis & Koch, 1977), k = 
.79 (95% CI, .75 to .85), p < .001. For each item in which there was a lack of agreement 
(i.e. the coders did not code it the exact same), I calculated a mean counterfactual 
specificity rating from the two ratings. When determining the proportion of specific 
counterfactuals out of the total number of counterfactual thoughts, I included 
counterfactuals that rated greater than or equal to four, and the final measurement value 
was the ratio of high specificity counterfactuals out of the total number of thoughts, 
expressed as a percentage.  
 
Control Variables. 
Individual differences. To account for relationships established in prior research, I 
used control variables. Need for cognition—the tendency for individuals to engage in and 
enjoy thinking (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982)—has been shown to influence the effectiveness 
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of counterfactual thinking (Petrocelli, Seta, & Seta, 2013) as well as reflection (Anseel et 
al., 2009) on task performance. Thus, I controlled for this variable using an 18-item scale 
(Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Consistent with prior research (Anseel et al., 2009), 
participants responded to these items using a 7-point anchored scale (1= extremely 
uncharacteristic of me and 7= extremely characteristic of me). Sample items include “I 
really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems” and “The 
notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.” The 18-item scale is included in 
Appendix D. 
 I also controlled for learning goal orientation—a mindset that motivates an 
individual to develop his or her competence by acquiring new skills or mastering new 
situations (Dweck, 1986; Dweck & Leggett, 2000). Anseel et al. (2009) demonstrated 
that written reflections are more effective for improving task performance when 
individuals have a high learning orientation. Similarly, Wong, Haselhuhn, & Kray (2012) 
have demonstrated that implicit beliefs—the beliefs that underlie learning goal 
orientation—influence the effects of counterfactual thinking. Based on these findings, I 
controlled for learning goal orientation using four items from VandeWalle, Cron, & 
Slocum's (2001) scale, measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree). Sample items include, “I truly enjoy learning for the sake of learning” 
and “I like classes that really force me to think hard.” The measurement items are 
presented in Appendix E.   
Additionally, studies have demonstrated that conscientiousness, a Big Five 
(McCrae & Costa, 1987) personality trait that is exemplified by planning, organization, 
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persistence, and achievement, among other behaviors, influences learning and reflection 
processes (e.g. Bidjerano & Dai, 2007; Colquitt & Simmering, 1998; DeRue et al., 2012; 
Komarraju, Karau, Schmeck, & Avdic, 2011). Therefore, I controlled for 
conscientiousness using six items from the NEO Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO-
PI-R) (Costa & McCrae, 1992). These items were measured on a 5-point scale (1 = 
strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) and are provided in Appendix F. 
Demographic variables. Prior research has established that multiple demographic 
variables can impact learning processes (e.g. Cassara, 1990; Joy & Kolb, 2009; Maurer, 
2001; Severiens & ten Dam, 1994). As a result, and consistent with DeRue et al. (2012) 
as well as DeRue & Wellman (2009), I controlled for international status (1 = born 
outside the U.S., 0 = born in the U.S.), as well as age and gender (0 = male, 1 = female). 
Additionally, I controlled for total amount of work experience, measured as number of 
months of full-time experience.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
 In this chapter, I provide a comprehensive review of the data and the results for 
each analysis I conducted to validate the simulation and to test the hypotheses. 
Accordingly, I have organized the details in this chapter in four sections. In the first 
section, I provide details pertaining to the simulation validation process, which includes 
the results from three expert rater evaluations as well as my pilot study. The second 
section includes an evaluation of the measurement model, followed by the results of the 
hypotheses testing. In the final section, I provide a summary of results, and I provide a 
detailed discussion of the findings subsequently in Chapter 5.   
 
Simulation Validation: Rating Tasks and Pilot Study 
Cloning Task. 
Recall that I followed an established protocol by Lievens & Anseel (2009) when 
examining the effectiveness of the incident isomorphic cloning procedure. Five 
independent raters (40% female, 60% male) participated in the rating process.  The raters 
had an average work experience of 20 years (SD= 9.03) and an average of 12 years (SD= 
7.87) experience using behaviorally anchored rating scales or similar behavioral 
guidelines to rate individual performance. Sixty-percent of the raters had a masters or 
terminal degree. 
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To determine the degree to which the raters provided consistency in their ratings 
of the 261 cloned sets, I assessed inter-rater reliability with a two-way mixed, 
consistency, average measures intra-class correlation (ICC). This is an appropriate 
measure for fully crossed designs in which the researcher seeks to determine if the raters 
provided scores that are similar in rank order and when the average of the ratings is of 
focal interest (Hallgren, 2012; LeBreton & Senter, 2008; McGraw & Wong, 1996). Based 
on the assessment for the current rating task, the resulting ICC was in the excellent range, 
ICC= .84 (95% CI, .81 to .87), p < .001 (Cicchetti, 1994). The ICC demonstrated that the 
raters had a high level of agreement and rated the cloned items similarly (LeBreton & 
Senter, 2008).  
The average similarity rating across all cloned items was 6.52 (SD=.48). The 
results indicated that the simulation contained six cloned interactions (three cloned 
negotiation interactions and three cloned management of personnel resources 
interactions). As such, the rating process provided preliminary results that the cloned 
interactions were suitable for use in the data collection process. Subsequently, I 
conducted a pilot study to confirm whether the two task rounds were comparable as 
viewed by non-expert participants, and I provide those details in a later section.  
 
Participant Response Options Rating Tasks. 
Time 1 participant response options. Five raters (60% female, 40% male) 
independently evaluated each set of response options presented in Time 1 interactions. 
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The raters had an average work experience of 21.8 years (SD= 5.42), an average of 6 
years (SD= 4.42) experience using behaviorally anchored rating scales or similar 
behavioral guidelines to rate individuals’ performance, and were scholars and industry 
professionals. 
Participant response options were comprised of three levels of intended skill 
proficiency: low (n= 280), moderate (n= 275), and high (n= 275). Due to an error on the 
rater data-collection spreadsheet, there was one moderate- and one high-skill proficiency 
response option missing from the data. Nevertheless, given the high number of 
observations per cell and the limited amount of missing data, I determined that the 
missing values would not materially affect the results (Hair et al., 2010). There were no 
outliers, as assessed by boxplot, and the data were normally distributed, as assessed by 
histograms and values of skewness and kurtosis. However, Levene’s test of homogeneity 
of variances indicated that homogeneity of variances was violated (p = .046). As such, 
Welch’s F (Welch, 1951) and Games-Howell post hoc analyses were conducted to 
correct for this issue (Field, 2013; Hair et al., 2010)  
Specifically, I conducted a one-way Welch ANOVA to determine whether the 
level of skill proficiency reflected in participant response options was different for each 
intended proficiency level. The mean expert rating for participant response options was 
statistically significantly different among the three intended skill proficiency groups 
Welch’s F (2, 549.24) = 550.40, p <.001. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, 
was .56. The expert rating of skill proficiency reflected in participant response options 
100 
 
 
 
increased from low (M = 2.19, SD = 1.17) to the moderate (M = 4.24, SD = 1.30), and 
high (M = 5.62, SD = 1.30) intended skill proficiency groups, all in the intended 
direction.  
Games-Howell post hoc analysis (see Table 11) revealed that the mean increase 
from low to moderate (2.05, 95% CI [1.80, 2.30]) was statistically significant (p <.001), 
as was the increase from moderate to high (1.39, 95% CI [1.13, 1.64], p <.001). The 
results indicate that Time 1 participant response options reflect the intended levels of skill 
proficiency.  
Table 11 
Time 1 Participant Response Options: Intended Skill Proficiency Comparisons 
Games-Howell Post-Hoc Analysis, Dependent Variable = Expert Rating  
 
(I) Intended Skill  
Proficiency 
(J) Intended 
Skill  
Proficiency 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Low Moderate -2.051* .105 .000 -2.297 -1.804 
High -3.436* .105 .000 -3.683 -3.190 
Moderate Low 2.051* .105 .000 1.804 2.297 
High -1.385* .111 .000 -1.645 -1.126 
High Low 3.436* .106 .000 3.190 3.683 
Moderate 1.385* .111 .000 1.126 1.645 
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
In addition to assessing the mean differences among the intended skill proficiency 
groups, I also assessed inter-rater reliability. Similar to the cloning rating task, I assessed 
inter-rater reliability with a two-way mixed, consistency, average measures intra-class 
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correlation (ICC). The results indicated that there was a high level of agreement and 
participant response options were rated similarly, as determined by an ICC result in the 
excellent range, ICC= .88 (95% CI, .84 to .90), p < .001 (Cicchetti, 1994).  
Time 2 participant response options. Independent of Time 1 participant response 
option ratings, five raters evaluated the participant response options presented to 
participants in the Time 2 interactions. The raters had an average of 26.60 years (SD= 
12.06) of work experience and 15.80 years (SD= 7.83) of experience using behaviorally 
anchored rating scales to evaluate performance. Similar to the Time 1 rater group, the 
raters for Time 2 participant response options were scholars and industry professionals.  
Following the steps used to analyze the Time 1 participant response option ratings 
I conducted an initial examination of the data to detect outliers, to assess normality, and 
to assess homogeneity of variances. Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances revealed 
borderline results (p = .052). As such, and for consistency with the approach used with 
the Time 1 ratings, I analyzed the expert ratings with a Welch ANOVA and a Games-
Howell post hoc analysis.  
I conducted a Welch ANOVA to determine whether the level of skill proficiency 
reflected in participant response options was different for each intended proficiency level. 
Again, the participant response options were comprised of three levels of intended skill 
proficiency, and there were no missing data in the Time 2 ratings, therefore: low (n= 
280), moderate (n= 280), and high (n= 280).   
102 
 
 
 
The mean expert rating for participant response options was statistically 
significantly different among the three intended skill proficiency groups Welch’s F (2, 
557.36) = 673.50, p <.001. A large effect size, .61 was found (Cohen, 1988). The expert 
rating of skill proficiency reflected in participant response options increased as intended. 
Specifically, the ratings increased from low (M = 2.20, SD = 1.08) to moderate (M = 
4.27, SD = 1.16), and high (M = 5.67, SD = 1.16).  
The mean increases were statistically significant, as determined by a Games-
Howell post hoc analysis. As illustrated in Table 12, the increase from low to moderate 
(2.07, 95% CI [1.85, 2.29]) was statistically significant (p <.001). Likewise, the increase 
from moderate to high was also statistically significant (1.38, 95% CI [1.15, 1.60], p 
<.001). The results indicate that Time 2 participant response options reflect the intended 
levels of skill proficiency.  
Table 12 
Time 2 Participant Response Options: Intended Skill Proficiency Comparisons 
Games-Howell Post-Hoc Analysis, Dependent Variable = Expert Rating 
(I) Intended Skill  
Proficiency 
(J) Intended 
Skill  
Proficiency 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Low Moderate -2.068* .095 .000 -2.290 -1.846 
High -3.443* .095 .000 -3.666 -3.220 
Moderate Low 2.068* .095 .000 1.846 2.290 
High -1.375* .099 .000 -1.606 -1.145 
High Low 3.443* .095 .000 3.220 3.666 
Moderate 1.375* .098 .000 1.145 1.606 
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Additionally, the raters had a high level of agreement and rated the response 
options similarly. The results of a two-way mixed, consistency, average measures ICC 
was in the excellent range, ICC= .87 (95% CI, .64 to .99), p < .001 (Cicchetti, 1994). To 
review the overall results from the participant response options rating processes, I now 
provide a brief summary of the Time 1 and Time 2 participant results. 
Participant response options rating summary. The aim of the participant response 
option rating task was to validate that the ranking of skill effectiveness for the decision 
points in the interactions represented the intended skill levels (i.e. low, moderate, and 
high). The results of the Time 1 and Time 2 rating tasks, reported above, indicate that the 
participant response options indeed reflected statistically significant differences among 
levels of skill proficiency. Additionally, the intended levels of skill proficiency aligned 
with expert rater judgments. For each rating task, there was a high level of agreement and 
consistent ratings across raters. Taken together, the results validate the level of skill 
proficiency reflected in participant response options in the simulation. I summarize the 
mean ratings for each proficiency group in Table 13. 
Table 13 
Expert Ratings: Participant Response Options, Mean Ratings of  
Intended Skill Proficiency Groups 
Intended Skill 
Proficiency Level 
Time 1 Participant 
Response Options 
Time 2 Participant 
Response Options 
Low 2.19 (SD = 1.17) 2.20 (SD = 1.08) 
Moderate 4.24 (SD = 1.30) 4.27 (SD = 1.16) 
High 5.62 (SD = 1.30) 5.67 (SD = 1.16) 
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Social Interactions Rating Task. 
To assess the extent to which each social interaction captured its intended skill 
domain, thirty raters evaluated the content of each social interaction. The raters (63% 
female, 37% male) had an average of 24.53 years (SD = 9.94) of total work experience, 
18.80 years (SD = 9.94) experience in a position that required negotiation skills, 15.03 
years (SD = 9.01) experience in a position that required management of personnel 
resource skills, and 8.13 years (SD = 7.10) experience using behaviorally anchored rating 
scales to evaluate individuals’ performance. The majority (83%) held, at least, a masters 
degree and 57% had doctoral level training.  
Recall that I designed six interactions to assess participants’ management of 
personnel resources skills and six to assess their negotiation skills. Thus, the raters 
evaluated the content of 12 interactions. For each interaction, a paired-samples t-test was 
used to determine whether there was a statistically significant mean difference between 
the interaction’s rating on the extent to which it depicted a situation in which the manager 
displayed negotiation skills compared to the extent to which it depicted a situation in 
which the manager displayed management of personnel resources skills. This was an 
appropriate analysis to assess how a single target, in this case each interaction, rated in 
terms of responses to two different questions (Pallant, 2013). Prior to conducting each 
analysis, I inspected the data to ensure the basic assumptions of t-tests had been met, as 
well as the paired-samples t-test assumption of normal distribution of the difference 
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between the two scores for each interaction. I provide the results of each analysis below, 
and I have organized the interactions by intended skill domain.  
 Management of personnel resources interactions. The “Alex” interaction rated 
higher on management of personnel resources (M = 3.87, SD = 1.11) compared to 
negotiation (M = 1.90, SD = 1.00), a statistically significant mean increase of 1.97, 95% 
CI [1.32, 2.61], t (29) = 6.22, p <.001, d = 1.14. Thus, the interaction reflected the 
intended skill domain.   
Likewise, the “Julie” interaction rated higher on management of personnel 
resources (M = 4.43, SD = .67) compared to negotiation (M = 2.07, SD = 1.31), a 
statistically significant mean increase of 2.67, 95% CI [1.82, 2.91], t (29) = 8.80, p <.001, 
d = 1.61. Again, a large effect was found (Cohen, 1988), and the interaction reflected the 
posited skill domain.  
As posited, the “Chris” interaction rated higher on management of personnel 
resources (M = 4.40, SD = .81) compared to negotiation (M = 2.30, SD = 1.26), a 
statistically significant mean increase of 2.10, 95% CI [1.48, 2.72], t (29) = 6.90, p <.001, 
d = 1.26. Thus, the results indicate that the “Chris” interaction reflected the intended skill 
domain. 
I also designed the “Michael” interaction to assess management of personnel 
resources skills. As intended, the interaction rated higher on management of personnel 
resources (M = 4.40, SD = .72) compared to negotiation (M = 2.37, SD = 1.27), a 
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statistically significant mean increase of 2.03, 95% CI [1.43, 2.64], t (29) = 6.84, p <.001, 
d = 1.25. Thus, the content of the interaction aligned with its intended skill domain.  
The “Laura” interaction rated higher on management of personnel resources (M = 
4.50, SD = .82) compared to negotiation (M = 2.40, SD = 1.22), a statistically significant 
mean increase of 1.86, 95% CI [1.40, 2.80], t (29) = 6.17, p <.001. The results indicated a 
large effect size, 1.13 (Cohen, 1988), and the interaction reflected the intended skill 
domain.  
Lastly, the “Sam” interaction also rated higher on management of personnel 
resources (M = 4.30, SD = .75) compared to negotiation (M = 1.36, SD = 1.10), a 
statistically significant mean increase of 1.93, 95% CI [1.40, 2.51], t (29) = 6.92, p <.001. 
Again, I found a large effect size, 1.26 (Cohen, 1988) and determined that the interaction 
reflected the intended skill domain. 
Negotiation interactions. I designed the “Joe” interaction to assess participants’ 
negotiation skills. As intended, the interaction rated higher on negotiation (M = 4.13, SD 
= .86) compared to management of personnel resources (M = 1.93, SD = 1.08), a 
statistically significant mean increase of 1.56, 95% CI [1.62, 2.79], t (29) = 7.71, p <.001, 
d= 1.41. Thus, the content of the interaction aligned with the posited skill domain.  
Similarly, the “Kevin” interaction also captured the intended skill domain. 
Specifically, the interaction rated higher on negotiation (M = 4.20, SD = 1.06) compared 
to management of personnel resources (M = 1.73, SD = 1.11), a statistically significant 
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mean increase of 2.47, 95% CI [1.74, 3.20], t (29) = 6.95, p <.001. The results indicated a 
large effect size, d= 1.27 (Cohen, 1988).  
I also designed the “Joyce” interaction to assess participants’ negotiation skills. 
The interaction rated higher on negotiation (M = 4.70, SD = .47) compared to 
management of personnel resources (M = 2.00, SD = 1.05), a statistically significant 
mean increase of 2.70, 95% CI [2.23, 3.17], t (29) = 11.70, p <.001, d= 2.14. Thus, the 
content of the interaction aligned with the posited skill domain. 
Likewise, the “Ryan” interaction rated higher on negotiation (M = 4.27, SD = .69) 
compared to management of personnel resources (M = 2.83, SD = 1.26), a statistically 
significant mean increase of 1.43, 95% CI [.93, 1.94], t (29) = 5.79, p <.001, d= 1.06. 
Thus, the results indicated that the content of the interaction reflected the intended skill 
domain.  
I designed the “John” interaction to reflect an interaction that would facilitate the 
assessment of participants’ negotiation skills. Contrary to my design intent, the 
interaction rated higher on management of personnel resources (M = 3.40, SD = 1.32) 
compared to negotiation (M = 3.33, SD = 1.45). However, the mean difference was not 
statistically significant, .67, 95% CI [-.85, .91], t (29) = .15, p = .88. Thus, the expert 
raters did not perceive the interaction as one that distinctly reflected the negotiation skill 
domain.  
The “Dylan” interaction, the last negotiation interaction evaluated, was rated 
higher on negotiation (M = 3.47, SD = 1.28) compared to management of personnel 
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resources (M = 3.10, SD = 1.21). Nevertheless, the mean difference was not statistically 
significant, .38, 95% CI [-.42, 1.16], t (29) = .95, p = .35. Thus, similar to its clone, the 
“John” interaction, the “Dylan” interaction did not distinctly reflect the negotiation skill 
domain. 
Social interactions rating task summary. The social interactions rating task 
assessed the extent to which the posited skill domain reflected in each social interaction. 
The results indicated that all six management of personnel resources interactions 
successfully captured the intended skill domain, whereas four of the six negotiation 
interactions successfully captured the intended skill domain. Two interactions, the “John” 
and “Dylan” clones, did not distinctly reflect the intended skill, negotiation.  
Recall that, in addition to the ratings discussed in the preceding sections, the 
expert raters also made a subjective decision as to which skill primarily reflected in the 
manager’s statements (i.e. the participant role in the simulation). The results were 
consistent with the findings above. The majority classification for each aligned with the 
intended skill domain, with the exception of two negotiation interactions. As such, I 
retained the six management of personnel resources interactions and advanced to the 
cloning effectiveness pilot study.  
 
Cloning Effectiveness Pilot Study. 
To assess whether mean performance on the two task rounds was comparable as 
viewed by non-expert participants, 62 participants completed both tasks (Time 1 and 
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Time 2 interactions) in a counterbalanced order. Initial inspection of the data revealed 
four cases with extreme scores more than two standard deviations below mean 
performance and completion times that suggested that the participants may have “clicked 
through” the simulation without weighing the various response options at each decision 
point. As such, I chose to remove those cases. Thus, the final sample included 58 usable 
responses for the two groups: normal (n = 28) and reversed (n = 30). The sample was 
59% female, had a mean age of 20.67 years (SD = 1.25), and had a mean work 
experience of 2.23 years (SD = 2.21). 
On average, participants completed the simulation in 40.05 minutes (SD = 11.78). 
The mean performance scores for the two task versions, presented to participants in a 
counterbalanced order, are reported in Table 14. I analyzed the performance data with a 2 
(order: normal- vs. reversed-order) X 2 (task: Time 1 vs. Time 2) mixed ANOVA, with 
repeated measures on the last factor and performance as the dependent variable. Results 
showed neither an interaction effect between task and order, Wilks’ Lamba = 1.00, F (1, 
56) = .005, p = .95, nor a significant main effect of task, Wilks’ Lamba = .97, F (1, 56) = 
.208, p = .65. The results indicated adequate alternate-form reliability at the level of task 
version and absence of practice or fatigue effects. As such, I determined that the 
simulation was ready for use in the hypothesis test study.  
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Table 14 
Pilot Study Mean Performance Scores, Order * Task Version 
Order Task  Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Normal 1 79.99 1.84 76.31 83.68 
2 79.67 1.71 76.25 83.10 
Reversed 1 78.75 1.78 75.20 82.31 
2 78.32 1.65 75.10 81.63 
 
Hypotheses Test Study Data Evaluation 
 Recall that I obtained 169 usable responses from my hypotheses test study 
sample. Upon collecting the data, I conducted an initial evaluation to identify outliers. 
Additionally, I conducted analyses to assess attrition bias, so I could determine whether 
the characteristics of the participants lost prior to launching the simulation, as well as 
those who failed to complete the simulation, differed significantly from those who 
completed the study in its entirety. The following sections outlines the results of these 
evaluation processes.  
Outlier Identification.  
To assess whether outliers were present, I conducted a Mahalanobis distance test 
D2, an appropriate outlier detection approach for multivariate analyses, which measures 
the distance of cases from the mean of the predictor variables (Field, 2013). I identified 
one outlier, participant #103, which reported above (3.41) the suggested threshold, D2/df 
> 2.5 (Hair et al., 2010). Upon further examination, I determined that the outlier 
contained observations within the ordinary range of values on each variable. Because the 
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participant did not appear to be particularly high or low on any variables, rather just 
unique in combination, I chose to retain the case so as not to reduce the sample size 
further, nor to ignore a potentially valid element of the population (Hair et al., 2010).  
  
Attrition Bias. 
 Due to the number of participants, 8 graduate- and 56 undergraduate students, 
who either elected to drop out or were unable to complete the simulation because of 
technical complications, it was important to assess whether those who dropped out were 
systematically different from those in the final sample. To this end, I conducted 
independent sample t-tests to assess differences in age, work experience, and supervisory 
experience between those in the final sample and those who did not complete the study in 
its entirety. While it was clear that some participants (n = 34) opted not to proceed to the 
simulation after completing the initial survey measures, recall that there was reason to 
believe that other participants, whose attrition occurred after launching the simulation (n 
= 30), may have failed to complete the study due to technical issues. As such, I conducted 
separate analyses to account for two types of attrition: 1) attrition prior to launching the 
simulation and 2) attrition after launching the simulation.    
 I reported the mean age for the final sample as well as the two attrition groups in 
Table 16. An independent-samples t-test revealed there was no significant difference in 
age between those in the final sample and those who dropped out during the simulation   
(t = 1.87, p = .07). In contrast, the difference in age between the final sample and that of 
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the second attrition group (i.e. attrition prior to launching the simulation) was 
significantly different (t = 4.54, p <.001). As reported in Table 15, the mean age of the 
final sample was higher.  
Table 15 
Attrition Bias Analysis for Age 
 N Mean S.D. 
Attrition during simulation  30 23.33 6.96 
Attrition prior to launching simulation 
Launch 
34 21.91 3.33 
Completed study and included in final sample 169 26.06 9.28 
Total 233 25.10 8.51 
   
 Tables 16 and 17 provide the means and standard deviations for total work 
experience and for supervisory experience. The results of independent sample t-tests 
demonstrated that there was a significant difference in work experience for those in the 
final sample and those who terminated their participation during the simulation (t = 2.04, 
p = .05). Likewise, there was a significant difference in work experience for the final 
sample and those who failed to proceed to the simulation after completing the initial 
survey measures (t = 4.12, p < .001). For supervisory experience, the final sample was 
significantly different from the attrition during simulation group (t = 1.93, p = .06), as 
well as the attrition prior to launching simulation group (t = 4.73, p < .001).   
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The differences in age, work experience, and supervisory experience between 
those who dropped out and those who completed the study can likely be attributed to the 
higher number of graduate students in the final sample (n = 58) compared to those who 
dropped out (n = 8). Thus, while differences between attrition groups and final samples 
can be undesirable (Gravetter & Forzano, 2012), in this case, the older, more experienced 
individuals in the final sample were more closely aligned with my desired sample.  
Table 16 
Attrition Bias Analysis for Years of Work Experience 
 N Mean S.D. 
Attrition during simulation  30 4.96 4.86 
Attrition prior to launching simulation 
Launch 
34 3.73 3.14 
Completed study and included in final sample 169 7.20 8.47 
Total 233 6.41 7.62 
 
Table 17 
Attrition Bias Analysis for Years of Supervisory Experience 
 N Mean S.D. 
Attrition during simulation  30 1.29 2.88 
Attrition prior to launching simulation 
Launch 
34 .52 .85 
Completed study and included in final sample 169 2.58 5.32 
Total 233 2.11 4.71 
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Prior to testing the hypotheses, I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
to test measurement model validity. This examined the alignment among the data and the 
theoretical specification of factors (Hair et al., 2010). I performed the CFA using the IBM 
SPSS® AMOS TM  version 22.0.0 software package. In the following sections, I report the 
steps I took to assess the initial measurement model as well as to improve model fit. 
Subsequently, I report the details of the final measurement model, as well as construct 
reliability and convergent and discriminant validity.   
 
Initial Measurement Model. 
Recall from Chapter 3, my study includes two latent constructs, two direct 
measures calculated by the simulation software, two direct measures from coding 
processes, and one experimentally manipulated categorical variable. Because 
confirmatory factor analysis assesses the extent to which measured variables represent 
latent constructs, only the three latent constructs in my research model were included in 
the CFA (Hair et al., 2010), namely psychological empowerment, task-relevant 
knowledge, and core self-evaluations. Each construct exceeded recommendations for a 
minimum of three to four indicators (Byrne, 2013; Hair et al., 2010). Specifically, each 
consisted of multiple indicators, including 12 for psychological empowerment, 11 for 
task-relevant knowledge, and 12 for core self-evaluations. To illustrate, an image of the 
initial measurement model is provided in Figure 7, Initial Measurement Model.  
115 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
Initial Measurement Model 
 
After I specified and, subsequently, estimated the measurement model, I reviewed 
multiple indices to determine the acceptability of the model fit. As recommended, I 
assessed X2 (1552.51), as well as a minimum of two other fit indices and the 
corresponding thresholds (Hair et al., 2010), which are summarized in Table 18, Initial 
Measurement Model Fit Results. As reported, modifications were needed to improve 
model fit. Therefore, I proceeded to a multi-step process to refine the model, which I 
describe in the following section.  
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Table 18 
Initial Measurement Model Fit Results 
Fit Index Desired Actual 
Chi-square/Degrees of Freedom 
(CMIN/DF) 
Below 2 is preferred; 
2-5 is acceptable 
2.772 
Comparative Fit Index  
(CFI) 
>.92 .699 
Root Mean Square error of 
Approximation 
(RMSEA) 
<.08 .103 
Note: The desired values are based on a model with 35 observed variables and N < 250 
(Hair et al., 2010). Current model: N = 169 
 
Model Refinement. 
 To refine the measurement model, it was necessary to identify and remove 
problematic indicators. Therefore, I followed established protocol to identify those with 
low validity, low reliability, strong and significant measurement error covariances, or 
non-hypothesized cross-loadings (Hair et al., 2010; MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Podsakoff, 
2011, p. 316). To this end, I examined the statistical significance of each loading, as well 
as the standardized loadings; those with values less than .50 were noted for potential 
removal. I also reviewed the modification indices to identify significant measurement 
error covariances with high expected change estimates.  
Using this approach, I removed nine items from the model, and I conducted the 
model evaluation steps in an iterative process following each removal.  Two indicators 
associated with question numbers 3 and 9 of the core self-evaluation scale (see Appendix 
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C) were removed due to low factor loadings, .48 and .45 respectively. I removed the 
indicators associated with question numbers 9 and 11 of the task-relevant knowledge 
scale (see Appendix G) due to measurement error covariances with high modification 
indices (e.g. 29.99). Likewise, I removed five indicators from the psychological 
empowerment. The indicators, which were associated with question numbers 1, 3, 9, 11, 
12 on the psychological empowerment scale (see Appendix I) which had measurement 
error covariances and had high modification indices (e.g. 81.29, 27.82).  
These changes improved X2 (589.41), as well as other indices, as shown in Table 
19. Although the final model does not pass the >.92 CFI threshold, the removal of 
additional indicators in the pursuit of improving fit would likely come at the expense of 
testing a true model based on theory and would far exceed the recommended limits for 
indicator removal (Hair et al., 2010). For these reasons, along with an acceptable 
CMIN/DF, as well as an acceptable RMSEA which can be used to reject the null 
hypothesis of poor fit (Coehlin, 2004), I chose not to remove additional indicators.  
Table 19 
Model Refinement Results  
 
Fit Index Desired Initial Model Final Model 
CMIN/DF 
Below 2 is preferred; 
2-5 is acceptable 
2.772 1.971 
CFI >.92 .699 .852 
RMSEA <.08 .103 .076 
     Note: N = 169 
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Construct Validity and Reliability. 
 Once I refined the measurement model, I evaluated construct validity and 
reliability. To this end, I examined the convergent, discriminant, and nomological 
validity as well as the internal consistency of the observed indicator variables. The 
evaluations, described below, indicated that the constructs met the recommended 
thresholds for both validity and reliability.  
Convergent validity. To assess convergent validity, I examined the standardized 
regression weights (factor loadings), variance extracted (AVE), and reliability. As shown 
in Table 21, all factor loadings meet the recommended minimum of .5 and many exceed 
the preferred .7 threshold. Moreover, the variance extracted exceeds 50 percent, and 
construct reliabilities surpass the minimum threshold of .7, thereby suggesting adequate 
reliability. Taken together, the findings reported in Table 20 support the convergent 
validity of the measurement model (Hair et al., 2010).   
Table 20 
Standardized Regression Weights, AVE, and Reliability Estimates 
    PE TRK CSE 
PE PE2 .72   
PE PE4 .91   
PE PE5 .93   
PE PE6 .74   
PE PE7 .64   
PE PE8 .59   
PE PE10 .75   
TRK TRK1  .83  
TRK TRK2  .75  
TRK TRK3  .68  
TRK TRK4  .71  
TRK TRK5  .67  
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    PE TRK CSE 
TRK TRK6  .84  
TRK TRK7  .78  
TRK TRK8  .83  
TRK TRK10  .79  
CSE CSE1   .80 
CSE CSE2   .74 
CSE CSE4   .85 
CSE CSE5   .53 
CSE CSE6   .55 
CSE CSE7   .78 
CSE CSE8   .86 
CSE CSE10   .70 
CSE CSE11   .62 
CSE CSE12   .88 
AVE 58.21% 59.86% 54.62% 
Construct Reliability .91 .93 .92 
Note: PE = Psychological Empowerment; TRK = Task-Relevant Knowledge;  
CSE = Core Self-Evaluations; N = 169 
 
Discriminant validity. To assess the extent to which each construct was distinct 
from the other constructs, I compared the AVE of each construct with the corresponding 
squared interconstruct correlations to ensure that the AVE was higher. I reported the 
findings in Table 22. As illustrated, the results indicated that the AVEs indeed exceed the 
squared interconstruct correlation estimates and, thus, support the discriminant validity of 
the constructs.  
Nomological validity. To assess nomological validity, I examined the correlations 
between the constructs in the measurement model. As shown in Table 21, the constructs 
are positively related. Prior empirical research and theory suggest that core self-
evaluations are positively related to psychological empowerment and task-relevant 
knowledge, and task-relevant knowledge can influence psychological empowerment (e.g. 
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Bandura, 1989; Seibert et al., 2011). Therefore, the analysis of correlations among the 
constructs, which are both positive and significant, support the nomological validity of 
the model.  
Table 21 
Construct Correlation Matrix 
  
Psychological 
Empowerment 
Task-Relevant 
Knowledge 
Core Self-
Evaluations 
Psychological 
Empowerment 1.00 .37 .37 
Task-Relevant 
Knowledge 
.61*** 
1.00 .18 
Core Self-
Evaluations 
.61*** .42*** 
1.00 
AVE 58.21% 59.86% 54.62% 
Significance Level: * = .05, ** = 10, *** = .001 
Note: Values below the diagonal are correlation estimates among constructs; values above the diagonal are 
squared correlations. N = 169 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Manipulations 
Descriptive Statistics. 
Descriptive statistics and correlations among variables are reported in Table 22. 
As can be seen, baseline performance discrepancy and Time 2 performance was 
significantly correlated (r = -.91, p < .01). Age (r = -.34, p < .01), education (r = -.38, p 
< .01), work experience (r = -.26, p < .01), and supervisory experience (r = -.28, p < .01) 
were all significantly correlated to baseline performance discrepancy, with more 
experienced and higher educated participants having lower performance discrepancy, 
thus providing additional support for the validity of the simulation. As shown, similar 
correlations between these variables and Time 2 performance were also found.  
 
 
 
 
1
2
1
 
Table 22 
Descriptive Statistics, Inter-correlations, and Reliability 
    Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 
Baseline Perf. 
Discrepancy 
22.47 11.57 --             
2 Time 2 Performance 77.16 11.07 -.91** --            
3 
Self-Focused  
Upward CFTa 
27.50 36.33 .12 -.14 --           
4 
Task-Relevant 
Knowledge 
5.62 .90 -.15 .17* .06 .92          
5 
Psychological 
Empowerment 
5.61 .73 -.19* .19* .03 .44** .84         
6 Feedback Specificityb -- -- .001 .03 .05 .04 .03 --        
7 CFT Specificityc 32.30 41.40 -.04 .05 .15* .12 .02 -.03 --       
8 
Core  
Self-Evaluations 
4.05 .67 -.12 .14 .14 .20** .28** -.12 .12 .84      
9 Work Experienced 87.03 101.75 -.26** .27** .04 .15 .23** -.08 .09 .19* --     
10 
Supervisory 
Experiencee 
31.15 63.80 -.28** .27** .06 .19* .22** -.11 .08 .14 .83* --    
11 Age 26.06 9.28 -.34** .35** -.02 .20** .20** -.11 .07 .21** .91** .70** --   
12 Educationf -- -- -.38** .41** -.08 .19* .14 -.05 .02 .23* .60** .45** .73** --  
13 Genderg -- -- -.21**   .24 .04 .09 .07 .05 .02 .07 .11 .02 .09 .08 -- 
Note: N = 169; Cronbach’s alpha coefficients when appropriate are shown on the diagonal; ** p < 0.01 (2-tailed); * p < 0.05 (2-tailed). 
a Percentage of self-focused upward counterfactual thoughts out of total thoughts recorded in reflection 
b  Coded 0 = Low, 1 = High feedback specificity 
c Percentage of specific counterfactuals out of total counterfactual thoughts recorded in reflection 
d Work experience was measured in months. 
e Supervisory experience was measured in months. 
f Coded 0 = Undergraduate student, 1 = Graduate student 
g Coded 0 = Male 1 = Female 
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Additionally, psychological empowerment was significantly correlated to lower baseline 
performance discrepancy (r = -.19, p < .05), and both psychological empowerment (r = 
.19, p < .05) and task-relevant knowledge (r = .17, p < .05) were significantly correlated 
with Time 2 performance, demonstrating that those who felt more empowered and 
reported higher levels of task-relevant knowledge performed somewhat better on the 
simulation tasks. 
Manipulations. 
Recall that my study included manipulations of feedback specificity and 
psychological empowerment antecedents. Prior to testing the hypotheses, I evaluated the 
effectiveness of the manipulations by analyzing participants’ responses to the 2-item 
perceived feedback specificity manipulation check (see Appendix H), as well as the mean 
ratings on the psychological empowerment scale (see Appendix I). I provide the results in 
the following sections.  
Feedback specificity. The feedback specificity manipulations included three 
specificity levels: low (n= 58), moderate (n= 55), and high (n= 56). When I assessed 
perceptions of feedback specificity among the three groups, Levene’s test of homogeneity 
of variances indicated that homogeneity of variances was violated (p = .001). 
Consequently, I conducted a one-way Welch ANOVA to determine whether the mean 
ratings of perceived feedback specificity differed significantly for each level of feedback 
specificity. Results demonstrated that the mean rating of perceived feedback specificity 
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was statistically significantly different among the three groups, Welch’s F (2, 166) = 
10.94, p <.001, with a medium to large effect size, .13 (Cohen,1988).  
Despite reaching statistical significance, the actual difference in mean scores 
between the groups indicated that, for some groups, participants’ perceptions of feedback 
specificity were not aligned with the intended levels of feedback specificity. More 
precisely, post-hoc comparisons using the Games-Howell test, which corrects for the 
homogeneity of variances violation, indicated that the mean score for the low feedback 
specificity condition (M = 4.96, SD = 1.40) did not differ significantly from the moderate 
feedback specificity group (M = 5.29, SD = 1.10). However, the mean difference between 
the low and high conditions (-.98, 95% CI [-1.49, -.47]) was significantly different (p 
<.001), as was the difference between moderate and high (-.65, 95% CI [-1.09, -.20], p 
<.001). On the basis of these findings, to conduct subsequent analyses I combined the 
low and moderate groups such that the final feedback specificity variable included two 
conditions (i.e. low and high).  
Psychological empowerment. To assess whether manipulations of psychological 
empowerment antecedents were effective for influencing the extent to which participants 
felt empowered, I conducted an independent-samples t-test to compare psychological 
empowerment scores for participants in the low (n = 93) and high (n = 76) conditions. 
There was no significant difference in scores for those in the low psychological 
empowerment group (M = 5.67, SD = .66) and those in the high group (M = 5.54, SD = 
.81). The magnitude of the mean difference (.13, 95% CI [-.10, .35]) was very small 
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(Cohen, 1988), d = .18, and not in the intended direction. I note this finding as a 
limitation and discuss it in more detail in Chapter 5.  
 
Data Analysis 
  To test hypothesis 1, I conducted a hierarchical regression analysis using IBM® 
SPSS® 23.0.0 software. I used a two-step process. First, I entered the control variables in 
Model 1, followed by the independent variable, baseline performance discrepancy, in 
Model 2.  
All subsequent hypotheses were tested with the PROCESS macro—a 
computational tool for SPSS, developed by Preacher and Hayes (Preacher & Hayes, 
2004) to help researchers overcome analytical challenges associated with mediation, 
moderation, and conditional process analyses (Hayes, 2012). This tool uses a path 
analysis framework to estimate coefficients in ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
models and can generate direct, indirect, and conditional indirect effects in moderated 
mediation models (Hayes, 2012, 2013). 
 For each proposed boundary condition in the relationship between baseline 
performance discrepancy and self-focused upward counterfactual thinking (H1 – H4), I 
utilized PROCESS Model 1, as there was not an ideal PROCESS model to test all 
moderators simultaneously. Using the PROCESS options available, I requested the mean 
center for all products.  
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 Next, I examined the relationship between self-focused upward counterfactual 
thinking and performance with the proposed boundary conditions. I utilized PROCESS 
Model 2 to test these relationships, as it accommodated all variables simultaneously. 
Again, I requested the mean center for the products.  
Then, I utilized PROCESS Model 4 to examine whether simple mediation was 
present, as proposed in Hypotheses 5b. Finally, I addressed the moderated mediation 
hypotheses (H8a – H8e). The results of the hypotheses testing are provided in the 
following section.  
Hypotheses Testing 
 Hypothesis 1 proposed a positive relationship between baseline performance 
discrepancy and self-focused upward counterfactual thinking. After controlling for the 
variables in Model 1, baseline performance discrepancy Model 2 of Table 23, the 
standardized coefficient (β = .17, p = .045) was significant. Therefore, hypothesis 1 was 
supported. As baseline performance discrepancy increased, participants engaged in more 
self-focused upward counterfactual thinking.  
Table 23 
Results of Regression Analysis for Self-Focused Upward Counterfactual Thinking 
 
Self-Focused Upward Counterfactual Thinking 
Variables Model 1a Model 2a 
 β S.E. β S.E. 
Learning Goal Orientation -.07 (3.12) -.08 (3.09) 
Need for Cognition .05 (4.98) .10 (5.08) 
Conscientiousness .07 (4.89) 1.00 (4.90) 
Total Work Experience .06 (.03) .08 (.03) 
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International Status -.16* (8.99) -.15* (8.90) 
Baseline Performance Discrepancy   .17* (.26) 
Adjusted R2 .004  .023  
ΔR2 .034  .024  
Sig. F Change .337   .045*  
a Standardized betas (β) with standard errors (S.E.) are reported.  
Note: N = 169; * p ≤ .05. 
 
 Hypothesis 2 proposed that task-relevant knowledge moderates the influence of  
baseline performance discrepancy on self-focused upward counterfactual thinking, such 
that the influence becomes more positive as task-relevant knowledge increases. Using the 
bootstrap method, moderation is deemed significant if the 95% bias-corrected confidence 
intervals for the interaction terms do not include zero—the equivalent of a significance 
value of p < .05 (Hayes, 2013). As shown in Table 24, the confidence intervals for the 
interaction term, BPD * TRK, include zero, b = .56, 95% CI [-.10, 1.23], t = 1.68, p = 
.09. Thus, hypothesis 2 was not supported.  
 
Table 24 
Results of Moderated Regression for Self-Focused Upward Counterfactual Thinking 
Predictor b SE t p LL 95% CI UL 95% CI 
Constant -7.03 28.31 -.25 .80 -62.94 48.87 
Baseline Perf. Discrepancy 
(BPD) .63 .28 2.24 .03 .07 1.19 
Task-Relevant Knowledge 
(TRK) 
2.48 3.25 .76 .45 -3.95 8.90 
BPD * TRK .56 .34 1.68 .09 -.10 1.23 
Controls:       
Learning Goal Orientation -2.93 3.18 -.92 .36 -9.22 3.36 
Conscientiousness 5.11 4.77 1.07 .29 -4.30 14.52 
Need for Cognition 6.25 5.02 1.25 .21 -3.66 16.15 
Work Experience .04 .03 1.15 .25 -.03 .10 
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Predictor b SE t p LL 95% CI UL 95% CI 
International Status -19.43 6.67 -2.91 .00 -32.60 -6.26 
Note: n = 169; Dependent variable = self-focused upward counterfactual thinking; Unstandardized regression 
coefficients are reported. Bootstrap sample size = 1,000; LL = lower limit; CI = confidence interval; UL = upper 
limit 
Hypothesis 3 proposed that psychological empowerment moderates the influence 
of baseline performance discrepancy on self-focused upward counterfactual thinking, 
such that the influence of baseline performance discrepancy becomes more positive as 
psychological empowerment knowledge increases. As shown in Table 25, the confidence 
intervals for the interaction term, BPD * PE, include zero, b = .61, 95% CI [-.17, 1.40], t 
= 1.54, p = .12. Thus, hypothesis 3 was not supported. 
Table 25 
Results of Moderated Regression for Self-Focused Upward Counterfactual Thinking 
Predictor b SE t p LL 95% CI UL 95% CI 
Constant -7.60 28.53 -.27 .79 -63.95 48.74 
Baseline Perf. Discrepancy 
(BPD) .54 .29 1.84 .07 -.04 1.11 
Psychological 
Empowerment (PE) 
.06 4.00 .01 .99 -7.84 7.96 
BPD * PE .61 .40 1.54 .12 -.17 1.40 
Controls:       
Learning Goal Orientation -.2.76 3.09 -.89 .37 -8.87 3.34 
Conscientiousness 5.66 4.78 1.18 .24 -3.78 15.09 
Need for Cognition 5.68 4.94 1.15 .25 -4.07 15.43 
Work Experience .04 .03 1.10 .27 -.03 .10 
International Status -17.85 6.46 -2.76 .01 -30.60 -5.09 
Note: n = 169; Dependent variable = self-focused upward counterfactual thinking; Unstandardized regression 
coefficients are reported. Bootstrap sample size = 1,000; LL = lower limit; CI = confidence interval; UL = upper 
limit 
 
Hypothesis 4 proposed that feedback specificity moderates the influence of 
baseline performance discrepancy on self-focused upward counterfactual thinking, such 
that the influence of baseline performance discrepancy becomes weaker as feedback 
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specificity increases. As shown in Table 26, hypothesis 4 was not supported, b = -.07, 
95% CI [-1.25, 1.12], t = -.11, p = .91. 
Table 26 
Results of Moderated Regression for Self-Focused Upward Counterfactual Thinking 
Predictor b SE t p LL 95% CI UL 95% CI 
Constant -6.54 27.25 -.24 .81 -60.34 47.27 
Baseline Perf. Discrepancy 
(BPD) .52 .28 1.83 .07 -.04 1.08 
Feedback Specificity 
(FBS) 
4.04 6.41 .63 .53 -8.62 16.69 
BPD * FBS -.07 .60 -.11 .91 -1.25 1.12 
Controls:       
Learning Goal Orientation -2.35 
2.42. 
3.15 -.75 .46 -8.57 3.87 
Conscientiousness 5.85 4.66 1.25 .21 -3.37 15.06 
Need for Cognition 4.76 4.88 .98 .33 -4.87 14.39 
Work Experience ..03 .03 .89 .38 -.04 .10 
International Status -18.14 6.83 -2.66 .01 -31.63 -4.65 
Note: n = 169; Dependent variable = self-focused upward counterfactual thinking; Unstandardized regression 
coefficients are reported. Bootstrap sample size = 1,000; LL = lower limit; CI = confidence interval; UL = upper 
limit 
 
 Together, hypotheses 5a, 6, and 7 proposed that self-focused upward 
counterfactual thinking will positively relate to performance and the relationship will 
become stronger as core self-evaluations (H6) and counterfactual content specificity (H7) 
increase. These were tested simultaneously using PROCESS Model 2. The effect of self-
focused upward counterfactual thinking on performance included zero in the lower and 
upper confidence interval limits (b = -.22, 95% CI [-1.44, 1.00], t = .36, p = .72). 
Likewise, the confidence interval for the interaction term for self-focused upward 
counterfactual thinking and core self-evaluations included zero b = -.22, 95% CI [-1.44, 
1.00], t = .36, p = .72, as did the interaction term for self-focused upward counterfactual 
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thinking and counterfactual content specificity, b = -.22, 95% CI [-1.44, 1.00], t = .36, p = 
.72. Therefore, hypotheses 5a, 6, and 7 were not supported. 
 Hypothesis 5b proposed that baseline performance discrepancy indirectly affects 
performance, through self-focused upward counterfactual thinking. The effect of baseline 
performance discrepancy on performance in isolation (the total effect) was significant, as 
indicated by a significant unstandardized regression coefficient (b = -.86, 95% CI [-.92, -
.79], t = -25.43, p < .01). When self-focused upward counterfactual thinking is 
introduced as well (the direct effect), the total effect changed minimally, (b = -.85, 95% 
CI [-.92, -.78], t = -25.28, p < .01). Based on bootstrap confidence intervals, mediation is 
present if the 95% bias-corrected indirect effect confidence intervals do not include zero. 
This is the equivalent of a significance value of p < .05 (Hayes, 2013). In this case, the 
indirect effect of baseline performance discrepancy on performance through self-focused 
upward counterfactual thinking was negative (-.01) and the confidence interval included 
zero (95% CI [-.02, .01]). Therefore, hypothesis 5b was not supported. 
Regarding the proposed conditional indirect effects (Hypotheses 8a – 8e), the 
preceding results indicated that neither the indirect effect nor the proposed boundary 
conditions on the direct paths in the research model were significant. Likewise, the 
conditional indirect effect hypotheses (H8a – H8e) were not supported.   
In summary, the results of the hypotheses testing indicated that hypothesis 1, the 
relationship between baseline performance discrepancy was supported. The remaining 
hypotheses were not supported.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this study, I integrated established theory from the psychology field—the 
functional theory of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 2008)—to investigate 
how counterfactual thinking influences feedback processing and subsequent performance. 
To this end, I examined whether a performance discrepancy, conveyed to individuals 
through feedback, indirectly effects subsequent performance through self-focused upward 
counterfactual thinking. In addition, I analyzed boundary conditions of such thinking and 
its effects on performance. To examine these relationships, I designed, developed, 
validated, and implemented a leadership skill social interaction simulation. I tested the 
conceptual model using data from a sample of 169 graduate and undergraduate students. I 
validated the research model with a CFA and, subsequently, tested the hypotheses with 
hierarchical regression analysis and the PROCESS macro for SPSS. In this chapter, I 
discuss the findings, implications, and limitations of my research, as well as directions for 
future research. 
Discussion of Findings  
My research represents a step towards theoretically integrating counterfactual 
thinking theory with reflection in the management literature to explain how individuals 
process and learn from feedback that conveys performance discrepancies. Over the last 
decade, scholars have promoted reflection as a way to enhance learning from feedback 
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and experiences (e.g. Ellis et al., 2014). However, prior research has not investigated the 
unique contribution of counterfactual thinking to learning and performance improvement. 
In this study, I sought to address this and to investigate whether counterfactual thinking 
can enhance the effectiveness of performance discrepancy feedback on performance. 
 
Baseline Performance Discrepancy, Self-Focused Upward  
Counterfactual Thinking, and Proposed Boundary Conditions. 
 
As predicted, my research suggests that when individuals reflect on performance 
discrepancies, they will likely engage in self-focused upward counterfactual thinking. In 
doing so, they question how they could have altered their behaviors to attain better 
outcomes. The results, therefore, demonstrate that individuals may attempt to reconcile 
performance discrepancies through self-focused upward counterfactual thoughts. Thus, 
this finding may be an important step towards understanding how to assist individuals 
with processing performance discrepancy feedback and to increase the effectiveness of 
such feedback.  
Task-relevant knowledge. The question remains as to what conditions support and 
hinder self-focused upward counterfactual thinking. I expected that task-relevant 
knowledge would moderate the effect of baseline performance discrepancy on self-
focused upward counterfactual thinking, such that task-relevant knowledge would 
strengthen the relationship. However, my results did not support this hypothesis. This 
finding can be interpreted in three ways: 1) task-relevant knowledge plays no role in 
influencing self-focused upward thoughts, 2) it plays a conditional role in the 
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relationship, or 3) the self-report measure of task-relevant knowledge did not capture 
accurately participants’ task knowledge.   
Task-relevant knowledge can lead to higher levels of self-efficacy, to help 
individuals direct efforts toward goals, and to select behavioral responses from among 
multiple possibilities (Bandura, 1986). Therefore, while it may be possible that task-
relevant knowledge plays no role in influencing self-focused upward counterfactual 
thoughts, theory suggests otherwise. As such, it seems more likely that task-relevant 
knowledge may play a conditional role, rather than no role, in influencing counterfactual 
thoughts. According to Kinciki et al. (2004), the extent to which an individual perceives 
feedback as an accurate representation of his or her performance, predicts whether he or 
she has a desire to respond (i.e. whether an individual wants to respond in line with the 
feedback). Therefore, in the current study, the extent to which individuals perceived their 
performance discrepancies as accurate may have influenced their desire to scan their 
repertoire of knowledge in the pursuit of identifying behavioral alternatives, from which 
they could generate self-focused upward counterfactuals.   
It is also possible that the lack of support for task-relevant knowledge as a 
boundary condition is an artifact of the self-report measurement. Participants may have 
selected those responses that were more socially desirable or more ego flattering than 
other responses, thereby compressing scores at the high end of the scale and restricting 
variance (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).  To this point, 61% of participants rated their task-
relevant knowledge as greater than or equal to 6 out of 7. Because task-relevant 
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knowledge is comprised of facts and knowledge structures that are necessary for 
successful task performance (Costanza et al., 1999, p. 71), one would expect to find a 
significant negative correlation between task-relevant knowledge and baseline 
performance discrepancy. Surprisingly, I did not find such in this study.  
However, recall from Chapter 3 that job experience contributes to the acquisition 
of task-relevant knowledge (Schmidt et al., 1986), and prior research has included job 
experience measures when operationalizing task-relevant knowledge (e.g. Ahearne, 
Mathieu, & Rapp, 2005). Following this practice, I collected supervisory experience as a 
supplemental indicator of task-relevant knowledge. Interestingly, when I tested the 
proposed relationship with supervisory experience as the indicator of task-relevant 
knowledge, I found support for hypothesis 2 (β = .01, p < .05). Likewise, I found a 
significant negative correlation between supervisory experience and baseline 
performance discrepancy (r = -.28, p <.01).  
These findings suggest that either participants did not assess accurately their task-
relevant knowledge or the accumulation of task-relevant knowledge through experience 
(Costanza, 1999) offers a unique contribution to self-focused upward counterfactual 
thinking. Perhaps supervisory experience provides individuals with opportunities to 
organize related facts and information about the skill domain in ways that are more 
meaningful and, thus, increases the influence of knowledge structures on counterfactual 
reflection.    
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Psychological empowerment. Contrary to my prediction, psychological 
empowerment did not moderate the relationship between baseline performance 
discrepancy and self-focused upward counterfactual thinking. Prior research has 
established a theoretical and empirical connection between social power and self-focused 
counterfactuals (Scholl & Sassenberg, 2014). As such, the extent to which one actually 
has the ability to control one’s own and other’s outcomes (i.e. social power) may make 
psychological empowerment less relevant. In the current study, participants’ ability to 
control outcomes was restricted to three predetermined choices. Therefore, although they 
served in the manager role, the extent to which they could actually control their course of 
action was somewhat restricted. Consequently, they may have had lower levels of social 
power, which would have attenuated self-focused counterfactuals. Additionally and as 
previously noted, the manipulations of psychological empowerment antecedents did not 
generate distinct conditions of low and high psychological empowerment. Consequently, 
the variance was limited, with the vast majority (92%) of participants reporting 
psychological empowerment scores greater than or equal to 5 out of 7.   
The empowerment literature offers potential explanations as to why the conditions 
were difficult to manipulate. Specifically, in contrast to structural empowerment, 
psychological empowerment comes from within an individual, not from external 
programs or processes (Spreitzer & Quinn, 2008; Spreitzer, 2008). Although forms of 
structural empowerment, such as those manipulated in this study, are antecedents to 
psychological empowerment, a number of individual differences (e.g. locus of control, 
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self-conscientiousness) also influence psychological empowerment (Seibert et al., 2011). 
It is possible that, for some participants, these factors influenced their sense of 
empowerment more than the manipulations. In the current study, I did not capture those 
individual differences and, thus, I cannot ascertain how many psychological 
empowerment scores may have been impacted by such differences.  
Another possible explanation for the ineffective manipulations lies in the research 
setting and, consistent with job characteristics theory (Hackman & Oldham, 1980), the 
design of the work itself (i.e. the simulation) may have promoted psychological 
empowerment. According to job characteristics theory, five core job characteristics (skill 
variety, task significance, task identify, autonomy, and feedback) influence critical 
psychological states that, in turn, affect motivational outcomes (e.g. empowerment). 
Before measuring psychological empowerment, each interaction was unique in terms of 
its situation and the challenge it posed for the participant. As such, it offered skill variety. 
Similarly, in each interaction, participants’ actions affected others (subordinates), and 
each interaction had a clear outcome. Thus, participants may have perceived task 
significance, as well as task identity. With the freedom to complete the simulation from a 
location of their preference, along with their roles as managers in the simulation, 
participants may have had a high level of autonomy. Finally, with the feedback provided 
by the simulated characters during the interactions, as well as the feedback provided at 
the end of Time 1 tasks, participants may have had sufficient knowledge of their results. 
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If true, then these design properties of the simulation may have promoted psychological 
empowerment, thus contributing to the high scores on this construct.   
On a related note, scholars contend that immersive learning experiences and 
interactivity in virtual worlds can enhance engagement and empowerment (de Freitas, 
Rebolledo-Mendez, Liarokapis, Magoulas, & Poulovassilis, 2010). As such, it is possible 
that the use of a virtual workplace setting affected how participants experienced 
empowerment in the study. To this point, participants may have had difficulty 
differentiating their sense of empowerment as a participant in a virtual simulation from 
their sense of empowerment as a manager in the virtual organization.  
Feedback specificity. I also examined whether feedback specificity influences the 
extent to which individuals engage in self-focused upward counterfactual thinking. I 
argued that high feedback specificity might limit the extent to which individuals explore 
alternative versions of their behaviors and associated performance outcomes. Following 
this line of thought, I hypothesized (hypothesis 4) that as feedback specificity increases, 
the relationship between baseline performance discrepancy and self-focused upward 
counterfactual thinking would weaken. However, I did not find support for this 
relationship and, interestingly, there were no significant mean differences between the 
low- and high feedback specificity groups on self-upward counterfactual thinking, 
reflection word count, nor reflection time.  
To these points, recall that the feedback specificity manipulations did not yield 
low-, moderate-, and high feedback specificity groups and, consequently, I conducted the 
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analysis with low and high conditions only. As such, the variance of this construct was 
somewhat limited. The feedback messages, including the specificity level of each, were 
similar to those used successfully in prior studies (e.g. Feys et al., 2011). Thus, it was 
interesting that the distinctions among the feedback specificity levels were less clear in 
the current study, which is important to consider when interpreting the results of 
hypothesis 4. Perhaps, rather than focusing on the specificity level of the text-based 
performance feedback, which was the focus of the manipulation check and the 
measurement of the construct, it is possible that participants in the current study also 
considered the specificity level of the feedback provided by the simulated characters 
during the interactions. As such, participants may have considered nonverbal feedback 
such as the simulated characters’ facial expressions, as well as other body language, 
when responding to the feedback specificity manipulation check and when considering 
the specificity level while reflecting. Such issues could have affected the results of 
hypothesis 4.     
The lack of support for this hypothesis and the lack of mean differences between 
the low and high feedback specificity groups on reflection word count and reflection time 
are intriguing, particularly when viewed in the context of Goodman et al.’s (2011) 
findings. Their study demonstrated that low feedback specificity led to higher levels of 
explicit information processing. In the current study, feedback specificity had no 
significant effects. A possible explanation for this may be that, whereas Goodman et al.’s 
(2011) study captured information processing via a verbal protocol method, the current 
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study engaged participants in a written reflection activity. Future studies should utilize a 
verbal reflection protocol to examine the effect of feedback specificity on self-focused 
upward counterfactual thinking.  
 
The Effect of Self-Focused Upward Counterfactual Thinking on  
Performance, Proposed Boundary Conditions, and Indirect Effects.  
 
According to the functional theory of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 
2008), counterfactual thinking involves the transfer of information from a causal 
inference and/or the activation of information processing that enhances motivation and 
effort expenditure and, consequently, fuels behavior change. As such, I argued that self-
focused upward counterfactual thinking would positively influence performance 
(hypothesis 5a). Surprisingly, and contrary to theory as well as prior research in the 
psychology literature (e.g. Epstude & Roese, 2008), I did not find this effect in my study.  
Whereas most counterfactual thinking studies in the psychology literature have 
measured the effect of counterfactuals on anagram task performance or academic-related 
tasks such as test performance (e.g. Markman et al., 1993; Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Roese, 
1994), my study examined the impact of self-focused upward counterfactuals on 
leadership task performance. Thus, the lack of support for hypothesis 5a is an important 
finding for integrating counterfactual thinking theory with reflection (e.g. after-event-
reviews) in management studies. Upon further review of the reflection content, it became 
evident that the lack of support for hypothesis 5a is likely attributable to multiple factors. 
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From a design point of view, it was not possible for some participants to 
implement their self-focused upward counterfactuals in Time 2 tasks. For example, one 
participant stated, “One of the biggest things I could have done differently on this activity 
was to complete it in seclusion, because I was easily distracted by other individuals, 
which I feel hindered my ability to fully comprehend the meetings…” (Participant 133). 
Because I instructed participants to complete the study in one sitting, it was not possible 
for this participant to implement the counterfactual in Time 2 tasks as, presumably, it 
would require him or her to disconnect temporarily from the simulation while relocating. 
Similarly, some participants generated self-focused upward counterfactuals about 
alternate statements they would have made to their subordinates, as well as alternate 
rewards and punishments they would have used to attain a better outcome. However, in 
this simulated environment, unless their counterfactuals aligned with one of the three 
available options at each decision point in Time 2 tasks, they were not able to apply their 
counterfactuals to subsequent behaviors.  
From a theoretical point of view, it is possible that the lack of support for 
hypothesis 5a can be attributed to affective contrasts resulting from self-focused upward 
comparisons. For some participants, upward counterfactual thinking may have triggered 
regret and led to distress (Davis, Lehman, Wortman, Cohen Silver, & Thompson, 1995; 
Gilbar & Hevroni, 2007), thereby hindering their performance on Time 2 tasks. Prior 
research suggests that when participants suffer from depression or anxiety, they may be 
particularly prone to such effects of counterfactual thinking (Markman & Miller, 2006).  
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Based on my findings, it is also important to ask whether self-focused upward 
counterfactuals differentially affect performance on closed versus open skills. Closed 
skills (e.g. computer software skills) require individuals to behave in a particular way 
based on a set of rules, whereas open skills (e.g. leadership) are more variable and, thus, 
are associated with multiple behaviors rather than a set of rules (Yelon & Ford, 1999). 
Studies have demonstrated that, individuals often need supportive contexts to transfer 
learning from open skills training to subsequent tasks (Blume, Ford, Baldwin, & Huang, 
2010). In the current study, participants did not have access to a supportive context (i.e. 
mentoring, peer interaction, etc.). As such, this may explain why some participants in the 
current study, which focused on open skill training, did not transfer learning to Time 2 
tasks. Again, this is an important consideration because prior counterfactual thinking 
studies have typically assessed the effects of counterfactual thinking on closed skills (e.g. 
anagram performance). 
Additionally, it is possible that implicit leadership theories (ILT) (e.g. Cronshaw 
& Lord, 1987; Shondrick & Lord, 2010) affected how participants attended to their 
feedback and, consequently, how they responded to it. ILTs are cognitive structures or 
prototypes that specify the traits and abilities that characterize leaders and are developed 
through socialization and past experiences with leaders (Epitropaki, Sy, Martin, Tram-
Quon, & Topakas, 2013). ILTs can influence selective attention, as well as how 
individuals think and act in leadership situations (Junker & van Dick, 2014). 
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To these points, my brief review of reflection content suggested that ILTs may 
have influenced participants’ Time 1 behaviors, as one participant noted that he would 
have been “more encouraging but feared it appeared unprofessional” (Participant 149), as 
well as how participants interpreted and applied feedback in Time 2 tasks. Specifically, 
some participants expressed that to perform better (i.e. be a more effective leader) they 
would need to be “harsher” (Participant 205), “more strict” (Participant 100), and “more 
stern” (Participant 52).  
These were interesting responses, as the feedback directed participants to 
encourage, reward, and engage participants in balanced conversation and participative 
decision-making (see Appendix J).  Based on cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 
1957), if the feedback was not aligned with participants’ ILTs, they would likely try to 
reduce dissonance by avoiding self-focused counterfactuals that targeted the behaviors 
suggested in the feedback and, instead, generate self-focused upward counterfactuals that 
aligned with their cognitive schemas of effective leadership. Consequently, this could 
have lowered their Time 2 performance.     
Finally, Noe (1986) defined motivation to transfer as a trainee’s desire to use the 
knowledge and skills learned in training on the job. Transfer motivation is influenced by 
many factors, including attitudes towards training (Gegenfurtner, Veermans, Festner, & 
Gruber, 2009). As such, if participants approached the study solely as an opportunity to 
earn extra credit, rather than an opportunity to assess, to learn, and to develop their 
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leadership skills, then this could have negatively influenced transfer of learning from 
self-focused upward counterfactuals to Time 2 tasks.  
Based on the lack of support for the direct relationship proposed in hypothesis 5a, 
it is not surprising that hypothesis 5b, which proposed that baseline performance 
discrepancy would indirectly affect performance through self-focused upward 
counterfactual thinking, was also not supported. In light of the preceding discussion, 
there are several potential boundary conditions that merit exploration and may result in a 
positive relationship between self-focused upward counterfactual thinking and 
performance, and a positive indirect effect of baseline performance discrepancy on 
performance through such thinking.  
In the current study, I examined core self-evaluations (hypothesis 6) and 
counterfactual content specificity (hypothesis 7) as boundary conditions of the 
relationship between self-focused upward counterfactual thinking and performance. I 
expected that core self-evaluations would strengthen the relationship, because those with 
high core self-evaluations have increased confidence in their abilities and are more 
capable of mobilizing cognitive resources (Bono & Judge, 2003; Judge et al., 1998). 
Likewise, I expected that as the specificity of counterfactuals increase, the likelihood of 
creating strong links in memory and evoking behavioral change would increase. 
However, I did not find support for these relationships. 
As previously noted, the training transfer literature suggests that environmental 
factors likely play an important role in whether individuals transfer learning from 
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counterfactuals to subsequent work tasks. When such factors are absent, one could expect 
that distal predictors of behavior (e.g. core self-evaluations) are not sufficient to promote 
the transfer of learning to performance. Similarly, recall that some participants generated 
counterfactuals that were beyond the scope of the simulation or misaligned with the 
feedback, consequently making the specificity level of counterfactuals less relevant than 
other considerations.  
 
Academic Contributions and Practitioner Implications 
My primary contribution to the management literature lies in identifying the types 
of thoughts individuals generate when they reflect on performance discrepancies. 
Consequently, this finding advances our knowledge of cognitive processes that are 
relevant for processing and learning from performance discrepancy feedback. To these 
points, my research demonstrates the usefulness of the functional theory of counterfactual 
thinking (Epstude & Roese, 2008) for further exploration of reflection in management 
studies.   
My research also makes methodological contributions. Specifically, I developed 
my research setting with the most robust immersive learning simulation authoring tool 
available (NexLearn, 2016) and deployed it with emerging learning technologies that 
enable one to collect data about a wide range of experiences. In doing so, I created a valid 
and reliable high fidelity interactive simulation that promoted psychological realism in 
behavioral research. As noted in a participant’s reflection, “I especially liked seeing 
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another human on the other side of the desk. This is very realistic because there will most 
likely always be another person sitting on the other side of the desk while you are 
addressing issues as a manager” (Participant 209). The use of social interaction 
simulations in behavioral research appears to be a viable option for balancing scholars’ 
desires to promote psychological realism (Colquitt, 2008) with their need to capture 
standardized observations that reduce biased assessments.  
On a related note, my study advances knowledge about the usefulness of the 
incident isomorphic cloning procedure for the development of alternate problem 
descriptions and social interaction tasks. This approach has been utilized in prior studies 
(e.g. Anseel et al., 2009) for cloning electronic in-basket exercises, and scholars have 
encouraged the investigation of its effectiveness for other types of tasks and content 
(Lievens & Anseel, 2007). As such, the strong support found in my study for the 
effectiveness of the cloning procedure for developing alternate simulation content makes 
an important contribution to the literature on assessment center exercises.  
Recent findings reported in the 2016 Deloitte Human Capital Trends Report 
suggest that 84% executives view learning as an important issue in their organization, and 
44% of executives view it as very important. Thus, my research is important for 
academics and practitioners alike. These executives indicate that their companies are not 
developing skills fast enough nor leaders effectively. All the while, they are urged to 
implement employee-centric, technology-driven learning opportunities, such as 
experiential simulations (Deloitte University Press, 2016).  
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To these points, my research provides practical insights on how to develop 
reliable web-based simulations that can be used for initial skill assessment, technology-
based training, or as a selection tool. Additionally, from a practical point of view, the 
counterfactual reflection intervention could be instrumental for developing employees 
after performance discrepancy feedback, as it can help them to identify alternate 
behavioral choices. Moreover, as seen in the current study, the reflection intervention can 
highlight misunderstandings employees may have about the content of feedback, thereby 
equipping managers with insight to aid in employee development and to minimize the 
impact of such misunderstandings on subsequent performance.  
 
Limitations 
My study is subject to a number of limitations. Foremost to this point, my sample 
was comprised of students, and their diligence, as well as their motivation to learn, while 
completing the simulation tasks and the reflection activity may not be representative of 
those who encounter learning opportunities in an organizational setting. Specifically, the 
reflection content indicated that some participants did not take the tasks seriously and, 
consequently, one may question the quality of the data. Additionally, the sample was 
relatively small and thus limited the power of statistical analyses. It will be important for 
future studies to investigate the usefulness of counterfactual thinking interventions with 
larger and more representative samples. Moreover, my data was collected within the 
same period of time, and I did not include a control group (i.e. no reflection) in this study.  
146 
 
 
 
Potential design limitations should also be noted. Despite the benefits of the social 
interaction simulation I developed for this study, there were also drawbacks to 
conducting the study in a web-based setting. Specifically, a considerable number of 
participants did not complete the study in its entirety. Aside from those who may have 
dropped out due to technical reasons, some participants expressed frustration with the 
time requirement on the reflection activity (i.e. the 5-minute minimum), as well as other 
design aspects such as not being able to replay audio-video content. It is plausible that 
these or similar design properties within the simulation influenced participants’ 
willingness to complete the study.  
My attrition bias analyses revealed age and work experience differences between 
my final sample and those in the attrition groups. Despite this, and as previously noted, I 
do not believe this was a substantial shortcoming. The characteristics of my final sample 
were more closely aligned with my desired sample.  
Concerning the manipulations in this study, as previously stated, the analyses 
revealed that the manipulations were not fully effective. Specifically, the manipulations 
of psychological empowerment did not facilitate distinct conditions of low and high 
psychological empowerment and, overall, the psychological empowerment scores were 
compressed at the high end of the scale. Similarly, the feedback specificity manipulations 
were not fully effective, as there was no significant mean difference between the low and 
moderate groups. As such, I combined the low- and moderate feedback specificity 
groups, which limited the variance on feedback specificity.  
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Finally, I measured the task-relevant knowledge construct with self-report survey 
questions. As such, participants’ perceptions of their task-relevant knowledge may have 
differed from their actual levels of knowledge. Likewise, participants may have selected 
the responses they deemed as most socially desirable.  
 
Directions for Future Research 
Given the limitations of the current study and the lack of counterfactual thinking 
studies in management, there are substantial opportunities for future research on 
counterfactual thinking and reflection in the workplace. Specifically, I recommend that 
researchers devote attention to exploring other feedback characteristics and outcomes that 
may influence reflection. Moreover, future research should focus on ways to maximize 
the effectiveness of counterfactual thinking interventions. I outline these 
recommendations in detail below.  
 Although the findings of this study suggest that feedback specificity does not 
influence the extent to which individuals engage in self-focused upward counterfactual 
thinking, other feedback characteristics such as feedback format, as well as feedback 
outcomes such as feedback reactions are worth exploring. Prior research has 
demonstrated that feedback format influences feedback reactions as well as performance 
improvement. Specifically, Atwater & Brett (2006) investigated how feedback format 
influences individuals’ feedback reactions and found that when individuals received text 
feedback about their leadership behaviors they were more angry, discouraged, and less 
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motivated than those who received numeric and comparative feedback. Moreover, 
feedback reactions were related to performance improvement. To these points, the current 
study included text feedback only and did not measure initial feedback reactions that may 
have affected the reflective processes. Although I did not quantitatively assess 
participants’ feedback reactions, my brief qualitative review of reflection content 
suggests that some participants focused on their reactions while reflecting. For example, 
participants commented, “I am satisfied with my performance rating” (Participant 49), “I 
am disappointed in my performance” (Participant 19), and “I do believe that I did better 
than the grade shown” (Participant 54). To help individuals process feedback more 
effectively, perhaps reflection prompts should vary based on recipients’ initial feedback 
reactions or target specific aspects of reflection (e.g. counterfactual thinking, self-
explanation). In turn, this may lead to more focused reflection and higher levels of 
improvement. A deeper understanding of how feedback format and feedback reactions, as 
well as other feedback characteristics (e.g. feedback frequency) influence reflection are 
important for enhancing its effects on performance. 
Similarly, it is important to identify how design changes to reflection 
interventions may enhance their effectiveness. To this end, the training literature may 
offer insight. For example, according to Noe & Colquitt (2002) individuals’ motivation to 
learn increases when the objectives, purpose, and intended outcomes of a training 
intervention are clearly communicated to participants. The current study did not inform 
participants of the various types of counterfactual thoughts or the associated benefits, as 
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demonstrated in psychology studies (see Epstude & Roese, 2008). Future studies should 
explore the impact of such on the extent to which participants engage in reflection and 
the extent to which they transfer learning to subsequent tasks.   
Another promising avenue for future research is to combine counterfactual 
thinking interventions with prompts that target goal-setting or prefactual thinking. 
Prefactual thoughts are mental simulations about strategies and outcomes before the 
actual outcomes are known (Scholl & Sassenberg, 2014). Thus, individuals engage in 
prefactual thinking prior to engaging in a course of action. In the current study, it appears 
that some participants had difficulty applying what they had learned through reflection to 
subsequent interactions. Perhaps forward-focused activities such as goal-setting or 
prefactual thinking can increase the effectiveness of lessons learned through 
counterfactual thinking.   
Finally, scholars should devote attention to investing the effectiveness of 
counterfactual thinking for feedback processing in applied settings. Because the current 
was set in a virtual workplace, it remains to be seen how environmental factors (e.g. peer 
and supervisor support) influence whether lessons learned through counterfactual 
thinking are applied to subsequent tasks. Scholars should explore such possibilities in 
future studies.    
Conclusion 
This research established a new direction for reflection studies in the management 
literature by integrating counterfactual thinking theory from the psychology literature. 
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While management scholars have highlighted the benefits of reflection for learning from 
feedback and experiences (e.g. Ellis et al., 2014), prior studies have not accounted for the 
unique contribution of counterfactual thinking to learning. Moreover, little focus has been 
given to individual written forms of reflection (e.g. Anseel et al., 2009).  
To enhance our understanding of reflective processes following performance 
discrepancies, my research untangled counterfactual thinking from other aspects of 
reflection (e.g. self-explanation). Additionally, using an individual written reflection 
intervention, I explored whether and under what conditions performance discrepancies 
indirectly effect performance through self-focused upward counterfactual thinking. To 
these ends, I developed and validated a leadership skill social interaction simulation 
capable of reliably assessing leadership skill performance over alternate task rounds.  
My research demonstrated that when individuals encounter performance 
discrepancies they are likely to engage in self-upward counterfactual thinking, during 
which they consider how they could have altered their behaviors to attain better 
performance outcomes. Overall, such thinking has supported learning in prior research in 
the psychology field; however, my research underscores the need to investigate 
environmental factors and intervention design properties that may exert unique effects of 
counterfactual thinking on applied task performance. I anticipate that as our 
understanding of the influence of such factors on this common feature of human 
cognition (Sanna et al., 2003) develops, we will be able to identify ways to enhance the 
effectiveness of performance discrepancy feedback.   
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Appendix A 
Table 27 
Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scale: Management of Personnel Resources 
Management of Personnel Resources: Motivating, developing, and directing people as they work. 
7 
HIGH SKILL PROFICIENCY 
Creates work environment that recognizes and rewards employee goal accomplishment and shows sensitivity to 
employee personal needs 
Develops employees by recognizing their strengths,  correcting their weaknesses, and affirming their sense of 
competency 
Proactively offers and assists employees in developing insight, as well as objective and descriptive information, that 
facilitates performance improvement and skill development 
Engages employees in participative decision-making and utilizes active listening and questioning techniques to create 
balanced conversations for constructing and implementing development plans 
6 
5 MODERATE SKILL PROFICIENCY 
 Attempts to motivate others by providing feedback and encouragement and being aware of personal needs  
4 Recognizes and points out to employees their areas of strengths and weaknesses 
 Provides specific directions to employees to facilitate performance improvement and skill development  
3 Creates performance plans which include work standards, goals, and objectives  
 LOW SKILL PROFICIENCY 
Does not motivate or encourage others to exert more effort on task accomplishment or recognize personal needs 
Unaware of differences in employee work performance or overreacts to subordinate weaknesses and fails to recognize 
strengths 
Fails to provide and to help employees develop useful information and clear performance standards for performance 
improvement and skill development 
Rejects employees' input, fails to demonstrate active listening and questioning techniques that engage employees in 
two-way developmental conversations  
 
2 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
1
7
3
 
Table 28 
Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scale: Negotiation 
 
Negotiation: bringing others together and trying to reconcile differences 
 HIGH SKILL PROFICIENCY 
Redirects focus of conflict towards collective goals and needs/interests of multiple parties 
Pursues conflict resolution by establishing and nurturing positive, open communication that includes active listening 
techniques 
Generates creative solutions to address challenges and conflicts and to meet the needs of multiple parties 
Proactively seeks the input and suggestions of others to resolve conflict 
Skillfully maintains composure and responds calmly in conflict situations 
7 
 
6 
 
 
5 
MODERATE SKILL PROFICIENCY 
Acknowledges the needs/interests of others during conflicts 
Responds to requests for information during conflicts 
Proposes alternative responses to resolve conflict  
Acknowledges the input of and suggestions of others in conflicts 
Avoids strong emotional reactions in conflict situations 
 
4 
 
3 
 LOW SKILL PROFICIENCY 
Fails to acknowledge the needs/interests of others during conflicts 
Withholds information that can lead to conflict resolution  
Attempts to control and manipulate others, pressures others to accept unreasonable conflict solutions  
Loses self-control, jumps to conclusions during conflict situations which complicates stressful situations 
Avoids or rejects inputs and suggestions of others in conflict situations 
2 
 
1 
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Appendix B 
 
Counterfactual Thinking Reflection Prompt  
 
Often after something happens, we tend to think about what could have been 
different that would have brought about a different outcome to the event. For example, 
after receiving poor performance feedback on a course project, one may think, “If only 
my professor had provided clearer instructions, I could have earned a higher grade.” Or 
you may think, “If only I didn’t procrastinate, I could have done a better job with this 
project.” You could also think, “At least the project wasn't weighted heavily in my final 
course grade, or it would have lowed my GPA.”  Think about the performance feedback 
you just received. Please use as much or as little of the space below to list any thoughts 
about what could have been different to lead to a different performance outcome. Many 
participants find it easier to use a bullet-point format to list their thoughts. When sharing 
your thoughts, please use complete sentences. 
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Appendix C 
Table 29 
The Core Self-Evaluation Scale  
(Judge et al., 2003) 
1 I am confident I get the success I deserve in life.  
2 Sometimes I feel depressed. (r) 
3 When I try, I generally succeed. 
4 Sometimes when I fail I feel worthless. (r) 
5 I complete tasks successfully. 
6 Sometimes, I do not feel in control of my work. (r) 
7 Overall, I am satisfied with myself. 
8 I am filled with doubts about my competence. (r) 
9 I determine what will happen in my life. 
10 I do not feel in control of my success in my career. (r) 
11 I am capable of coping with most of my problems. 
12 There are times when things look pretty bleak and hopeless to me. (r) 
r= reversed scored 
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Appendix D 
Table 30 
The Efficient Assessment of Need for Cognition  
(Cacioppo et al., 1984) 
1 I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
2 I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of 
thinking.  
3 Thinking is not my idea of fun. (r) 
4 I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is 
sure to challenge my thinking abilities. (r) 
5 I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will 
have to think in depth about something.  
6 I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
7 I only think as hard as I have to. (r) 
8 I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones. (r) 
9 I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them. (r) 
10 The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
11 I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
12 Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much. (r) 
13 I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles I have to solve.  
14 The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.  
15 I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not require much thought. 
16 I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot 
of mental effort. (r) 
17 It’s enough for me that something gets done; I don’t care how or why it 
works. (r) 
18 I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me 
personally.  
r= reversed scored 
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Appendix E 
Table 31 
Learning Goal Orientation Subscale  
(VandeWalle et al., 2001) 
1 I prefer challenging and difficult classes so that I’ll learn a great deal. 
 
2 I truly enjoy learning for the sake of learning. 
 
3 I like classes that really force me to think hard. 
 
4 I’m willing to enroll in a difficult course if I can learn a lot by taking it. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
178 
 
 
 
Appendix F 
Table 32 
Revised NEO-PI Inventory (NEO-PI-R) Conscientiousness Scale Items 
(Costa & McCrae, 1992) 
I see myself as… 
1 Self-disciplined 
 
2 Competent 
 
3 Orderly 
 
4 Dutiful 
 
5 Deliberate 
 
6 Achievement oriented 
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Appendix G 
 
Table 33 
Task-Relevant Knowledge Scale  
 
In a supervisory role, individuals often engage in many tasks to manage personnel 
resources. Several tasks commonly performed to manage personnel resources are 
provided below. Please rate the extent to which your professional training and experience 
provides you the knowledge to:  
1 Create a work environment that recognizes employee goal accomplishment 
2 Create a work environment that rewards employee goal accomplishment 
3 Create a work environment that shows sensitivity to employee needs 
4 Develop employees by recognizing their strengths 
5 Develop employees by correcting their weaknesses 
6 Develop employees by affirming their sense of competency 
7 Assist employees in developing insight that facilitates performance 
improvement 
8 Assist employees in developing information that facilitates performance 
improvement  
9 Engage employees in participative decision-making for constructing 
development plans 
10 Engage employees in participative decision-making for implementing 
development plans 
11 Utilize communication techniques that create balanced conversations for 
constructing and implementing development plans 
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Appendix H 
Table 34 
 Feedback Specificity Manipulation Check  
(Goodman et al., 2004, 2011) 
1 I received detailed feedback about my performance as a Special Order Manager. 
 
2 I was given specific feedback about my performance as a Special Order Manager. 
 
 
Table 35 
Adapted Manipulation Check for the Current Study 
1 I received detailed feedback about my performance as a manager. 
 
2 I was given specific feedback about my performance as a manager. 
 
Note: Adaptations indicated in italics.   
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Appendix I 
Table 36 
Psychological Empowerment in the Workplace Scale  
(Spreitzer, 1995) 
Items measuring meaning dimension 
1 The work I do is very important to me. 
2 My job activities are personally meaningful to me. 
3 The work I do is meaningful to me. 
Items measuring competence dimension 
4 I am confident about my ability to do my job. 
5 I am self-assured about my capabilities to perform my work activities. 
6 I have mastered the skills necessary for my job. 
Items measuring self-determination dimension 
7 I have significant autonomy in determining how I do my job. 
8 I can decide on my own how to go about doing my work. 
9 I have considerable opportunity for independence and freedom in how I do 
my job. 
Items measuring impact dimension 
10 My impact on what happens in my department is large. 
11 I have a great deal of control over what happens in my department. 
12 I have significant influence over what happens in my department. 
 
Table 37 
Adapted Psychological Empowerment Scale for the Current Study 
Items measuring meaning dimension 
1 The work I do as a manager is very important to me. 
2 My job activities as a manager are personally meaningful to me. 
3 The work I do as a manager is meaningful to me. 
Items measuring competence dimension 
4 I am confident about my ability to do my job as a manager. 
5 I am self-assured about my capabilities to perform my work activities as a 
manager. 
6 I have mastered the skills necessary for my job as a manager. 
Items measuring self-determination dimension 
7 I have significant autonomy in determining how I do my job as a manager. 
8 I can decide on my own how to go about doing my work as a manager. 
9 I have considerable opportunity for independence and freedom in how I do 
my job as a manager. 
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Items measuring impact dimension 
10 My impact on what happens in my department is large. 
11 I have a great deal of control over what happens in my department. 
12 I have significant influence over what happens in my department. 
Note: Adaptations indicated in italics.  
